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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis seeks to ascertain whether the rule of law limits the legislative power of State 
legislatures (a question posted in Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1). It argues that the 
rule of law, understood as a legal principle, is not presently recognised as a constraint on the 
capacity of the New South Wales Legislature. It further argues that it is unlikely that the rule of law 
will be recognised as such a constraint. 
 
This thesis starts with consideration of the concept of the rule of law. It surveys conceptions of the 
rule of law that have informed Australian jurists and conceptions advanced by those jurists. It does 
so to show how theoretical conceptions have informed judicial consideration of the rule of law. It 
also surveys the aspects and requirements of the rule of law that have been recognised by the High 
Court of Australia. It demonstrates that those aspects correspond to the theoretical conceptions. It 
also distinguishes those aspects and requirements connected to legality from other identified 
aspects and requirements.  
 
This thesis then shows that the rule of law has not been recognised as a constraint on the power 
conferred on the New South Wales Legislature by the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). It examines 
the constraints imposed by the Constitution Act 1902 and the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution.  
 
In light of the conclusion that the rule of law is not a recognised constraint, this thesis assesses 
whether the rule of law might be recognised as such a constraint. It evaluates the possibility that 
the Commonwealth Constitution might provide a basis for the imposition of the rule of law. To do 
so, it considers Justice Dixon’s acknowledgement, in Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, that the rule of law is a traditional conception assumed by the 
Commonwealth Constitution. It also examines the relationship between the rule of law and 
Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution and the implications that relationship might have 
for State legislatures. It shows that any constraint derived from Chapter III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution is unlikely to extend beyond securing the legality of governmental action. This thesis 
also assesses whether the common law is capable of imposing the rule of law as a constraint on 
legislative capacity. It shows that such a constraint will be weak in the face of considered action by 
a State legislature. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the rule of law is only likely to be recognised 
as a constraint when a court is confronted with an extreme law.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE MOMCILOVIC QUESTION 
 
‘The Charter draws attention to another question. It is whether the rule of law, upon which 
the principle of proportionality is founded, may itself imply a limitation. 
 
This is a large question concerning the limits, if any, which the rule may effect upon the 
grant of legislative power to State parliaments. It may also involve consideration of the 
Australian Constitution.’1  
 
 
I   THE QUESTION 
 
The question asked above — whether the rule of law limits the legislative power of State 
parliaments — is the subject of this thesis. 
 
In Momcilovic, Justices Crennan and Kiefel, of the High Court of Australia (‘High Court’), 
asked their question in the course of considering the effect of a declaration made under the 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). Their Honours noted that 
the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (‘Charter’) adopted in that Act is not a 
‘constitutional document’ because it did not compel successor legislatures to enact 
consistent legislation. 2  Nor did it empower the Supreme Court of Victoria to ‘declare 
invalid legislation which is inconsistent with a Charter right’.3  This raised the question of 
the Victorian Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to scrutinise the validity of Victorian legislation 
other than when it is alleged to breach Commonwealth or State constitutional 
requirements.  
1  Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1  ('Momcilovic '), 215-6 [562]-[563] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
2 Ibid 215 [561]. 
3 Ibid. 
1  
 
                                                 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel observed that, according to current authorities, the Victorian 
Supreme Court lacked ‘power to declare legislation invalid for excess of power in the sense 
that it is manifestly disproportionate to its purpose’.4  Accepting that the State legislatures 
have legislative power equivalent to that the ‘Parliament of the United Kingdom [‘United 
Kingdom Parliament’] might have exercised’, 5  Crennan and Kiefel JJ noted three 
purported constraints on State legislative power: (i) proportionality; (ii) fundamental 
common law rights; and (iii) the rule of law. Justices Crennan and Kiefel dismissed 
proportionality as a constraint. Their Honours noted that, following Union Steamship 
Company of Australia v King,6  it is settled that the State Supreme Courts lack power to 
declare invalid legislation that is ‘manifestly disproportionate to its purpose’, in the sense 
of not securing the ‘welfare and the public interest’.7  Crennan and Kiefel JJ did not dismiss 
fundamental common law rights outright. Their Honours noted the lingering suggestion 
that ‘some common law rights might be “so deep” that Parliament cannot override them’.8 
Both these limits will be further considered later in this thesis. Proportionality — in the 
sense of not securing the peace, welfare, or good government — will be considered further 
in part III of chapter 4. Fundamental common law rights will be considered in part III of 
chapter 6. That consideration will confirm that, to date, neither of these contested limits 
has been enforced by an Australian court. 
 
The third potential limit — the rule of law — is the focus of this thesis. In Momcilovic, 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel stated that the Victorian Charter drew attention to ‘whether 
the rule of law, upon which the principle of proportionality is founded, may itself imply a 
limitation’.9  Crennan and Kiefel JJ observed that the question of whether the rule of law 
limits the State legislatures is a ‘large question’ that was likely to involve the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution (‘Commonwealth Constitution’).1 0 Noting that 
the Commonwealth Constitution lacks an equivalent to the guarantees contained in 
article 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, Crennan and 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid 215 [562] (footnote omitted). 
6  Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Limited v King (1988) 166 CLR 1  (‘Union Steamship 
Company’). 
7  Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 215-6 [561]-[562]. 
8 Ibid 216 [562]. 
9 Ibid. The preamble to the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 states the Charter is 
founded on principles including recognition that ‘human rights are essential in a democratic and inclusive 
society that respects the rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom’. 
1 0 Ibid, 216 [563]. 
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Kiefel JJ observed that the protection of life, liberty, and property was left to the rule of 
law1 1  which, as Justice Dixon observed in the Australian Communist Party case,1 2  ‘is an 
assumption in accordance with which the [Commonwealth] Constitution is framed’.1 3  
 
As these potential limits had not been ventilated in argument, Justices Crennan and Kiefel 
set them aside. 
 
II   ANSWERING THE MOMCILOVIC QUESTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the ‘large question’ of whether the rule of law limits 
State legislative power (the ‘Momcilovic question’).1 4  The lines of inquiry suggested by 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel will be pursued in the following chapters. These lines include 
the possibilities that the rule of law is (i) a binding implication that can be drawn from the 
Commonwealth Constitution and (ii) a fundamental common law principle. This exercise 
includes assessing the likelihood of these possibilities being recognised as constraints on 
State legislative capacity. Accordingly, the Momcilovic question will be approached as a 
legal question. Central to this approach is the possibility that the rule of law may be a 
‘principle or doctrine’ that has ‘some legal force’.1 5  
 
The first possibility noted above — that the rule of law can be implied from the 
Commonwealth Constitution — will be examined in chapter 5. Two related suggestions 
regarding the relationship between the rule of law and the Commonwealth Constitution 
will be considered. The first, which was noted above, is Justice Dixon's recognition of the 
rule of law as a traditional conception assumed by the Commonwealth Constitution. This 
will be shown, ultimately, not to constrain State legislative capacity; because, as will be 
argued in section C of part I, assumed conceptions should be understood as aiding 
constitutional interpretation. The second, which was also noted by Justices Crennan and 
1 1 Ibid; citing Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 
1898, 664-91 . 
1 2 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1  (‘Australian Communist Party’). 
1 3 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [563]; citing Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 
(discussed in part I of chapter 5 below). 
1 4 This question was expressly  set aside by  Burton Crawford in her recent study  of the relationship between 
the rule of law and the Australian constitution; see Lisa Burton Crawford, The Rule of Law and the 
Australian Constitution (The Federation Press, 2017), 6. 
1 5 Ibid 175 (emphasis in original). 
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Kiefel, 1 6  is that the rule of law is an implication available for derivation from the 
Commonwealth Constitution. This suggestion will be shown, in part II, to provide a 
significant foundation for the recognition of the rule of law as a constraint on the capacity 
of the Commonwealth Parliament. However, that limit will not necessarily extend to 
constrain the State legislatures. Whether an identified constraint on State legislative 
capacity — the constitutional entrenchment of the State Supreme Courts — might secure 
the rule of law will be examined in part III. That consideration will show that, if it were to 
be recognised as a constraint, the constraint is unlikely to extend beyond those 
requirements necessary to secure the legality of governmental action. The analysis 
undertaken in chapter 5 also supports an argument that some elements of the rule of law 
are secured from legislative action by recognised constitutional implications. 
 
The second possibility noted above — that the rule of law is a fundamental common law 
principle — is the focus of chapter 6. Whether the rule of law is so fundamental to the 
common law that a purported law enacted by a State legislature that sufficiently infringed 
or abrogated it could be declared void will be examined in part III. Further, the complexly 
interwoven relationship between the rule of law and the principle of legality will be 
examined in part IV. That examination focuses on the suggestion that the quasi-
constitutional status of the rule of law might shield the rule of law from legislative 
abrogation. Both of these options are, ultimately, weak in the face of considered action by a 
State legislature. 
 
Returning to chapters 2 and 3, they are concerned with what Justices Crennan and Kiefel 
meant by the rule of law. This consideration commences, in part II of chapter 2, with a 
survey of the influential conceptions of the rule of law presented by Dicey, Hayek, and Lord 
Bingham. Then, in part III, Justice Heydon’s conception of the rule of law is compared to 
those conceptions. This analysis provides insight into how a senior Australian jurist’s 
conception of the rule of law corresponds to those conceptions. It also indicates how the 
theoretical conceptions may influence jurists. The influential conceptions — especially 
Lord Bingham’s — provide the basis of an argument that the rule of law should be 
understood as a shorthand phrase that encapsulates a disparate group of aspects and 
requirements. The elements of the rule of law that judges, especially members of the High 
1 6 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [563]; citing inter alia Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 
CLR 47 6 ('Plaintiff S157/2002'), 492 [31] (Gleeson CJ), 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and 
Hay ne JJ); South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1  ('Totani'), 155-6 [423] (Crennan and Bell JJ). 
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Court, have identified are surveyed in chapter 3. Anticipating arguments developed in later 
chapters, those requirements connected to legality (which might be incorporated within a 
constitutional conception of the rule of law) and those associated with the characteristics 
of courts, are distinguished from other identified requirements. The identification of the 
elements that have been judicially recognised is relevant to the question of whether specific 
elements of the rule of law, distinct from the broader concept, are secured from legislative 
action. 
 
Chapter 4 confirms that the rule of law is not a recognised constraint on the capacity of the 
New South Wales Legislature. The survey of current authorities focuses on the legal scope 
of the power conferred by s 5 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) (‘Constitution Act’), 
including the limits imposed by the Commonwealth Constitution. The limited ability of the 
rule of law as a political ideal to constrain State legislative power will also be noted. The 
conclusions reached in chapter 4 prompt the investigations conducted in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Finally, the analysis in the earlier chapters will be drawn together in chapter 7 to provide 
an answer to the Momcilovic question. While a court could recognise the rule of law as a 
constraint on State legislative power, it will be argued that only an extreme law could incite 
a court to take the step of enforcing that recognition by declaring a law void. This 
requirement, it will be further argued, limits the likelihood that the rule of law will be 
recognised to limit State legislative capacity. 
 
III   METHODOLOGICAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL NOTES 
 
A   Choice of Jurisdiction 
For the purposes of this thesis, New South Wales has been chosen as a proxy for the other 
States. That choice was informed by the extensive judicial consideration of the validity of 
its laws and the associated academic commentary. It avoids the difficulties, and 
distractions, that would arise if an abstract State legislature was considered. 
  
5 
 
B   References to Legislatures and Constitutions 
Following the Constitution Act, the Legislature referred to in s 3 of that Act will be referred 
to as the ‘New South Wales Legislature’. Consistently, the State legislative bodies will be 
referred to as ‘legislatures’ rather than ‘parliaments’. ‘Parliament’, for clarity, will be 
reserved for the Commonwealth Parliament1 7  and the United Kingdom Parliament. 
 
‘New South Wales constitution’ should be understood as referring to the ‘thicker’1 8  
constitutional arrangements in New South Wales. That is, the Constitution Act and the 
other statutes that establish the various institutions through which government operates. 
 
As noted earlier, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia will be referred to as 
the ‘Commonwealth Constitution’. Where appropriate, it will be distinguished from the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) which will be referred to as the 
‘Commonwealth Constitution Act’. Consistently with the distinction between the 
Constitution Act and the New South Wales constitution, the thinner Commonwealth 
Constitution will be distinguished from the thicker Australian constitution. The Australian 
constitution incorporates the Commonwealth Constitution, alongside the State 
constitution acts,1 9  various British constitutional statutes,2 0 and the common law.2 1  At its 
thickest, the Australian constitution incorporates the governmental institutions that are 
created by and give effect to this legal structure. 
 
1 7  Established by  s 1  of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
1 8 The distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constitutions is derived from Raz: see Joseph Raz, 'On the 
Authority  and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries' in Larry  Alexander (ed), 
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 152, 153. 
1 9 In addition to the Constitution Act, the State constitution acts include the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and 
the Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA), the Constitution Act 1934 (SA), the Constitution Act 1934 
(Tas), the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), and the Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld). 
20 Such as the Australia Act 1986 (UK). For discussion of constitutional statutes in the Australian context, see 
New South Wales v Cadia Holdings Pty Limited (2009) 257  ALR 528, 540 [58]-[60] (Spigelman CJ); 
considered in Cadia Holdings Pty Limited v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 217-9 [54]-[58] (French 
CJ). 
21  See Nicholas Aroney et al, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia: History, Principle and 
Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
 
WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? 
 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel did not outline their conception of the ‘rule of law’ in 
Momcilovic. This is unhelpful because, as this chapter will show, the rule of law is a 
‘concept the precise content of which is hotly disputed’.2 2  
 
This chapter starts to explore what Justices Crennan and Kiefel might have meant by the 
rule of law when they proposed it as a limit on State legislative power. It starts by looking 
at the traditional understanding of the rule of law; that the rule of law is a political ideal (in 
part I). In part II, three significant expositions of that understanding — those espoused by 
Dicey, Hayek, and Lord Bingham — will be considered. These expositions gain their 
significance, for the purposes of this thesis, from their influence on members of the High 
Court. This will be explored, in part III, in the course of surveying Justice Heydon's 
conception of the rule of law. Justice Heydon serves as an example of how a judge might 
conceive the rule of law. In preparation for chapter 3, this chapter concludes with an 
argument in favour of understanding the rule of law as a convenient shorthand for a 
disparate collection of elements. Chapter 3 will survey the elements that have been 
judicially recognised. 
 
The broader task undertaken in this chapter and chapter 3 is warranted by the need to 
ascertain what content might be attributable to a conception of the rule of law that has 
legal force. The potential content of the rule of law is relevant to the consideration, in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis, of how the rule of law, or its constituent elements, may 
constrain the capacity of State legislatures. 
  
22 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91  ALJR 890 ('Graham'), 909 [82] 
(Edelman J). 
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I   THE RULE OF LAW AS A POLITICAL IDEAL 
 
‘What is the rule of law?’ can be briefly answered: it is a political ideal. Understood thus, 
the rule of law is a ‘condition to be achieved under human governments’.2 3  Tamanaha 
claimed that it is ‘the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today’.2 4  Allan 
suggested that a polity can only aspire to fully conforming with its requirements.2 5  
Loughlin went further, stating that the rule of law ‘presents itself as an impossible ideal’.2 6  
But that answer says nothing about the ideal’s content. 
 
The core of the ideal is captured in the canonical phrase ‘a government of laws, not men’.2 7  
The ideal this phrase encompasses has, not necessarily with appropriate caution,2 8 been 
attributed to Plato2 9  and Aristotle3 0 in order to claim their endorsement. The ideal has long 
23 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law  (Oxford University Press, 2005), 1 . 
24 Brian Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4. 
25 T R S Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice (Oxford University  Press, 1993), 22-3. Allan’s conception of the rule 
of law has been extensively  considered by  Burton Crawford; see Burton Crawford, above n 14. Elements of 
Allan’s conception will be further considered in part III of chapter 5 and part II of chapter 6 below. 
26 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public  Law  (Oxford University Press, 2010), 312, 337. 
27  Marbury v Madison 5 US (1  Cranch) 137  (1803), 163 (Marshall CJ); cited in Richard Fallon, '"The Rule of 
Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse' (1997) 97(1) Columbia Law Review  1 , 3. Fallon endorsed 
Radin’s suggestion that this should be rephrased as ‘not of indiv iduals’; see Margaret Jane Radin, 
'Reconsidering the Rule of Law' (1989) 69(4) Boston University Law Review  7 81. Hayek traced the origin of 
the phrase to James Harrington; F A Hay ek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (National Bank of Egypt, 
1955), 8; see James Harrington, 'The Commonwealth of Oceana' in J G A Pocock (ed), The Commonwealth of 
Oceana and A System of Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 1  , 8-9, 20-1. Toohey  J noted, extra-
judicially , that the phrase appears in article XXX of the first part of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts; John Toohey, 'A Government of Laws, and Not of Men' (1993) 4(3) Public Law Review  158, 
158. 
28 Tamanaha advised caution in order to ‘avoid the temptation of placing too modern of a spin on Plato and 
Aristotle’; Tamanaha, above n 24, 9-10; compare John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (Simon 
Schuster, 2009), 46. 
29 ‘Where the law is subject to some other authority  and has not of its own, the collapse of the state, in my 
v iew, is not far off; but if the law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the 
situation is full of promise’: Plato, The Laws (Trevor Saunders trans, Penguin Books Limited, first published 
1970, 2004 ed, 2004), 128 [715d]; quoted in Tamanaha, above n 24, 8-9; see also Danielle Allen, The World 
of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens (Princeton University Press, 2000), 179-90. 
30 ‘The rule of law is therefore preferable, according to the view we are stating, to that of a single citizen’: 
Aristotle, Politics (Ernest Barker trans, Oxford University Press, 1998), 127  [1287a]; quoted in Hayek, above 
n 27 , 7 ; see also Toohey , above n 27 , 159; Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law  (Penguin, 2010), 3. Scalia J 
agreed with Aristotle’s v iew that ‘[r]ightly  constituted laws should be [the final] sovereign’: Antonin Scalia, 
'The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules' (1989) 55(4) University of Chicago Law Review  1175, 1176, 1182. 
Waldron argued that Aristotle was hesitant in respect of the rule of law; see Jeremy Waldron, 'Is the Rule of 
Law an Essentially  Contested Concept (in Florida)?' (2002) 21(2) Law and Philosophy 137 , 141-2; see also: 
Judith Shklar, 'Political Theory  and the Rule of Law' in Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (eds), The 
Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell, 1987) 1 . 
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received judicial endorsement. Justice Berkeley, in the Ship Money case, contrasted the 
rule of law with the rule of government.3 1  Chief Justice Marshall set the ideal as one 
against which the government of the United States could be measured.3 2  More recently, 
Justice Scalia endorsed this conception of the rule of law in the course of arguing that 
judges should submit their personal discretion to the maintenance of the general rule of 
law.3 3  Locally, Justice Blackburn, sitting in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, 
employed the ideal as a standard when weighing evidence concerning whether the 
Rirratjingu and Gumatj clans, of Arnhem land, possessed a system of traditional law.3 4  
 
The core of the ideal is contentious. Loughlin argued that it suffers from circularity: since 
laws lack agency, they require individuals to implement them.3 5  Thus the ability of law to 
rule over men is contingent on individual conduct. Justice Kirby argued, extra-judicially, 
that conceiving the rule of law as merely the government of law is insufficient. Taking aim 
at the reduction of law to ‘the law of rules’, Kirby J emphasised the problem that such rules 
‘may be unjust, out-of-date, inefficient, lacking in balance, inattentive to later knowledge 
or contrary to universal human rights’.3 6  This deficiency, Kirby J suggested, could be 
corrected by supplementing the law of rules with a measure of justice.3 7  The disagreement 
over whether the rule of law should incorporate justice as a substantive3 8 requirement 
extends beyond Justice Kirby’s disagreement with Justice Scalia. 3 9  It, and the other 
31 R v Hampden (1637) 3 Howell State Trials 825, 1287. Berkeley J observed that ‘things that may not be 
done by  the rule of law may be done by  the rule of government’. Sedley, commenting on R (Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 2 WLR 583, noted that it took the remainder of the 
17th century  to ‘establish that government enjoyed no such extra-legal power’; Stephen Sedley, 'The Supreme 
Court's Judgment' (2017) 39(5) (2 March 2017) London Review of Books 26. 
32 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137  (1803), 163. 
33 Scalia, above n 30. 
34 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Limited (1971) 17  FLR 141, 267 ; cited in John Basten, 'Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law' (2009) 11 Newcastle Law Review 31 , 31-2. 
35 Loughlin, above n 26, 312. 
36 Michael Kirby , 'The Rule of Law Beyond the Law of Rules' (2010) 33(3) Australian Bar Review  195, 204. 
This attack draws on Raz’s criticisms of some conceptions of the rule of law; see Jospeh Raz, 'The Rule of Law 
and Its Virtue' in The Authority of Law  (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 210. 
37  Kirby , above n 36, 204. 
38 Craig distinguished between ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ conceptions of the rule of law; see Paul Craig, 
'Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework' (1997) (3) Public Law 
467 ; see further Tamanaha, above n 24, 91-113. 
39 For example, Spigelman CJ argued that the rule of law, at a minimum, requires that ‘the rights and duties 
of persons in the community, and the consequences of breach of any such rights and duties must be capable 
of objective determination’: James Spigelman, 'Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence' (2008) 
17(3) Journal of Judicial Administration 139, 140. Spigelman CJ argued against incorporating ‘forms of 
government, economic sy stems, and human rights’ into the rule of law, lest the concept become ‘less useful’; 
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contests over the nature of the rule of law, 4 0 led Jeremy Waldron to argue that it is an 
‘essentially contested concept’.4 1  
 
II   DICEY, HAYEK, BINGHAM 
 
Fully charting these debates is beyond the scope of this thesis.4 2  It is, however, useful to 
briefly sketch three influential contributions to the debate. The contributions of Dicey, 
Hayek, and Bingham provide examples of the range of conceptions of the rule of law.4 3  To 
this extent they indicate what the rule of law might mean. 
 
Further, Dicey, Hayek, and Bingham’s conceptions are salient because, as will be shown 
below, they have informed dicta offered by members of the High Court. This indicates that 
members of the High Court have given them weight and suggests that they are likely to 
continue to inform judicial consideration of what the rule of law requires. The absence of 
judicial references to other conceptions suggests that they may not prove as influential.  
James Spigelman, 'The Rule of Law in the Asian Region' in Tim Castle (ed), Speeches of a Chief Justice: 
James Spigelman 1998-2008 (CS2N Publishing, 2008), 54. 
40 See Fallon, above n 27 , 1 . 
41  Waldron, above n 30, 140. Waldron drew on Gallie’s account of essentially contested concepts (see W B 
Gallie, 'Essentially  Contested Concepts' (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167) while 
considering the contradictory  invocations of the rule of law in the debate over the result of the ballot in the 
State of Florida after the presidential election in 2000. Waldron quoted Justice Stevens’ observation that 
America’s ‘confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law’ was the true loser of Bush v 
Gore 531  US 98 (2000) as an example of such an invocation. 
42 And was recently undertaken by Tamanaha; see Tamanaha, above n 24. 
43 The rule of law as a concept can be distinguished from the various conceptions of it that have been, and 
will continue to be, advanced. Craig employed this distinction while analysing formal and substantive 
conceptions of the rule of law; see Craig, above n 38. 
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A   Dicey’s Conception 
Dicey formulated the canonical conception of the rule of law. 4 4  He considered that it was a 
distinctive feature of the English constitution,4 5  alongside the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.4 6  Dicey considered the rule of law encompassed ‘three distinct though kindred 
conceptions’:4 7  the requirements of (i) legality, (ii) equality, and (iii) judicial determination 
of disputes. 
 
1   The First Sense of the Rule of Law: Legality 
Dicey argued the first sense of the rule of law was: 
 
that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or in goods except for a 
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of 
the land.48 
 
This sense recognises a vital constraint on the legitimate exercise of governmental power: 
the need for legal authorisation.4 9  It also distinguishes the exercise of a power to punish 
from the ‘exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of 
constraint’.5 0 Dicey was justifiably concerned that the conferral of discretionary powers on 
governmental officials allowed arbitrariness. This risk meant that discretionary powers 
jeopardised the security (the ‘legal freedom’) of those who might be affected by their 
exercise.5 1   
44 Arndt argued that Dicey’s conception of the rule of law explicated ideas that had been developed by  Hearn; 
see Heinz Arndt, 'The Origins of Dicey ’s Concept of the “Rule of Law"' (1957) 31(3) Australian Law Journal 
117; discussing William Hearn, The Government of England (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dy er, 1867), 54. 
45 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan & Co Limited, 9th ed, 
1952), 188. 
46 Ibid 35, 39. 
47  Ibid 187-8. 
48 Ibid 188. 
49 See Jeffrey  Jowell, 'The Rule of Law and Its Underly ing Values' in Jeffrey  Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), 
The Changing Constitution (Oxford University  Press, Seventh ed, 2011), 1 ; compare Derry  Irv ine, 'The Spirit 
of Magna Carta Continues to Resonate in Modern Law' (2003) 119(April) Law Quarterly Review  227  , 243; 
quoted in Murray Gleeson, 'Legality - Spirit and Principle' (Second Magna Carta Lecture delivered at New 
South Wales Parliament House, 20 November 2003) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_20nov.html>. 
50 Dicey , above n 45. 
51  Ibid. 
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2   The Second Sense of the Rule of Law: Equality 
Dicey’s second sense of the rule of law has been cited by members of the High Court on 
several occasions.5 2  This second sense was: 
 
not only that with us [the English] no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) 
that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the 
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.53 
 
This sense distinguishes two related propositions. The first is equality under the law; all 
members of the polity are similarly subject to its laws. The second is subjection of 
individuals and government to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Dicey argued that 
the English had pressed this form of equality to its extreme; their officials, including the 
Crown’s representatives,5 4  were subject to the jurisdiction exercised by the common law 
courts. 5 5  In contrast, Dicey claimed that French officials were ‘protected from the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’ because their conduct was subject to ‘official law 
administered by official bodies’.5 6  Dicey feared such exemptions prejudiced citizens when 
they confronted the executive government of their polity. 
 
3   The Third Sense of the Rule of Law: Judicial Determination of Disputes 
Thirdly, Dicey considered that the English could claim their constitution was: 
 
pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the constitution (as 
for example the right to personal liberty, or the right to public meeting) are with us the 
result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the courts.57  
 
 
Craig observed that this sense is ambiguous, as it suggests an assertion that the rule of law 
requires the protection of human rights.5 8 However, Dicey is more accurately understood 
52 See, for example, Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462 ('Green'), 472 [28] (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel 
JJ). Equality, as a requirement of the rule of law, will be further considered in section B of part III of 
chapter 3. 
53 Dicey , above n 45, 193. 
54 See, for example, Mostyn v Fabrigas [1774] 1  Cowp 160; 98 ER 1021; Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 . 
55 Dicey  noted, however, that there were some specialist tribunals, such as those exercising jurisdiction over 
soldiers and Anglican clerics; Dicey , above n 45, 193-4. 
56 Ibid 193. The accuracy of Dicey ’s account has been justifiably  criticised; see, for example, Alfred Denning, 
Freedom Under the Law  (Stevens Sons Limited, 1949), 80; Jowell, above n 49, 14. 
57  Dicey , above n 45, 195. 
58 Paul Craig, 'The Rule of Law' in Select Committee on the Constitution, Relations between the Executive, 
the Judiciary and Parliament, House of Lords Paper 151, Session 2006-2007 (2007), 98. 
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as arguing that the English constitution was more effective at securing human liberty.  This 
reading is supported by Dicey’s assertion that the derivation of the general principles of the 
English constitution from judicial determination of the rights of the parties in specific 
cases was a virtue. In other jurisdictions, Dicey opined, individual rights were secured in 
written constitutions with the principles located in declarations and definitions.5 9  That 
contrast was consequential when disputants invoked their rights because, unlike other 
constitutions which paid insufficient attention to providing for enforcement, the English 
constitution connected the right with its means of enforcement.6 0 For example, the right to 
liberty is secured by the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.6 1  
 
B   Hayek’s Conception 
Hayek’s conception of the rule of law is salient because it influenced Justice Heydon’s 
conception. That influence will be illustrated, in part III below, in the context of outlining 
his Honour’s conception. 
 
1   The Constraint of Executive Discretion 
For Hayek, the rule of law’s purpose was to constrain government. The rule of law 
constrains a government from coercing its subjects except in accordance with known 
rules.6 2  Hayek considered that the rule of law was a modern rendition of the classical 
conception of isonomia. 6 3  Isonomia, or ‘equality according to the laws’, 6 4  could be 
contrasted with the rule of tyrants.6 5  The rule of tyrants, Hayek implied, was effectively 
unfettered executive discretion. 
 
Hayek was concerned by the development of the modern administrative polity.6 6  He was 
concerned by the ability of governmental ‘planning’ to negatively affect citizens as 
individuals. These risks could be reduced, if not eliminated, by constraining administrative 
action — especially the exercise of coercive powers — with fixed rules.6 7  If such rules were 
59 Dicey , above n 45, 195-6. 
60 Ibid 199. 
61  See, for example, Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574, 587 [35] (Tamberlin J). 
62 F A Hay ek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, 2006), 180. 
63 Hay ek, above n 27 , 7 ; see also Hayek, above n 62, 144-5; F A Hay ek, 'The Decline of the Rule of Law, Part 
1 ', The Freeman (Orange, Connecticut), 20 April 1953, 518, 518-9. 
64 Melissa Lane, Greek and Roman Political Ideas (Penguin Books Limited, 2014), 71. 
65 Hay ek, above n 62, 144. 
66 Ibid 189. 
67  F A Hay ek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, 2001), 54; cited in Raz, above n 36, 210. 
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effective, they would corral the scope of executive discretion to the narrowest expanses 
practicable. 
 
2   Components of the Rule of Law 
Hayek’s conception of the rule of law included two components. One was a set of ‘familiar 
requirements’ regarding the characteristics of laws. 6 8  The second stipulated that 
‘administrative discretion in coercive action’ must be amenable to judicial review.6 9  The 
two components acknowledge a distinction between the types of requirements that the rule 
of law may impose. One type addresses the characteristics of laws. The other addresses the 
characteristics of the legal system. These components were allied, according to Hayek, in 
their endeavours to limit the exercise of coercive power: 
 
to instances where it is explicitly required by general abstract rules which have been 
announced beforehand and which [apply] equally to all people, and refer to circumstances 
known to them.7 0 
 
 
The familiar requirements that the rule of law imposed on a polity’s laws were certainty, 
equality, and generality. Hayek coupled the requirements of equality and generality. He 
argued that ‘true laws’ consisted of ‘general rules’ that apply to both the relationships 
between individuals and to those between individuals and the polity.7 1  These rules were 
also to be the same for all. Hayek considered that equality before the law required more 
than the mere avoidance of ‘irrelevant distinctions’. 7 2  This is an obvious similarity between 
Hayek’s and Dicey’s conceptions. However, Hayek cautioned that equality before the law 
was ‘probably both unattainable and undesirable’.7 3  
 
Hayek’s conception stressed the importance of certainty and intelligibility. Hayek endorsed 
Wade’s view that foreknowledge of the legal consequences of an action was more 
important to individuals than justice.7 4  Certainty concerning how laws will be applied 
68 Hay ek, above n 27 , 45. 
69 Ibid. 
7 0 Ibid. 
7 1  Ibid. Hay ek contrasted true laws with provisions regulating a government’s resources and their use; the 
latter were merely the orders the executive issued its officers; Hay ek, above n 62, 182. 
7 2 Hay ek, above n 27 , 36. 
7 3 Ibid. 
7 4 Ibid; citing H W R Wade, 'The Concept of Legal Certainty: a Preliminary  Skirmish' (1941) 4(3) The Modern 
Law Review  183, 187. 
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enables individuals to make considered choices informed by their knowledge of what they 
can do lawfully. This demonstrates Hayek’s view that individual autonomy depended on 
the rule of law (a view that is central to Justice Heydon’s conception). Certainty was also 
significant, according to Hayek, because it was necessary for the ‘smooth and efficient 
working of economic life’.7 5  
 
The availability of effective judicial review was another central component of Hayek’s 
conception. Hayek was concerned by the delegation of coercive powers to administrators 
who could potentially ‘wield coercion without rule’7 6  and arbitrary exercise of discretion.7 7  
Hayek, however, considered that these threats could be minimised by strictly limiting the 
coercive powers available to the executive. 7 8  Coercion, according to Hayek, was 
permissible ‘only in execution of a general rule but not in service of a particular aim of 
policy’.7 9  Judicial review of administrative decisions was required to ensure that coercive 
power was only being exercised in accordance with legal rules. 
 
3   The Rule of Law as a Meta-legal Doctrine 
Hayek rejected the possibility of the rule of law being a legal rule.  He viewed it as a ‘meta-
legal doctrine’, a ‘rule about the law’.8 0 It was a specific kind of rule about law, because it 
was concerned with the attributes that a polity’s laws should possess.8 1  In this form, 
according to Hayek, the rule of law was able to constrain the exercise of legislative power.8 2  
Because it could do so, it was prevented from being an enforceable legal principle: 
 
[f]rom the fact that the rule of law is a limitation upon all legislation it follows that it cannot 
itself be a law in the same sense as the laws passed by the legislature.83 
 
7 5 Hay ek, above n 27 , 36; see also Hay ek, above n 62, 183. This dependency  is central to the ‘international 
Rule of Law promotion industry ’ (using Krygier’s term: Martin Krygier, 'Why  Rule of Law Promotion is too 
Important to be Left to Lawyers' in Raimond Gaita and Gerry Simpson (eds), Who's Afraid of International 
Law? (Monash University Press, 2017) 133); see, for example, 'Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the 
Jungle', The Economist 18 March 2008 2008 <http://www.economist.com/node/108491157>. 
7 6 Hay ek, above n 27 , 36. 
7 7  Compare Murray Gleeson, 'The Judicial Method: Essentials and Inessentials' (2010) 9(4) The Judicial 
Review  376 , 387. 
7 8 Hay ek, above n 27 , 40-1. 
7 9  Ibid 41 . Hay ek conceived policy, by  contrast to legislation, as the general principles adopted by a 
government in its pursuit of its ‘concrete, ever changing aims’; Hay ek, above n 62, 188-9. 
80 Hay ek, above n 27 , 33. 
81  Ibid. 
82 Hay ek, above n 62, 180. 
83 Ibid. 
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Instead, the rule of law operated ‘only through its action on public opinion’.8 4  Hayek 
considered that on-going public endorsement of the rule of law was necessary for it to 
continue to constrain legislative activity.8 5  Hayek correctly distinguished the rule of law 
from laws in the sense of legislation. However, this distinction does not necessarily 
relegate the rule of law to the ‘non-legal’ rule Hayek suggested. 
 
C   Lord Bingham’s Conception 
Lord Bingham’s conception is the most significant recent contribution to the on-going 
discussion of the rule of law.8 6   
 
Lord Bingham’s conception was developed in response to the accusation that the concept 
is, ultimately, meaningless.8 7  Lord Bingham refused to concede this accusation.8 8 Lord 
Bingham's strongest objection rested on the strength of judicial invocations of the rule of 
law. Lord Bingham argued that references by senior jurists, including members of the 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (‘Judicial Committee’), should not be ‘dismissed 
as meaningless verbiage’.8 9  Lord Bingham called on Lord Steyn’s formulation of a canon of 
statutory construction — the principle of legality — for support.9 0 It gains similar support 
from at least some of the dicta cited in chapter 3 as they indicate that senior Australian 
jurists have not invoked the rule of law only for rhetorical effect. 
 
Lord Bingham advocated a thick conception of the rule of law. The formal core of this 
conception was: 
 
that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private should be bound 
by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future 
and publicly administered in the courts. 91 
 
84 Hay ek, above n 63, 520. 
85 Ibid; see also Hay ek, above n 62, 181. 
86 Lord Bingham initially sketched his conception of the rule of law in his 2006 Sir David Williams Lecture; 
see Thomas Bingham, 'The Rule of Law' (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67 . 
87  Lord Bingham attributed this accusation to Shklar and Waldron; Bingham, above n 30, 5; quoting Shklar, 
above n 30; Waldron, above n 30. 
88 Bingham, above n 30, 6. Shklar was similarly  reluctant to accept that overuse had rendered the rule of law 
a mere slogan; Shklar, above n 30, 1 . 
89 Bingham, above n 30, 6. 
90 Ibid 6; quoting R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1998] 1  AC 539 ('Ex 
parte Pierson'), 591. 
91  Bingham, above n 30, 8. 
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Lord Bingham expanded on this core with eight ingredients:9 2  
(i) a requirement that the ‘law must be accessible and so far as possible 
intelligible, clear and predictable’;93 
(ii) a requirement that disputes concerning legal rights and liabilities should be 
‘resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion’;94 
(iii) a requirement that the ‘laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to 
the extent objective differences justify differentiation’;95 
(iv) an obligation on public officials to exercise their powers ‘in good faith, fairly, 
for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the 
limits of such powers and not unreasonably’;96 
(v) a requirement that the laws adequately protect fundamental human rights;97 
(vi) a requirement that dispute resolution be accessible;98 
92 Lord Bingham’s list can be compared with Finnis’ and Raz’s conceptions. Finnis argued that the rule of law 
is the ‘name commonly given to the state of affairs in which a legal sy stem is legally in good shape’; John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University  Press, 1980), 27 . Finnis argued that such a legal 
sy stem was required (to some extent) to possess: (i) prospective rules (cited PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 
CLR 355 ('PGA '), 413 [156] (Hey don J)); (ii) that are promulgated; (iii) that are clear; (iv ) that cohere with 
each other; (v) and that are not impossible to comply  with; (v i) that are ‘sufficiently stable’ to allow their 
subjects to act informed by  their knowledge of the rules; and (v ii) that are made in accordance with ‘rules 
that are promulgated, clear, stable, and relatively  general’; further (v iii) the officials ‘who have authority  to 
make, administer and apply  the rules’ (a) should be accountable for their compliance with the rules that 
regulate their official actions and (b) should actually  administer the rules consistently  with their ‘tenor’ (270-
1). In comparison, Raz derived eight important principles from the core of the rule of law: (i) ‘All laws should 
be prospective, open, and clear’; (ii) ‘Laws should be relatively  stable’; (iii) ‘[t]he making of particular laws 
(particular legal orders) should be guided by  open, stable, clear, and general rules’; (iv ) ‘[t]he independence 
of the judiciary  must be guaranteed’; (v) ‘[t]he principles of natural justice must be observed’; (v i) ‘[t]he 
courts should have review powers over the implementation of the other principles’; (v ii) ‘[t]he courts should 
be easily  accessible’; and (v ii) ‘[t]he discretion of the crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to 
pervert the law’; Raz, above n 36, 213-8. Lon Fuller’s list of ‘desiderata’ for the rule of law preceded both 
Finnis’ and Raz’s lists; MacCormick, above n 23, 16; citing Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University 
Press, Rev ised edition ed, 1969), 33-9. Fuller argued that law’s ‘inner morality’ made eight demands: (i) there 
‘must be rules’; (ii) these rules should be promulgated publicly  (see Brantley v Constituency Boundaries 
Commission [2015] 1 WLR 2753, 2762 [21]); (iii) they should be promulgated prospectively; (iv ) they  should 
be expressed clearly ; (v) they  should avoid contradictions; (v i) they ‘should not demand the impossible’ (see 
SSC Plenty Road Pty Limited v Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Limited [2015] VSC 631, [98] (Vickery 
J)); (v ii) they  should be altered infrequently; and (v iii) official action should be consistent with them (at 39, 
46, 49, 51, 63, 65, 71, 79, 81). For comparison of Fuller and Raz’s accounts, see Burton Crawford, above n 14, 
20-7 . 
93 Bingham, above n 30, 37; see also R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 
AC 604 ('Anufrijeva'), 618 [20]. 
94 Bingham, above n 30, 48. 
95 Ibid 55. 
96 Ibid 60. 
97  Ibid 66. 
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(vii) a requirement that adjudicative processes, such as trials, be fair;99 and 
(viii) a requirement that the polity, and its laws, comply with the obligations  
  imposed by international law.100 
This list shows the range of requirements that emerge from the rule of law and the 
potential for conflict between them.  
 
Lord Bingham's list also shows how some of these requirements can have legal content or 
form. This follows from Lord Bingham’s assumption that the rule of law is a constitutional 
principle. His Lordship’s analysis proceeds from the recognition, following Dicey and the 
understanding of the English constitution that he epitomises, in the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005 (UK) of the constitutional significance of the rule of law. His Lordship, relevantly 
to this thesis, was silent on whether this principle was directly enforceable in an English 
court. 
 
Members of the High Court have endorsed elements of Lord Bingham’s exposition. Chief 
Justice French and Justices Crennan and Kiefel noted Lord Bingham’s analysis of legal 
equality (ingredient (iii)) while expounding the concept of equal justice.1 01  Further, 
Crennan J cited Lord Bingham’s discussion of the obligation to exercise statutory powers 
in good faith (ingredient (iv)).1 02  Lord Bingham, while discussing the kinds of lawfulness 
that will result in a successful application for review, observed that this obligation is a 
presumed intention of the legislature.1 03  Crennan J observed that this obligation was 
additional to other requirements that constrained the options available to decision 
makers.1 04   
 
  
98 Ibid 85; compare FP (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ  13, [60]-[61] 
(Arden LJ). 
99 Bingham, above n 30, 90. 
1 00 Ibid 110. 
1 01  Green (2011) 244 CLR 462, 47 2 [28]; citing Bingham, above n 30, 55-9. 
1 02 CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 514 ('CPCF '), 581  [200]; citing, 
inter alia, Bingham, above n 30, 62. 
1 03 Bingham, above n 30, 62; citing Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] 1  AC 437, 443 (Lord Diplock). 
1 04 CPCF (2015) 255 CLR 514, 580-1 [200]. 
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III   JUSTICE HEYDON ON THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Justice Heydon provides an interesting example of how a senior Australian jurist 
conceived the rule of law. As will be shown later in this part and in chapter 3, his Honour’s 
extra-judicial exposition of the rule of law was consistent with views expressed in his 
judicial dicta. Accordingly, Heydon J provides a model for how judges could draw on 
theoretical conceptions when considering the rule of law. 
 
Justice Heydon is not alone among members of the High Court in considering, extra-
judicially, the rule of law. Justice Kirby’s substantive conception was noted earlier in this 
chapter.1 05  Chief Justice Gleeson's consideration of the relationship between the High 
Court and the rule of law1 06  provides the foundation of chapter 3. These sit alongside extra-
judicial contributions by Chief Justices Gibbs,1 07  Brennan, 1 08 French,1 09  and Kiefel,1 1 0 and 
Justices Stephen,1 1 1  Toohey,1 1 2  Gummow, 1 1 3  Bell,1 1 4  and Keane.1 1 5  These statements show 
that members of the High Court have seriously considered the rule of law. Where they are 
consistent with judicial dicta, these statements also support Lord Bingham’s argument1 1 6  
1 05 Kirby , above n 36. 
1 06 Murray  Gleeson, 'Courts and the Rule of Law' in Cheryl Saunders and Katherine Le Roy  (eds), The Rule of 
Law  (The Federation Press, 2003) 178. 
1 07  Harry  Gibbs, 'Remarks at the Opening of the Lawasia Conference' (Speech, Manila, 9 September 1983); 
Harry  Gibbs, 'Two Rules of Law?' (1997) 9 Proceedings of the Samuel Griffiths Society 53 . 
1 08 See, for example, Gerard Brennan, 'The Role of the Legal Profession in the Rule of Law', Hearsay 
September 2007 
<http://www.hearsay.org.au/index.php?option=com_contenttask=viewid=188Itemid=48>. 
1 09 See, for example, Robert French, 'The Rule of Law as a Many Coloured Dream Coat' (2014) 26(1) 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 1 ; Robert French, 'Rights and Freedoms and the Rule of Law' (2017) 
28(2) Public Law Review  109 ; Robert French, 'Judicial Rev iew: Populism, the Rule of Law, Natural Justice 
and Judicial Independence' (2017) 44(9) Brief 19. 
1 1 0 Susan Kiefel, 'The Use of Constitutional Supra Principles by Judges' (Paper delivered at the VII World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico City, Mexico, 10 December 2010) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/kiefelj/kiefelj-2010-12-10.pdf>. 
1 1 1  Ninian Stephen, 'The Rule of Law' (2003) 22(2) Dialogue 8. 
1 1 2 Toohey , above n 27 . 
1 1 3 William Gummow, 'Sir Owen Dixon Today ' (2017  George Winterton Memorial Lecture at the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Sy dney  16 February 2017) 
http://sydney.edu.au/law/news/docs_pdfs_images/2017/Feb/The_2017 _Winterton_Lecture-
Sir_Owen_Dixon_Today .pdf. 
1 1 4 Virginia Bell, 'The Rule of Law and Access to Justice' (Paper delivered to Community Legal Centres NSW 
Conference, 5 May  2010) 
<http://www.clcnsw.org.au/cb_pages/images/Justice%20Virginia%20Bell%20Speech.pdf> 
1 1 5 Patrick Keane, 'Magna Carta and Bey ond: The Rule of Law 800 Y ears On'' (2015) 35(5) The Proctor 22 . 
1 1 6 Bingham, above n 30, 5-6. 
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that judicial references to the rule of law should not be disregarded as merely rhetorical 
because they suggest endorsement of seriously considered conceptions. 
 
A   Justice Heydon’s conception 
Justice Heydon expounded a broadly coherent conception of the rule of law directed to 
facilitating human autonomy. This conception focused on the role of judges in securing the 
rule of law. It also emphasised the conditions that constitute the presence of the rule of law 
in a polity. 
 
Like Hayek,1 1 7  Justice Heydon viewed the rule of law as constraining ‘untrammelled 
discretionary power’.1 1 8  While doing so, it wore the garb of: 
 
an independent arbiter not affected by self-interest or partisan duty, applying a set of 
principles, rules and practices having objective existence and operating in paramountcy to 
any other organ of state and to any other source of power, and possessing a measure of 
independence from the wrath of disgruntled governments or other groups.1 1 9 
 
Influenced by Finnis, 1 2 0 Justice Heydon's rule of law adopted the visage of the judiciary. It 
was the judiciary who embodied the independent arbiter overseeing the administration of 
the polity’s laws.1 2 1  
 
Justice Heydon’s conception of the rule of law distinguished between the characteristics a 
polity must possess to have the rule of law and the characteristics of a polity’s laws. 
Heydon J argued that a polity possessed the rule of law if its institutions actively displayed 
six characteristics.1 2 2  First, anyone subject to the polity’s laws was not to be held liable to 
sanctions or penalties unless they had been judged to have breached those laws.1 2 3  His 
Honour stipulated that those rules should be prospective and of general application (but 
not ‘so general as to create only vague discretions with no general criteria to guide and 
1 1 7  Hay ek, along with Walker (see Geoffrey  de Q Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional 
Democracy (Melbourne University Press, 1988)), influenced Justice Heydon’s conception of the rule of law. 
1 1 8 J D Hey don, 'Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law' (2003) 23(2) Australian Bar Journal 
110, 111. 
1 1 9 Ibid. 
1 20 See Finnis, above n 92, 267-70. 
1 21  By  continuing the tradition of interpreting the ‘law according to the books’; Hey don, above n 118; adopting 
a phrase from Orwell: see George Orwell, 'The Lion and the Unicorn' in Essays (Penguin Books Ltd, 2014 ed, 
2014), 145. 
1 22 J D Hey don, 'What Do We Mean by  the Rule of Law' in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the Rule 
of Law  (LexisNexis NZ Limited, 2011) 15, 19. 
1 23 Ibid. 
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control their exercise’).1 2 4  The polity’s laws should be published and accessible ‘at least to 
significant classes’ (such as the judiciary and legal practitioners). 1 2 5  These laws should also 
be clear and coherent. 1 2 6  The constitutional rules regarding how the polity’s laws are 
altered should also be published, clear, and coherent.1 2 7  Finally, the polity’s laws should be 
enforceable in courts (or comparable tribunals). 1 2 8 The possession of these characteristics, 
his Honour opined, would be complimented and reinforced by a ‘strong legal profession, 
an informed public opinion, and a spirit sympathetic to legality and obedience to the 
law’.1 2 9  
 
Justice Heydon also argued that, for the laws of a jurisdiction to enliven the rule of law, 
they needed to (i) aspire to certain objectives and (ii) satisfy certain criteria. In respect of 
(i), his Honour derived the relevant objectives from Dicey’s conception of the rule of law.1 3 0 
In respect of (ii), Heydon J stipulated two criteria that a polity’s laws should satisfy. First, 
they should apply equally. Heydon J, agreeing with Dicey, stated that the ‘rule of law 
requires all persons within the polity to be subject to the obligations of the laws’.1 3 1  
Conversely, the law’s subjects were also entitled to its benefits.1 3 2  Secondly, the polity’s 
laws should ensure the fairness of its adjudicative proceedings. Given the central role of 
these processes in his Honour’s conception of the rule of law, it is vital that they are fair. 
Heydon J stipulated ten requirements an adjudicative process must satisfy to be described 
fair.1 3 3  
 
1 24 Ibid; see also Dy son Hey don, 'Chief Justice Gibbs: Defending the Rule of Law in a Federal System' (2006) 
18 Proceedings of the Samuel Griffiths Society vii , x ; quoting Harry  Gibbs, 'Remarks at the Opening of the 
Lawasia Conference' (Speech, Manila, 9 September 1983). 
1 25 Hey don, above n 122, 19; compare Watson v Lee (1979) 144 CLR 37 4 ('Watson'), 379 (Barwick CJ). 
1 26 Hey don, above n 122, 19-20. 
1 27  Ibid 20. 
1 28 Ibid. 
1 29 Ibid 22. 
1 30 Ibid 27 . 
1 31  Ibid 33 (emphasis altered). 
1 32 Ibid. 
1 33 Specifically : (i) public trials; (ii) that legal representatives be heard; (iii) that interpreters be available 
when required; (iv ) the prov ision of legal aid; (v) the various procedural requirements associated with the 
accusatorial trial and natural justice; (v i) the presumption of innocence (in the sense that the burden of 
prov ing an accused’s guilt is normally  borne by the prosecutor and in the sense of the tribunal of fact 
attending to its task without prejudice or a predisposition to finding guilt); (v ii) jury trials; (v iii) the accused 
possessing the right to be heard during a criminal trial; (ix) the protections that emerge from the law of 
ev idence; and (x) that litigation be conducted efficiently; Ibid 34-8. 
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These conditions, according to Justice Heydon, enable personal autonomy. His Honour 
understood autonomy as an individual’s capacity to decide how to act and the ability to act 
accordingly.1 3 4  Heydon J argued that the subjects of a polity cannot make informed choices 
concerning their future conduct: 
 
unless they are capable of knowing in advance what consequences in law their choices will 
have, and knowing that the law will be enforced in a competent way by unbiased courts.1 35 
 
The rule of law was, his Honour opined, ‘more likely’ to shelter freedom of thought (which 
was necessary for personal autonomy) by clearly defining the limits of the related freedoms 
of conscience and speech.1 3 6  
 
The influence of this conception of the rule of law can be discerned in reasons Justice 
Heydon delivered. One instance is his Honour’s endorsement of the requirement that laws 
be certain in their expression and operation. 1 3 7  His Honour subsequently raised this 
requirement in the course of (rhetorically) criticising the High Court’s statements in 
Kirk. 1 3 8 Kirk itself provides an example of how Justice Heydon’s conception of the rule of 
law influenced his jurisprudence. His Honour’s concerns regarding specialist courts were, 
arguably, informed by his views regarding the role of judicial procedures in maintaining 
the rule of law.1 3 9  These views also underlay his Honour’s repeated emphasis on the need 
for and the obligation on courts to enforce the law.1 4 0 A final example is Justice Heydon’s 
repeated criticism of retrospective legislation.1 4 1  
 
  
1 34 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2008) 237  CLR 215, 248 [88]-[89] (Gummow, Hay ne, and Hey don JJ). 
1 35 Hey don, above n 122, 25; compare MacCormick, above n 23, 16. 
1 36 Hey don, above n 122, 26. 
1 37  PGA  (2012) 245 CLR 355, 401 [137]. 
1 38 Public Service Association and Professional Officers' Association Amalgamated of NSW v Director of 
Public Employment (2012) 250 CLR 343 ('Public Service Association'), 469-70 [62]. 
1 39 Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531  ('Kirk'),  589-90 [122]. Hey don J quoted 
Walker’s observation that history  ‘teaches us to be suspicious of specialist courts and tribunals of all 
descriptions’; Walker, above n 117, 35. 
1 40  Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Limited (2009) 239 CLR 75 ('Jeffrey & 
Katauskas'), 123 [110]; Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22 ('Haskins'), 48-9 [73]; discussed p 31 
below. 
1 41  See Haskins (2011) 244 CLR 22, 48 [7 2]; PGA  (2012) 245 CLR 355, 402 [127], 413 [156]. 
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IV   THE RULE OF LAW AS A SHORTHAND 
 
It is possible to conceive a coherent and cohesive conception of the rule of law. For 
example, the rule of law could be conceived as being synonymous with formal legality.1 4 2  
This approach would require the reconciliation or rejection of those purported elements 
that pull the concept toward incoherence and in-cohesion. 
 
Alternatively, the preceding discussion suggests that the rule of law is not necessarily 
coherent and cohesive. Justice Basten, in the context of construing a reference to the 
‘common law’, observed that the rule of law is ‘multifaceted and may mean different things 
in different contexts and at different times’.1 4 3  Justice Basten’s observation is consistent 
with the assertion implicit in Chief Justice Gleeson’s statement that the principle of legality 
is one aspect of the rule of law; 1 4 4  if there is one aspect, by implication there must be 
others. It is also supported by the conceptions proposed by Lord Bingham and Justice 
Heydon. Such conceptions demonstrate that the rule of law could, as Allan suggested,1 4 5  
braid together a range of desiderata.1 4 6  
 
Accepting that the rule of law can consist of a disparate group of components, it can be 
understood as a ‘shorthand’ phrase. This approach is similar to how the ‘right to silence’ is 
understood as a collection of legal immunities. 1 4 7  Lord Mustill observed that the 
immunities that comprise the right to silence ‘differ in nature, origin, incidence and 
1 42 Tamanaha considered Hay ek espoused such a v iew; see Tamanaha, above n 24, 65-8, 93-4. 
1 43 Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited v Bateman (2015) 90 NSWLR 79 ('Bateman'), 109 [137]; see p 47  
below. 
1 44 Electrolux Home Products Pty Limited v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221  CLR 309 ('Electrolux 
Home Products') 329, [21]; this statement, and the relationship between the principle of legality  and the rule 
of law, are discussed further in part IV of chapter 6. 
1 45 Allan, above n 25, 21-2. 
1 46 Leighton McDonald, 'Rule of Law' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The 
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University  Press, 2001) 610, 610. Webber argued 
that ‘desiderata’ is an appropriate description of the components because it conveys their aspirational nature; 
see Grégoire Webber, 'Rights and the Rule of Law in the Balance' (2013) 129(July) Law Quarterly Review 
399 , 402. 
1 47  Lord Mustill described the immunities that compose the ‘right to silence’ as a ‘disparate group’; R v 
Director of Serious Fraud Office; Ex parte Smith [1993] 1  AC 1  ('Ex parte Smith'), 30; considered in X7 v 
Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92 ('X7 '), 117  [40] (French CJ and Crennan J); RPS v The 
Queen (2009) 199 CLR 620, 630 [22] (Gaudron A-CJ, Gummow, Kirby, and Hay ne JJ) (quoted in Carr v 
Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138 ('Carr'), 152 [36] (Gummow, Hey don, and Crennan JJ)). 
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importance’.1 4 8 Lord Mustill’s observation applies consistently to the ingredients of the 
rule of law identified by Lord Bingham. Lord Bingham’s eight ingredients are disparate. 
They have different sources.1 4 9  They differ in their nature and their importance. Further, 
the eight ingredients do not necessarily gain from being corralled into a conception of the 
rule of law. But Lord Bingham considered these ingredients were vital to the rule of law 
and argued that they could be gathered around that core ideal. 
 
Importantly for the thesis developed in subsequent chapters, recognising that the rule of 
law can be understood as a shorthand does not entail that all the aspects and requirements 
will have consistent legal force. That is, it does not necessarily follow from the recognition 
of the rule of law as a constraint on legislative power that all, or even most of the aspects or 
requirements that have been endorsed by commentators such as Dicey, Hayek, and Lord 
Bingham (or, as will be shown in the next chapter, members of the High Court) will 
constrain legislative power. Similarly, it does not follow from the recognition of one aspect 
or requirement as a constraint that the others, either individually or collectively, should be 
recognised as constraints. That is, it will require something more than the recognition of a 
particular requirement, such as the amenability of executive action to judicial review, for 
the rule of law more broadly to be recognised as a constraint. 
 
V   CONCLUSION: HOW THE RULE OF LAW CAN BE UNDERSTOOD 
 
This chapter started to explore what the rule of law refers to. It showed that significant 
proponents of the rule of law, such as Hayek, have understood it as a political ideal rather 
than a legal principle. It also showed how Justice Heydon can serve as an example of how a 
jurist might understand the rule of law. That example is pertinent to the consideration of 
the High Court’s dicta that will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
1 48 Ex parte Smith [1993] 1  AC 1 , 30. 
1 49 Lord Bingham sketched a ‘highly  selective’ history  of the development of the rule of law in the United 
Kingdom; see Bingham, above n 30, 10-33. 
24 
 
                                                 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
WHAT DOES THE RULE OF LAW REQUIRE? 
 
A complementary approach to ascertaining what Justices Crennan and Kiefel meant by the 
rule of law, when asking the Momcilovic question, involves answering the question posed 
in the epigraph to this thesis: ‘what does the rule of law require?’1 5 0  
 
This chapter will show that senior Australian jurists, including Justices Crennan and 
Kiefel, have suggested various answers to that question. Anticipating arguments that will 
be developed in later chapters, this chapter shows that members of the High Court have 
identified aspects and requirements (or elements) of the rule of law that can be woven into 
a core thread concerned with securing the legality of governmental action. These dicta, 
which will be surveyed in part II, indicate the content that could be attributed to a 
conception of the rule of law assumed by, or implied from, the Commonwealth 
Constitution (a possibility that will be examined in chapter 5). The elements identified in 
these dicta can, at least superficially, be distinguished from other, more substantive, 
requirements. The dicta surveyed in part III, as Chief Justice Gleeson suggested, indicate 
that members of the High Court have embraced thicker conceptions of the rule of law. 
 
 
  
1 50 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 ('Thomas'), 342 [61]. 
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I   THE HIGH COURT ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The rule of law has gained prominence in the jurisprudence of the High Court. As Burton 
Crawford observed, members of the High Court increasingly refer to the rule of law in their 
decisions.1 5 1  Chief Justice Gleeson, in his lecture on ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’, identified 
eleven ‘practical conclusions’ his fellow Justices asserted were required by the rule of 
law.1 5 2  Pointing to an example that will be considered in detail in part IV of chapter 6, 
Chief Justice Gleeson, subsequently, described the constitutional hypothesis underlying 
the principle of legality as an aspect of the rule of law.1 5 3  The dicta recording the High 
Court’s suggested elements provide an initial well of authorities from which a jurist could 
draw to support assertions concerning the content of the rule of law. They also provide 
examples that can be considered in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
  
1 51  Burton Crawford, above n 14, 175. 
1 52 Gleeson, above n 106, 180. 
1 53 Electrolux Home Products (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21]. 
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A   The Problem of Rhetorical References 
Any survey of judicial references to the rule of law is exposed to a significant objection. It is 
the objection, prompted by Lord Toulson’s quip that the ‘rule of law is a fine concept but 
fine concepts butter no parsnips’,1 5 4  that some judicial references to the rule of law are 
purely rhetorical. 1 5 5  Joseph levelled that challenge against Lord Steyn’s speech in 
Anufrijeva. 1 5 6  Lord Steyn stated the rule of law required ‘fundamental principles’ to be 
upheld by the executive even in ‘unprepossessing cases’. 1 5 7  Accordingly, the Home 
Secretary’s decision not to inform the applicant of his decision contravened the 
‘constitutional principle requiring the rule of law to be observed’.1 5 8 Joseph asserted that 
Lord Steyn had substituted a rhetorical device for a principled explanation of the rule of 
law’s requirements.1 5 9  A similar criticism could, possibly without merit, be levelled against 
Justice Kirby’s observation that ignoring the obligations imposed by international law ‘will 
reduce the enlargement of the international rule of law’.1 6 0 
 
To the extent that judicial references to the rule of law are merely rhetorical, rather than 
fully considered, they are unlikely to carry the authority of ‘seriously considered dicta’.1 6 1  
The challenge, however, is to thrash the wheat from the chaff. That task does not need to 
be completed in this thesis. Here, it is sufficient to show: (i) that senior jurists, including 
members of the High Court, have attributed content to the rule of law; and (ii) that those 
dicta can substantiate both legality focused and thicker conceptions of the rule of law. 
 
 
  
1 54 R (Guardian News and Media Limited) v City of Westminster Magistrate’s Court (Article 19 intervening) 
[2013] QB 618, 630 [1]. 
1 55 Used in Zagor’s sense; see Matthew Zagor, 'Judicial Rhetoric and Constitutional Identity : Comparative 
Approaches to Aliens' Rights in the United Kingdom and Australia' (2008) 19(4) Public Law Review  276, 
27 8. 
1 56 Philip Joseph, 'The Rule of Law: Foundational Norm' in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the 
Rule of Law  (LexisNexis NZ Limited, 2011) 47  154. 
1 57  Anufrijeva [2004] 1  AC 604, 623 [36]. 
1 58 Ibid 621  [28]. 
1 59 Joseph, above n 156, 63. 
1 60 Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308, 345 [116]; see Kirby, above n 36, 196; citing Olaide 
Gbadamosi and Ol Adewoye, 'The Rule of Law as a Catalyst for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria' (2010) 
36(2) (June 2010) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 343, 349. 
1 61  Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151  [134], 159 [158] (Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Hey don, and Crennan JJ). 
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B   The Aspects and Requirements of the Rule of Law 
Chief Justice Gleeson distinguished between the ‘formal and aspirational’ aspects of the 
rule of law.1 6 2  Gleeson CJ considered that the thin ‘formal essence’ of the rule of law was 
that ‘all authority is subject to, and constrained by, law’.1 6 3  Distinctly, Gleeson CJ 
acknowledged that ‘contestable claims’ were made about the ‘substantive content’ of the 
rule of law.1 6 4  Such claims concerned the rights to be derived from the rule of law.1 6 5  They 
also concerned the content of a jurisdiction’s laws.1 6 6  However, a more convenient (though 
it is far from analytically satisfactory) taxonomy for the purposes of this thesis 
distinguishes those requirements that are connected to securing the legality of 
governmental action from the other, more substantive, requirements. In lieu of a more 
satisfactory classification, these other elements will be gathered together in part III. 
 
Further, it is appropriate to acknowledge that some judicial references are to ‘corollaries or 
consequences’ of more fundamental elements. These relationships allow clusters of 
elements to be described. While they are also analytically unsatisfactory, such clusters 
provide a convenient basis for structuring parts II and III of this chapter. 
 
It should be stressed that the purpose of this survey is neither to write a recipe for the rule 
of law 1 6 7  in Australia nor to check the amounts of which ingredients have been added to the 
mixture for the rule of law soufflé. Rather, its purpose is to take an inventory of the pantry 
in order to learn what ingredients might be available should Australian jurists, in an 
extreme case, need to bake such a soufflé. The inventory undertaken in the next two parts 
of this chapter also provides a convenient opportunity to indicate where the elements 
might conflict. 
 
 
  
1 62 Gleeson, above n 106, 178; this distinction is informed by the distinction between formal and substantive 
conceptions of the rule of law; see Craig, above n 38. 
1 63 Gleeson, above n 106, 179; citing Keith Mason, 'The Rule of Law' in Paul Finn (ed), Essays on Law and 
Government, Principles and Values (Law Book Company  Limited, 1995) vol 1 , 114 , 114. 
1 64 Gleeson, above n 106, 178. 
1 65 See Craig, above n 38, 467. 
1 66 Tamanaha, above n 24, 92. 
1 67  Adopting Burton Crawford’s analogy; Burton Crawford, above n 14, 176. 
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II   SECURING THE LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION 
 
It is convenient, for the purposes of answering the Momcilovic question, to identify the 
elements that might be incorporated in a constitutional conception of the rule of law. As 
will be argued in chapter 5, central to any conception of the rule of law assumed by, or 
implied from, the Commonwealth Constitution will be securing the legality of 
governmental action. This focus may limit any judicial endorsement to a thin, or formal, 
set of elements. That set can be distributed between (a) those elements associated with 
judicial review and (b) those that can be connected to the separation of governmental 
powers. 
 
A   Elements associated with Judicial Review of Governmental Action 
In Ex parte Lam, Justices McHugh and Gummow observed that the rule of law ‘reflects 
values concerned in general terms with abuse of power by the executive and legislative 
branches of government’.1 6 8 Central to securing the legality of the action of the executive 
branch is amenability to judicial review. Chief Justice French and Justice Keane observed 
that judicial review ‘serves to promote the rule of law’.1 6 9  The High Court’s judicial review 
jurisdiction, as will be shown in part II of chapter 5, is entrenched by s 75(v) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. The comparable jurisdiction held by the State Supreme 
Courts is also constitutionally secured.1 7 0 
 
Consistently with the requirement that administrative action be amenable to judicial 
review, the rule of law has been considered to require limits on the ability of legislatures to 
immunise administrative actions from judicial scrutiny.1 7 1  This requirement implies that 
the rule of law, at least indirectly, limits the effectiveness of privative clauses.1 7 2  
 
  
1 68 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 
('Ex parte Lam'), 23 [7 2]. 
1 69 Argos Pty Limited v Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (ACT) (2014) 254 CLR 
394, 411 [48]. 
1 7 0 See Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531; discussed in part III of chapter 5 below. 
1 7 1  Fish v Solution 6 Holdings Limited (2006) 225 CLR 180 ('Fish'), 224 [146] (Kirby J). 
1 7 2 See Gleeson, above n 106, 186-7 . 
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B   Elements connected to the separation of governmental powers 
The separation of governmental powers, as will be noted in part II of chapter 5, has been 
central to the High Court’s consideration of the rule of law. Chief Justice Gleeson observed 
that members of the High Court had recognised the ‘separation between executive and 
judicial power’ was required by the rule of law.1 7 3  The distribution of functions affected by 
this separation, according to a plurality of the Court, reflects ‘fundamental concerns in the 
structure of government under the rule of law’.1 7 4  
 
The High Court’s consideration has focused on the importance of judicial power, and the 
courts, in securing the rule of law. In a widely endorsed passage,1 7 5  Justice Gaudron stated 
the rule of law requires the courts to provide appropriate remedies as a prophylactic 
against the executive not exercising its powers in accordance with law.1 7 6  Her Honour 
derived this obligation from the proposition that those who exercise administrative power 
‘are as much subject to the law as those who are or may be affected’ by its exercise.1 7 7  This 
proposition invokes the principle of equality that is embodied within Dicey’s second 
conception1 7 8 of the rule of law. This requirement secures the core ideal of the rule of law; 
that the exercise of executive power should be legally constrained. 
 
The requirement that there be means of enforcing the separation of powers itself requires 
that there be courts to facilitate those means. Justice Heydon, consistently with his 
conception of the rule of law,1 7 9  considered that the provision of courts (and appropriate 
rules to regulate the conduct of litigation) was a ‘central pillar of the rule of law’.1 8 0 In 
Haskins, Heydon J explained that the provision of courts was an expectation arising from 
1 7 3 Ibid 180; citing Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197  CLR 510 ('Abebe '), 560 [137] (Gummow and Hayne 
JJ); Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 ('Enfield 
City Corporation'), 157 [56] (Gaudron J). 
1 7 4 Byrnes v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 1 , 28 [58] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ). 
1 7 5 See, for example, Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 ('Ex parte Aala'), 107-8 
[55] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited (2008) 237  CLR 
146 ('Futuris Corporation'), 173-4 [91] (Kirby  J); SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, 355 [211] (Hay ne JJ). 
1 7 6 Enfield City Corporation (2000) 199 CLR 135, 157 [56]. 
1 7 7  Ibid. 
1 7 8 See section A1 of part II of chapter 2 above. 
1 7 9 See part III of chapter 2 above. 
1 80 Jeffery & Katauskas (2009) 239 CLR 7 5, 123 [110]. 
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the state’s monopoly over the use of compulsion and coercion,1 8 1  a monopoly that was 
characteristic of a ‘free society under the rule of law’.1 8 2  
 
Another requirement that appears to emerge from the separation of powers is the 
obligation on courts to declare the law. While commenting on Justice Dixon’s dictum,1 8 3  
Justices Gummow and Hayne endorsed Chief Justice Marshall’s statement (from Marbury 
v Madison) that it is the ‘province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is’.1 8 4  Their Honours considered the exercise of the duty was required for the ‘conduct of 
government under the [Commonwealth] Constitution’.1 8 5  
 
Related to that obligation is a requirement that courts ‘give effect to the purpose of 
Parliament expressed in the law made by or under an enactment’.1 8 6  Justice Kirby traced 
this requirement to Justice Dixon’s dictum, explaining that maintaining the rule of law 
requires that courts, exercising jurisdiction under the Commonwealth Constitution, ‘give 
effect to the commands of the several legislatures of the States and the Commonwealth’ as 
expressed in legislation.1 8 7  
 
The separation of powers can anchor the related prohibitions against dispensations: 
(i) that against the judiciary granting the executive dispensation from the law; and (ii) that 
against the executive granting dispensation from legal obligations. The prohibition against 
dispensations in favour of the executive may serve as a prophylactic against the risk such 
dispensations pose to the administration of the criminal law and, thus, the rule of law. 
Justice Deane considered that, if a court were to aid the enforcement of a contractual 
promise not to disclose information about a party to an agreement when the enforcement 
of that promise would ‘obstruct the due administration of the criminal law’, the court 
1 81  Haskins (2011) 244 CLR 22, 48-9 [7 3]. 
1 82 Ibid 48 [7 3]. 
1 83 Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193; see part I of chapter 5 below. 
1 84 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137  (1803), 177. 
1 85 Abebe (1999) 197 CLR 510(1999) 197 CLR 510, 560 [137]. 
1 86 Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Limited (2006) 228 CLR 529, 556 [82] (Kirby  J); citing Byrne v 
Australian Airlines Limited (1995) 185 CLR 410, 459 (McHugh and Gummow JJ); see also Nicholas v The 
Queen (1998) 193 CLR 17 3 ('Nicholas'), 197  (Brennan CJ). 
1 87  Central Bayside General Practice Association Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2006) 228 
CLR 168 ('Central Bayside '), 196 [77]; quoted in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231  CLR 260 ('Cornwell'), 
323 [181] (Kirby  J); compare Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicant M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1 , 62-3 [173] 
(Kirby  J). 
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would itself be obstructing the law.1 8 8 Deane J stressed that such obstructions jeopardised 
the rule of law.1 8 9  Justice Brennan, sharing Justice Deane’s concerns, observed that a court 
granting the executive a dispensation subverted the ‘rule of law upon which our system of 
government depends’.1 9 0  Brennan J repeated his concern in Ridgeway.1 9 1  Echoing a 
passage from Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Sherman, 1 9 2  Brennan J stressed that judges 
are obliged to: 
 
set their face against grave criminality on the part of anyone, regardless of whether he or 
she be government officer or ordinary citizen. To do otherwise would be to undermine the 
rule of law itself.1 93 
 
Chief Justice Mason and Justices Dawson and Deane stressed that illegal activities by 
police officers (such as those seeking to rely on the dispensation) were a ‘particularly 
malignant threat to the rule of law’.1 9 4  Relatedly, the High Court has held that State 
executive power does not include a general power to grant dispensation from the operation 
of statutes.1 9 5  This ‘general constitutional principle’1 9 6  was considered to be an ‘aspect of 
the rule of law’ by a unanimous Court.1 9 7  
 
A further requirement that can be linked through the separation of powers to securing 
legality is the bias rule. Justice Kirby argued that the principle stated by the High Court in 
Ex parte Angliss Group1 9 8  was an ‘essential principle of the rule of law’.1 9 9  His Honour 
1 88 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, 595. 
1 89 Ibid. 
1 90 Ibid 591. 
1 91  Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 (‘Ridgeway’). 
1 92 Sherman v United States 356 US 369 (1958), 380. 
1 93 Ridgeway (1995) 184 CLR 19, 44 (Mason CJ, Dawson, and Deane JJ); quoted in Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 
173, 222 [116] (McHugh J), 243 [181] (Kirby J). 
1 94 Ridgeway (1995) 184 CLR 19, 39. 
1 95 Port of Portland Pty Limited v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348 ('Portland'), 359-60 [13]. 
1 96 Cam & Sons Pty Limited v Ramsay (1960) 104 CLR 247 , 258 (Dixon J), 272-3 (Windeyer J). 
1 97  Portland (2010) 242 CLR 348, 359 [13] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell 
JJ). 
1 98 That the requirements of natural justice are infringed ‘when it is firmly  established that a suspicion may 
reasonably  be engendered in the minds of those who come before the tribunal or in the minds of the public 
that the tribunal or a member or members of it may  not bring to the resolution of the questions arising 
before the tribunal fair and unprejudiced minds’; R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission; Ex parte The Anglis Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 ('Ex parte Anglis Group'), 553-4. 
1 99 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57  ('Ex parte 
Miah'), 112 [180]; citing Ex parte Anglis Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, 553-4. 
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acknowledged the influence of Raz’s argument that a requirement to observe the principles 
of natural justice could be derived from the ‘basic idea of the rule of law’.2 00 
 
Further, there are judicial suggestions that awarding exemplary damages against the 
executive2 01  vindicates the rule of law.2 02  This vindication was considered to flow from the 
judicial condemnation, implicit in such awards, of unlawful action by the executive.2 03  
 
Whether all the elements associated with the separation of governmental powers are 
necessary to securing the legality of governmental action, and can be connected to s 75(v) 
of the Commonwealth Constitution, is arguable. It could be argued, for example, that the 
availability of exemplary damages against the executive is a corollary of the amenability of 
governmental action to judicial review. However, that requirement has an historical 
pedigree and does not necessarily require the rule of law for justification. As will be argued 
in chapter 5, this is an issue that needs to be resolved if the rule of law is recognised as a 
constitutional implication. Further, s 75(v) is concerned with the High Court’s jurisdiction 
to issue the constitutional writs not common law damages. Since the jurisdiction for such 
suits is conferred by s 75(iii), it is not clear whether the necessary textual basis would 
extend to incorporate this requirement. 
 
 
  
200 Raz, above n 36, 217; cited in Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 , 112 [180]. 
201 A practice of ancient pedigree; see Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1 , 98 ER 489, 18-9. 
202 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122 ('Kuddus'), 147-9 (Lord 
Hutton); discussed in New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 649-50 [40] (Kirby J). 
203 Kuddus [2002] 2 AC 122, 147-9. 
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III   OTHER PURPORTED ELEMENTS 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson observed that the High Court's references to the rule of law evince 
the ‘extent to which [it] has been extended judicially beyond its minimum’, or formal, 
content.2 04  For convenience, these references will be loosely grouped together. However, 
this grouping risks concealing several interrelated issues. One issue was identified in 
section A of part I of this chapter; some of the references to the rule of law made by 
members of the High Court may only be rhetorical. This could be resolved by examining 
connection: is there a necessary connection between the rule of law and the element? Many 
of the elements surveyed in this section have independent foundations in Australian law. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider whether they require whatever justification or 
legitimation the rule of law might provide. Taking equality (discussed in section B below) 
as a convenient example, it is not obvious that the principle of equality before the law 
requires support from its long association with the rule of law. Further, the twin 
requirements of judicial impartiality and independence (discussed in section D below) may 
have adequate constitutional foundations to render any legitimisation offered by reference 
to the rule of law superfluous. This is not to deny that there is a connection between the 
element and the rule of law. Rather, it is to stress that, to the extent that these 
requirements do not need to be associated with the rule of law, then the association needs 
further justification. Without such justification, the association may only complicate 
understanding of the element by pulling focus from its proper foundations in Australian 
law. While, ultimately, the questions of connection and justification do not need to be 
resolved in this thesis, they should be borne in mind throughout this survey because they 
will be relevant to determining whether an element inheres in the rule of law. 
 
A   Qualities of Australian law 
Members of the High Court have identified several requirements concerning the qualities 
of Australian law. While some of these may be brought within a formal conception of the 
rule of law, they are not necessarily required to secure the legality of governmental action. 
 
204 Gleeson, above n 106, 181; compare Heydon, above n 122, 19. 
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First, members of the High Court have recognised that the rule of law requires the content 
of the law to be accessible to all citizens.2 05  Lord Justice Scott argued that the need for laws 
to be accessible was a corollary of the fundamental maxim that ignorance of the law does 
not provide a defence.2 06  Scott LJ considered that the maxim — ignorantia juris non 
excusat — was the ‘working hypothesis on which the rule of law rests’.2 07  Justice Stephen, 
in the course of explaining the importance of publication requirements imposed by the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and the Rules Publication Act 1903 (Cth), considered 
Lord Justice Scott’s observations applied ‘with at least equal force’ in Australia.2 08 Chief 
Justice Barwick (without hint of hyperbole) described binding a ‘citizen by a law, the terms 
of which he has no means of knowing’ as a ‘mark of tyranny’.2 09  Justice Windeyer invoked 
the requirement to support his argument that publishing ‘reports of the decisions of the 
superior courts’ was ‘essential for the continuance of the rule of law’.2 1 0 
 
Associated with accessibility are the requirements of clarity, 2 1 1  certainty, 2 1 2  and 
consistency. 2 1 3  Justice Heydon, for example, opined that the less clear and fixed a 
jurisdiction’s laws are, the less it possesses the rule of law.2 1 4  The virtue of certainty has 
been invoked in opposition to the ‘broad and amorphous construction of criminal 
legislation’.2 1 5  A majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia stated 
that such an approach, which would permit police officers to exercise their ‘good judgment’ 
when enforcing the criminal law, ignored the ‘fundamental importance of the rule of 
law’.2 1 6  Justices Peek and Blue considered that the rule of law, and the separation of 
205 Gleeson, above n 106, 181. Equivalent requirements have been asserted by Fuller (see Fuller, above n 92, 
39, 49-51), Finnis (see Finnis, above n 92, 270), and Bingham (see Bingham, above n 30, 37 , 39). 
206 Blackpool Corporation v Locker [1947] 1  KB 349 ('Locker'), 361; quoted in Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 
218 CLR 493, 500-1 [2] (Gleeson CJ and Kirby  J). 
207  Locker [1947] 1  KB 349, 361. 
208 Watson (1979) 144 CLR 37 4, 395. 
209 Ibid 37 9. 
21 0 Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Commissioner of Taxation of the 
Commonwealth (1971) 125 CLR 659 ('Incorporated Council of Law Reporting'), 672; cited in Gleeson, above 
n 106, 181. 
21 1  Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 909 [82] (Edelman J). 
21 2 PGA  (2012) 245 CLR 355, 401  [125] (Hey don J); compare Graham (2017) 91  ALJR 890, 909 [82] 
(Edelman J). 
21 3 See Daniels Corporation International Pty Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543 ('Daniels Corporation'), 569 [67] (Kirby  J); Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442, 481 
[118] (Kirby  J); Central Bayside (2006) 228 CLR 168, 201  [92] (Kirby  J); Markarian v The Queen (2005) 
228 CLR 357, 390 [84] (McHugh J). 
21 4 Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 542 [72]; see Hey don, above n 122, 19-20. 
21 5 R v Morcom (2015) 122 SASR 154, 170 [59], [61] (Peek and Blue JJ). 
21 6 Ibid 170 [58]-[59]. 
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powers, inspired an expectation that legislatures ‘will prescribe clear legislation which 
informs the community exactly what is, and what is not, prohibited and not abnegate its 
power and responsibility to a police force’. 2 1 7  Their Honours did not indicate the 
consequence of a failure to satisfy this expectation. 
 
Further, Justice Heydon accepted that the imposition of obligations that are impossible to 
satisfy offends the rule of law.2 1 8 In Kirk, the appellant argued that the construction of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) adopted by the trial judge made it 
impossible for those required to comply with the Act to do so, which placed it in conflict 
with the rule of law.2 1 9  Heydon J, and the majority, preferred a construction that did not 
impose such obligations. 
 
B   Equality 
As was noted in chapter 2, members of the High Court have endorsed Dicey’s view that 
there is a significant relationship between equality and the rule of law.2 2 0 In Green, Chief 
Justice French and Justices Crennan and Kiefel acknowledged that equality before the law 
(embodied in the ‘common law norm of equal justice’) was an aspect of the rule of law.2 2 1  
Their Honours observed that equal justice according to law requires like cases be treated 
alike so far as the relevant laws allow.2 2 2  Their Honours further observed that equal justice 
requires ‘differential treatment of persons according to differences between them relevant 
to the scope, purpose and subject matter of the law’.2 2 3  These observations suggest that 
equal justice should be understood as importing more than just formal equality before the 
law.2 2 4   
21 7  Ibid 170 [59]. However, their Honours did not go so far as suggesting that their Court could declare invalid 
laws that failed to fulfill that expectation. 
21 8 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 587  [120]. 
21 9 Ibid 535; referring to Black-Clawson Limited v Papierwerke A G [1975] 1  AC 591 ('Black-Clawson'), 638. 
220 See section A2 of part II of chapter 2 above; see also Gleeson, above n 106, 181  (citing R v Shrestha (1991) 
173 CLR 48 ('Shrestha'), 60 (Brennan and McHugh JJ); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 
('Leeth'), 485 (Deane and Toohey  JJ)); Hey don, above n 122, 33. 
221  Green (2011) 244 CLR 462, 472 [28]; citing Bingham, above n 30, 55-9. Threatening to further complicate 
the complex  relationship between the rule of law and the principle of legality  (discussed in part IV of 
chapter 5 below) further, their Honours endorsed Hans Kelsen’s characterisation of ‘equality  before the law’ 
as ‘the principle of legality , or lawfulness, which is immanent in every  legal order’; citing Hans Kelsen, What 
is Justice (University of California Press, 1960), 1. 
222 Green (2011) 244 CLR 462, 47 3 [28]. 
223 Ibid; quoting Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608 [65] (Gaudron, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ). 
224 In the context of considering whether prov isions prohibiting indiv iduals who were not members of an 
Indigenous Australian community  from entering land owned on behalf of that community were 
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The constitutional status of equality before the law appears settled. In their notable dissent 
in Leeth, Justices Deane and Toohey argued that legal equality was a ‘fundamental 
constitutional doctrine’.2 2 5  Their Honours suggested (though refrained from determining) 
that the Commonwealth Constitution, as a complete document, indicated that the 
common law doctrine of legal equality was assumed.2 2 6  Their Honours went further, 
suggesting that this assumption served as a prima facie constraint on the Commonwealth 
Parliament’s legislative power.2 2 7  Their Honours’ formulation of the common law doctrine 
incorporated the ‘subjection of all persons to the law’.2 2 8 The constitutional doctrine was, 
however, peremptorily rejected by their fellow Justices.2 2 9  
 
However, a narrower conception — political equality — influenced the High Court’s 
reasoning in McCloy. 2 3 0  In the course of considering whether a prohibition against 
property developers making political donations contravened the constitutionally secured 
freedom of communication concerning political matters,2 3 1  the plurality observed that 
‘[e]quality of opportunity to participate in the exercise of political sovereignty is an aspect 
of representative democracy guaranteed by our constitution’.2 3 2  It is too early to ascertain 
whether this concept will gain further prominence in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
A core element of equality before the law is the uniform operation of laws. A High Court 
majority stated that the rule of law requires that criminal laws ‘should operate uniformly in 
circumstances which are not materially different’.2 3 3  This requirement effectively imposes 
discriminatory  for the purposes of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975  (Cth), Brennan J observed that ‘formal 
equality  before the law is insufficient to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination’; Gerhardy v Brown 
(1985) 159 CLR 7 0, 128. 
225 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 485. 
226 Ibid 488; see George Winterton, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to 
Ends?' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and 
Institutions (Federation Press, 1996) 121 , 131. 
227  Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 488. Had this been accepted, equality would have a status comparable to that 
Dixon J attributed to the rule of law; see part I of chapter 5 below. 
228 Ibid 485; quoting Dicey, above n 45, 193 (discussed in section A2 of part II of chapter 2 above). 
229 For example, see Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 467  (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ). 
230 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178 ('McCloy'). 
231  See section B of part IV of chapter 4 below. 
232 McCloy (2015) 257  CLR 178, 207  [45]; citing Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177  CLR 1 
('Nationwide News'), 72; Australian Capital Television Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1992) 177  CLR 106 
('Australian Capital Television'), 136; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530 ('Unions NSW'), 
57 8 [135]-[136]; Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508 ('Tajjour'), 593 [197]. 
233 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454, 465; cited in Gleeson, above n 106, 180. 
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on courts the task of ‘sentencing offenders on the basis that they are … all equal before the 
law’.2 3 4  
 
Equality before the law, in the sense of the uniform operation of a jurisdiction's laws, 
suggests that there should be few, if any, immunities from liability. Justice Kirby observed 
that immunity from legal liability subverts the ‘normal accountability for wrong-doing 
which is an ordinary feature of the rule of law’.2 3 5  However, in Attwells, the plurality 
acknowledged that the common law advocate’s immunity from suit operated at the 
‘expense of equality before the law’ which was an ‘important aspect of the rule of law’.2 3 6  
Their Honours considered that other aspects of the rule of law required retention of that 
immunity. This tension between the requirement of equality before the law and the 
recognition that certain immunities from civil liability (including the immunity of judicial 
officers for their judicial actions, discussed further in section E) serve the rule of law is 
important and will be revisited in part IV below. 
 
C     Freedoms 
Members of the High Court have linked two related freedoms to the rule of law: 
(i) freedom of expression and (ii) freedom of association. 
 
Justice Kirby endorsed the view that the rule of law would not be effective without freedom 
of expression. 2 3 7  Kirby J argued that the implication of a ‘high level of unrestricted 
communication’ (necessary for the ‘operation of the government’ contemplated by the 
Commonwealth Constitution) was confirmed by the ‘central place’ given to freedom of 
expression in international human rights law.2 3 8 However, the implication of a freedom of 
communication concerning political matters from the system of representative and 
responsible government established under the Commonwealth Constitution and its 
234 R v Binder [1990] VR 563, 569-70 (Marks J); quoted in Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48, 60 (Brennan and 
McHugh JJ). 
235 Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited (1996) 167  ALR 575, 611; cited in D'Orta-Ekenaike v 
Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1  ('D'Orta-Ekenaike '), 98 [314] (Kirby  J). 
236 Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Limited (2016) 90 ALJR 572 ('Attwells'), 583 [52] (French CJ, 
Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, and Keane JJ). 
237  APLA Limited v Legal Services Commissioner (2005) 224 CLR 322 ('APLA '), 443 [356]; citing R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 ('Ex parte Simms'), 125 
(Lord Stey n). 
238 APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 443 [356]; citing Roper v Simmons 543 US 551  (2005), 578. 
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recognition as an independent constraint on legislative capacity 2 3 9  provides stronger 
recognition of that freedom. This entrenched protection challenges the need to incorporate 
freedom of expression in respect of political matters in any constitutionally secured 
conception of the rule of law, though such incorporation may be found to secure 
expression that is not protected by the implied freedom. 
 
The second freedom connected to the rule of law is that of association. Justices McHugh 
and Kirby considered that the freedom to associate, subject to law, was ‘the underlying 
assumption of the rule of law’.2 4 0 Justice Gaudron suggested that freedom of political 
communication ‘depends on human contact and entails at least a significant measure of 
freedom to associate with others’.2 4 1  However, the High Court has declined to imply an 
independent freedom of association from the Commonwealth Constitution. In Tajjour, the 
Court was asked to consider whether a ‘freedom of association independent of the implied 
freedom of communication on governmental and political matters’ arose from the 
Commonwealth Constitution.2 4 2  Justice Hayne answered that question bluntly; stating 
that the Court had held ‘more than once’  that there was no independent freedom of 
association.2 4 3  Justice Gageler, however, argued that the authorities Justice Hayne relied 
upon ‘should not be read as suggesting that the constitutional protection of freedom of 
association for governmental or political purposes is in doubt’.2 4 4  Rather, association ‘for 
the purpose of engaging in communication on governmental or political matter is part and 
parcel of [that] freedom’.2 4 5  
 
D   The Judiciary and the Courts 
Justice Heydon, as discussed in part III of chapter 2, considered that the judiciary had a 
significant role in securing the rule of law. According to Chief Justice Street: 
 
239 See subsection B2 of part IV of chapter 4 below. 
240 Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473, 491 
[44]. 
241  Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 , 115. 
242 Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 534 [5] (French CJ). 
243 Ibid 566-7  [95]; citing Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 234 [148] 
(Gummow and Hay ne JJ), 306 [364] (Heydon J); Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 
('Wainohu'), 220 [72] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 230 [112] (Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, and Bell JJ), 251 
[186] (Hey don J). 
244 Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 578 [143]. 
245 Ibid. 
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[f]undamental to the rule of law and the administration of justice in our society is the 
convention that the judiciary is the arm of government charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting and applying the law between litigants in individual cases.246 
 
Justice French traced this role to the confrontation between Chief Justice Coke and King 
James I.2 4 7  Members of the High Court have recognised that the rule of law ‘controls the 
operation of the courts’2 4 8 and the judiciary. 
 
Central to a court’s fulfilment of that role are the twin requirements of impartiality2 4 9  and 
independence. Impartiality and independence are considered ‘defining features of judicial 
power’.2 5 0 Observing that impartiality is ‘fundamental to the rule of law’, Justice Rothman 
explained that a court’s ability to function would be diminished by the appearance of 
partiality.2 5 1  The consequence of this risk informs the disqualification of a judge who may 
not bring an ‘impartial and unprejudiced mind’ to resolving the question before them.2 5 2  
Justice Kirby asserted that the Commonwealth Constitution implies that the requirements 
of impartiality and independence are ‘essential to the maintenance of the rule of law’.2 5 3  
His Honour further asserted that these requirements are imposed on the State Supreme 
Courts because they come within the minimum content of the ‘constitutional description of 
such courts’. 2 5 4  Similarly, in the context of considering judicial impartiality and 
independence in Totani, Chief Justice French observed that the rule of law ‘does not vary 
246 Building and Construction Employees and Builders Labourers' Federation of New South Wales v 
Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2 ('Builders Labourers Federation'), 375-6. 
247  NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 298 
('NAAV '), 415-6 [444]. 
248 Gleeson, above n 106, 188. 
249 Mahoney J stated that the ‘duty  of impartiality  involves two things: that the judge be in fact impartial; and 
that what he [or she] does not give rise to an appearance which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of 
lack of impartiality’: Australian National Industries Limited v Spedley Securities Limited (In Liq) (1992) 26 
NSWLR 411 , 435-6; citing Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288. 
250 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 , 25 (Gaudron J); 
quoted in Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 226 [598] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
251  Karadaghian v Big Beat (Australia) Pty Limited (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1691, [24]. Partiality  risks public 
confidence in the administration of the law; see Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 492-3 [12] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ); see also Matthew Groves, 'Public Statements by 
Judges and the Bias Rule' (2014) 40(1) Monash University Law Review 115. 
252 Michael Wilson and Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427, 437  [31] (Gummow A-CJ, Hay ne, Crennan, 
and Bell JJ). 
253 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 ('Forge '), 118 [181]; 
citing Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes (eds), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), xv. Kirby  J, subsequently, observed that the ‘impartial application of 
basic legal principles … with judicial dispassion and complete even-handedness’ was a feature of the rule of 
law; R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232 ('Taufahema'), 293 [182]. 
254 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45 (2006) 228 CLR 45, 118 [181]. 
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in its application to any individual or group according to the measure of public or official 
condemnation, however justified, of that individual or that group’.2 5 5  
 
The requirements of independence and impartiality are currently secured, for State 
Supreme courts, by the Kable principle.2 5 6  In Emmerson, the High Court confirmed that 
Kable requires the satisfaction of these minimum requirements. 2 5 7  While the Court 
concluded that the challenged regime did not contravene the Kable principle, their 
Honours stated that Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club2 5 8  had established that legislation 
purporting to direct a court as to the manner or outcome of the exercise of its jurisdiction 
was ‘apt to impair, impermissibly, the character of courts as independent and impartial 
tribunals’.2 5 9  
 
A further anchor securing judicial independence and impartiality is the legal immunity 
afforded to judicial officers. The immunity shields a judge of a superior court ‘from civil 
liability for acts done in the exercise of his [or her] judicial function or capacity’.2 6 0 While 
considering that immunities generally derogate from the requirement of equality imposed 
by the rule of law,2 6 1  Justice Kirby conceded that the immunity of judges from liability for 
their judicial actions was an ‘essential precondition to the rule of law’.2 6 2  
 
Justice Kirby also asserted that the rule of law required judicial analysis, in the sense of 
reasoned consideration of an issue. Justice Kirby, with flourish, opined that, if the High 
Court were to succumb to Chief Justice Gleeson’s concern regarding judicial intuition,2 6 3  
the ‘Court might just as well renounce the function it has hitherto asserted’ in respect of 
legislative requirements (in that case, with respect to appropriations) imposed by the 
Commonwealth Constitution.2 6 4  
 
255 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 , 49 [7 3]. 
256 See section B3 of part IV of chapter 4 below. 
257  Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson (2014) 253 CLR 393 ('Emmerson'), 426 [44]. 
258 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police (WA) (2008) 234 CLR 532. 
259 Emmerson (2014) 253 CLR 393, 426-7  [45]; citing International Finance Trust Company Limited v New 
South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319 ('International Finance Trust Company'), 360 [77] 
(Gummow and Bell JJ). 
260 Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522, 527  (Kirby P). 
261  See section B of this part. 
262 Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227  CLR 166, 229 [188]. 
263 Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494 ('Combet'), 525-6 [12]. 
264 Ibid 609 [271]. 
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Providing an example of a generally recognised element of the rule of law,2 6 5  the plurality 
in Attwells, stated that the ‘certainty and finality of judicial decisions’ were ‘values at the 
heart of the rule of law’.2 6 6  Responding to a submission concerning advocates’ immunity 
from liability, their Honours explained that the immunity served to secure the judicial 
determination of rights between parties from being undermined by ‘subsequent collateral 
attack’.2 6 7  This is similar to the rationale that supports the judicial immunity2 6 8 (discussed 
above). 
 
1   Procedural Requirements 
Justice Heydon, as noted in part III of chapter 2, argued that a polity’s laws need to ensure 
the fairness of its adjudicative proceedings for the rule of law to be enlivened. Consistently, 
other jurists have suggested that the rule of law mandates the following procedural 
requirements: 
(i) the open courts principle (court proceedings should generally ‘be conducted 
 “publicly and in open view”’ not in secret2 6 9 );2 7 0 
(ii) the ability to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts;2 7 1  
(iii) the right to a fair trial2 7 2  (including the right to be heard2 7 3  and the  
 availability of trial by jury 2 7 4 ); and 
(iv) the obligation of fidelity to the orders of a superior court.2 7 5   
265 Burton Crawford, above n 14, 178. 
266 Attwells (2016) 90 ALJR 572, 583 [52] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, and Keane JJ). 
267  Ibid 583 [52]. 
268 D'Orta-Ekenaike (2005) 223 CLR 1 , 19 [40] (GleesonCJ, Gummow, Hay ne, and Hey don JJ). 
269 Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495, 520. 
27 0 K-Generation Pty Limited v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237  CLR 501 ('K-Generation'), 520 [49] 
(French CJ); citing Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17  CLR 50; see Wainohu (2011) 
243 CLR 181, 208 [44]. 
27 1  See Gleeson, above n 106, 181; citing Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limited (1981) 149 CLR 27 , 35 (Gibbs CJ); 
see also Re Attorney General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 135 ALR 29, 31-2 (Kirby  J); Patrick Stevedores 
Operations No 2 Pty Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 153 ALR 641, 641  [1] (Hay ne J); 
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, 303 [159] (Kirby  J); Lindon v 
Commonwealth (1996) 136 ALR 251, 256 (Kirby  J); see also DC v Secretary, Department of Family and 
Community Services [2017] NSWCA 225[164]-[167] (Sackville AJA); considering R (UNISON) v Lord 
Chancellor [2017] 3 WLR 409. 
27 2 Gleeson, above n 106, 180; citing Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264, 300 (Deane J); Krakover v 
The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 202, 224 [68] (McHugh J). Deane J opined that the availability of a fair and 
unprejudiced trial was the ‘touchstone of the existence of the rule of law’; Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) 
(1987) 164 CLR 15, 58. 
27 3 McCullagh v Autore [2014] NSWLEC 46, [16] (Pepper J). 
27 4 Cheng v Commonwealth (2000) 203 CLR 248, 227-8 [80]; quoted in Alqudsi v The Queen (2016) 285 
CLR 203, 231  [58] (French CJ). 
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Related to procedural requirement (ii), members of the High Court have stated the rule of 
law requires courts to exercise their jurisdiction when it is properly invoked.2 7 6  Justice 
Deane, for example, considered that the: 
 
prima facie right to insist upon the exercise of jurisdiction is a concomitant of a basic element of the 
rule of law, namely, that every  person and organisation, regardless of rank, condition or official 
standing, is “amenable to the jurisdiction” of the courts and other public tribunals.27 7  
 
 
Justice Kirby stressed that the rule of law requires that parties who invoke a court’s 
jurisdiction should ordinarily have redress2 7 8 where their arguments (however technical) 
are found to be valid and possessing merit.2 7 9  In the context of criminal prosecutions, this 
requirement constrains the power of courts to stay proceedings. Justice Brennan, in Jago, 
rejected the proposition that a criminal proceeding could be permanently stayed because 
prosecutorial delays had prejudiced the accused.2 8 0 His Honour considered that ‘so broad 
a power does not fall far short of a power which is incompatible with the rule of law’.2 8 1   
 
In respect of procedural requirement (iii), members of the High Court have recognised that 
the rule of law requires that courts determine matters according to law not according to 
considerations of fairness.2 8 2  This requirement arises from concerns that justice according 
to law might be ‘supplanted by justice according to whim’. 2 8 3  Justice Gaudron, for 
example, considered it ‘beyond controversy’ that courts are obliged to maintain the rule of 
27 5 Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 313, [36] (Mason P; Meagher and Handley 
JJA agreeing); see also Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 125, [60] (Beazley  P 
dissenting). 
27 6 Gleeson, above n 106, 181; citing Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 
197, 239 (Brennan J); Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23 ('Jago '), 7 6 (Gaudron J). 
27 7  Re Queensland Electricity Commission; Ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia (1987) 72 ALR 1, 
12; citing Dicey , above n 45, 193. 
27 8 Katsuno v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 40, 94 [130]; citing Wu v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 99, 128-9 [82] 
(Callinan J). 
27 9 Forsyth v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 231 CLR 531  ('Forsyth'), 551 [53]. 
280 Jago  (1989) 168 CLR 23, 51-3. 
281  Ibid 53. 
282 Gleeson, above n 106, 180; citing Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Westraders Pty Limited (1980) 144 
CLR 55, 60 (Barwick CJ) (quoting Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Westraders Pty Limited (1979) 38 
FLR 306, 319-20; citing inter alia Ransom v Higgs [1974] 1  WLR 1594, 1617  (Lord Simon)); see also Plaintiff 
M70/2011  v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144, 157  [2] (French CJ); Murray 
Gleeson, 'Judicial Discretion and the Rule of Law: Is There a Clash?' (2015) 3 Judicial College of Victoria 
Journal 3, 7 . 
283 Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (1971) 125 CLR 659, 668 (Barwick CJ). 
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
law — doing ‘justice according to law’ — rather than the rule of judges, doing ‘justice 
according to idiosyncratic notions[ 2 8 4 ] as to what is just in the circumstances’.2 8 5  
 
E   The Legal Profession 
A significant connexion between the rule of law and the legal profession has been widely 
recognised. President McMurdo asserted that the independent legal profession operates as 
a ‘check on the abuse of executive power’.2 8 6  Her Honour suggested that this check arose 
from the role played by the legal profession in assuring that ‘every citizen has access to the 
rule of law in independent courts’.2 8 7  Similarly, Chief Justice Warren argued that a lawyer’s 
duty to the proper administration of justice ‘goes to ensuring the integrity of the rule of 
law’.2 8 8 Members of the High Court have suggested that the rule of law requires that 
citizens be able to obtain legal advice.2 8 9  This requirement facilitates citizens accessing the 
content of the law to inform themselves of the potential legal consequences of their 
actions. 2 9 0  The right to obtain legal advice is complemented by a right to privileged 
communications with legal advisors.2 9 1  This right itself has been considered to follow from 
the rule of law. Justice McHugh, for instance, argued that the doctrine of client legal 
privilege was ‘a natural, if not necessary, corollary of the rule of law’.2 9 2   
284 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2002) 209 CLR 533, 558 [67]. 
285 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited (2001) 208 CLR 199, 231  [59]; 
quoted in Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 479 [516] (Hay ne J). 
286 Margaret McMurdo, 'Address' (delivered to Admission Ceremony 4, Supreme Court of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 2 February 2015) <http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2015/McMurdo020215.pdf>. 
287  Ibid. 
288 Mary lin Warren, 'The Duty  Owed to the Court - Sometimes Forgotten' (Paper delivered to Judicial 
Conference of Australia Colloquium, Melbourne, 9 October 2009) <http://jca.asn.au/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/2009OriginalKeynoteAddress.pdf>. 
289 Gleeson, above n 106, 180; citing Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 ('Baker'), 71  (Gibbs CJ); 
Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 ('Yuill'), 346 (McHugh J); 
Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121  ('Carter (1995)'), 161 
(McHugh J). 
290 Black-Clawson Limited v Papierwerke A G [1975] 1  AC 591, 638 (Lord Diplock); quoted in Y uill (1991) 
172 CLR 319, 346 (McHugh J). In Black-Clawson, Lord Diplock stated that the ‘acceptance of the rule of law 
as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen before committing himself to any  course of action, should 
be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it’. 
291  Baker (1983) 153 CLR 52, 71 (Gibbs CJ); citing A M & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European 
Communities [1983] 1  QB 87 8, 949-50. 
292 Carter (1995) 183 CLR 121, 161  (McHugh J); quoted in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v 
Propend Finance Pty Limited (1997) 188 CLR 501, 552 (McHugh J). 
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F   The Presumption Against Retrospectivity 
The presumption against laws having retrospective operation2 9 3  follows from the principle 
that individuals should only be punished for breaching laws knowable to them at the time 
of their actions.2 9 4  Retrospectivity is considered ‘antithetical’ to the rule of law.2 9 5  As noted 
in section B of part II of chapter 2, Hayek argued that a polity’s coercive power, including 
the power to punish a criminal offence, can only be exercised ‘in cases defined in advance 
by the law and in such a way that it can be foreseen how it will be used’.2 9 6  Hayek 
considered that the rule of law, in this sense, implied a limit to the scope of legislative 
power.2 9 7  Justice Heydon endorsed the proposition that coercive powers should only be 
exercised in cases prospectively defined by the law. 2 9 8  More generally, his Honour 
observed that it is characteristic of jurisdictions governed by the rule of law that their 
‘substantive laws are prospective not retrospective’.2 9 9  However, as will be shown in 
section 2 of part III of chapter 4, the State legislatures, like the Commonwealth 
Parliament,3 00 have power to enact retrospective legislation. 3 01  Further, although a public 
policy based, or judicial, preference for prospective effect may be relevant to the resolution 
of legislative ambiguity, such preferences do not give rise to enforceable constraints on 
legislative power. 
 
 
  
293 Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261, 267  (Dixon CJ); cited in Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 , 22-
3 (Gibbs J). 
294 Haskins (2011) 244 CLR 22, 48 [7 2] (Hey don J); PGA  (2012) 245 CLR 355, 444 [425] (Bell J). 
295 Hey don, above n 118, 126. 
296 Hay ek, above n 67 , 87; see Hey don, above n 122. 
297  Hay ek, above n 67 , 87 . 
298 PGA  (2012) 245 CLR 355, 403 [128]; quoting Hay ek, above n 67 , 87 . 
299 Haskins (2011) 244 CLR 22, 48 [7 2] (Hey don J); see Hey don, above n 122. 
300 See, for example, R v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425, 443 (Isaacs J), 451-2 (Higgins J), 455 (Gavan Duffy  and 
Rich JJ), 459-61 (Powers J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 ('Polyukhovich'), 642-3 
(Dawson J), 7 21 (McHugh J); see also Aroney et al, above n 21 , 108-9. 
301 This power, however, is moderated by the common law presumption against retrospectiv ity ; see n 326 
below. 
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G   Just Compensation 
A further purported requirement of the rule of law is just compensation for governmental 
appropriation of property. Justice Heydon endorsed Hayek’s view 3 02  that just 
compensation was an ‘integral and indispensable element of the principle of supremacy of 
law’. 3 03  Heydon J argued that s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution served 
functions beyond preventing ‘arbitrary exercise’ of the power of compulsory acquisition.3 04  
 
While just compensation may be required by the rule of law, the New South Wales 
legislature will be shown, in chapter 4, to have power to enact laws to compulsorily acquire 
property without compensation.3 05  This requirement, accordingly, has not been recognised 
to constrain the capacity of the State legislatures. 
 
H   Proportionality 
Finally, in Momcilovic, Justices Crennan and Kiefel observed that proportionality was 
founded on the rule of law.3 06  Their Honours did not expand on that observation. Drawing 
on the context of the observation, it appears that their Honours had in mind a potential 
need for proportionality between a State law and the scope of the legislative power that 
enables its enactment. Their Honours noted that the State Supreme Courts lacked 
jurisdiction to declare ‘manifestly disproportionate’ legislation void.3 07  
 
However, the relationship between the principle of proportionality and the rule of law is 
not as clear as Justices Crennan and Kiefel’s observation suggests. In McCloy, the plurality 
emphasised that proportionality is an analytical framework. 3 08  Accepting that this 
correctly describes proportionality’s function, it is not clear how it could be founded on the 
rule of law. It is, further, not obvious that proportionality, as it emerges from McCloy, is an 
aspect or requirement of the rule of law. It is not clear how the rule of law provides the 
302 Hay ek, above n 62, 191. 
303 ICM Agriculture Pty Limited v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140 ('ICM Agriculture '), 208 [177]; 
quoting Hay ek, above n 62, 191 . Hey don J noted Hayek’s observation was not ‘wholly  accurate’ though it did 
not stand alone. 
304 ICM Agriculture (2009) 240 CLR 140, 208 [177]. 
305 Durham Holdings Pty Limited v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399 ('Durham Holdings'), 410 [14] 
(Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ; Callinan J agreeing with reservations), 425 [56] (Kirby J). 
306 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [562]. 
307  Ibid 215 [561]. 
308 McCloy (2015) 257  CLR 17 8 (2015) 257  CLR 178, 215 [73] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, and Keane JJ). 
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foundation for an analytic framework for ascertaining whether legislation is proportionate 
to the grant of legislative power. 
 
IV   CONCLUSION: THE RANGE OF RECOGNISED ELEMENTS 
 
This chapter has shown that members of the High Court have provided a range of answers 
to the question of what the rule of law requires. Doing so, it has updated Chief Justice 
Gleeson’s survey of recognised elements and shows the increased prominence of the rule of 
law in the High Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
Further, this chapter has shown that the elements identified by the High Court may 
conflict. A convenient example of that conflict is the tension between equality before the 
law and the recognition of certain immunities from civil liability. This tension was 
identified in section B of part III. One side of the tension was a core, if not fundamental, 
element of the rule of law — equality before the law — against which pulls a set of 
requirements derived from other aspects of the rule of law (such as the requirements of 
certainty and finality). By showing how easily the aspects of the rule of law may come into 
conflict, this tension provides a basis for rebutting the claim that the rule of law is coherent 
or cohesive and for the assertion that the rule of law can be recognised as a single, 
monolithic, legal concept. The range of the aspects and requirements identified support 
Justice Basten’s observation that the rule of law is ‘multifaceted’.3 09  Accordingly, they 
support the argument advanced in part IV of chapter 2 that any court considering the rule 
of law should view it as a shorthand phrase that encompasses a disparate, and incoherent, 
group of elements. 
 
The examination undertaken in this chapter has also indicated that the recognised 
elements have different sources. For example, some of the requirements (such as the 
distinction of judicial power) can be attributed to the separation of governmental powers 
effected by the Commonwealth Constitution. Further, at least in respect of Commonwealth 
legislation, the requirement of just compensation for the acquisition of property has a 
direct source in s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution. These different sources 
appear to prevent the different elements from being compelled into a coherent and 
cohesive conception of the rule of law. To the extent that the different elements cannot be 
309 Bateman (2015) 90 NSWLR 7 9, 109 [137]. 
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corralled into such a conception, they present a problem for any assertion that a singular 
conception of the rule of law could constrain State legislative power. 
 
Two observations relevant to arguments developed in subsequent chapters can be drawn 
from this chapter. First, part II of this chapter showed that there are a set of recognised 
elements that are connected to the core ideal of securing the legality of governmental 
action. The recognition of these elements shows that a court could easily attribute content 
to a conception of the rule of law derived from the Commonwealth Constitution.  
 
Importantly for chapter 4, this chapter also showed that some of the recognised elements 
have been held to not constrain the State legislatures. The requirement for just 
compensation for the acquisition of property, again, serves as an apt example. As a 
requirement imposed by s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution (irrespective of its 
association with the rule of law), it constrains the exercise of Commonwealth legislative 
power. However, that requirement does not constrain the New South Wales Legislature. 
This shows that elements of the rule of law that constrain the Commonwealth may not 
similarly constrain a State. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 
 
The Momcilovic question is concerned with the capacity of State legislatures. It concerns 
the limits on the capacity of those legislatures. 
 
This chapter seeks to establish whether the rule of law is a constraint imposed on the 
power conferred on the New South Wales Legislature, serving as an example State 
legislature, by s 5 of the Constitution Act. The authorities considering the breadth of that 
power will be summarised in part III as will the constraints imposed by the Constitution 
Act. Two further sources of constraints will then be considered. The first source, which will 
be considered in part IV, is the Commonwealth Constitution. The second, which will be 
briefly considered in part V, is the common law. Parts III, IV, and V ultimately show that 
the rule of law has not yet been recognised as a judicially enforceable constraint on the 
power conferred by s 5 of the Constitution Act. 
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I   POLITICAL IDEALS 
 
This is a convenient point, before progressing, to consider a short answer to the 
Momcilovic question. If the rule of law is, as Justice Basten3 1 0 and others imply, only a 
political ideal then it can only be a political constraint on legislative capacity. A political 
ideal may constrain a legislature.3 1 1  As Hayek observed, the rule of law may be secured by 
public opinion.3 1 2  Public opinion might deter a legislature from enacting an extreme law 
(such as the hypothetical law requiring the infanticide of blue-eyed infants 3 1 3 ). A political 
ideal may also operate by guiding the decisions of legislators. In neither of these guises, 
however, is the rule of law a judicially enforceable constraint on legislative capacity. 
 
Further, reliance on the rule of law, in the guise of a political ideal, to influence or inhibit 
legislative activity seems overly optimistic. A recent example might be the addition of 
s 33AA to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), which deemed certain conduct 
inconsistent with ‘allegiance to Australia’ and as effecting a renunciation of Australian 
citizenship. Krygier, who has written extensively on the rule of law, 3 1 4  criticised that 
amendment for inviting the exercise of arbitrary power.3 1 5  This, and other examples, 
suggest that general public and political endorsement of the ideal is insufficient to 
constrain a legislature determined to disregard the rule of law in the course of 
implementing a populist agenda with minimal risk of electoral consequences.  
31 0  John Basten, 'Constitutional Law in the Federal and State Courts in 2014: The Judiciary  and the 
Legislature' (paper delivered to the Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law Constitutional Law Conference, 
13 February  2015) <http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/Pre-
2015%20Speeches/Basten/basten_20150213.pdf>. 
31 1  Jeffrey Goldsworthy , Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 59. 
31 2 Hay ek (1953), above n 63, 520; see section B of part II of chapter 2 above. 
31 3 Adopting Stephen’s example; see Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (Smith, Elder & Co, 1882), 143; quoted 
in Dicey , above n 45, 81; Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 402 (Kirby  P), 420 (Priestley 
JA). 
31 4 See, for example, Martin Krygier, 'Rule of Law' in Niel J Smelser and Paul B Baltes (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier, 2001) vol 20, 13403 ; Martin Krygier, 'Rule of 
Law' in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajo (eds), The Oxford Companion of Comparative Constitutional 
Law  (Oxford University  Press, 2012) 233 ; see also Clarence Ling, 'Martin Kry gier's Contribution to the Rule 
of Law' (2013) 4 Western Australian Jurist 211 . 
31 5  Martin Kry gier, 'On the Rule of Law' on The Monthly (20 August 2015) 
https://www.themonthly.com.au/blog/martin-krygier/2015/20/2015/1440049152/rule-law. 
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II   LEGISLATIVE POWER 
 
Before proceeding to consider s 5 of the Constitution Act, it is useful to distinguish 
legislative power from the other governmental powers. Essentially, it is the power 
conferred on a governmental institution, the legislature, to determine the content of 
laws.3 1 6  It is conventionally distinguished from executive power, understood as the power 
to administer existing laws.3 1 7  It is also distinguished from judicial power, understood as 
the power to decisively settle disputes.3 1 8 The extent that these powers should be conferred 
on distinct governmental institutions — the separation of powers — is a live issue in 
contemporary constitutional theory.3 1 9  
 
III   LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION ACT 
 
In New South Wales, the Constitution Act confers legislative power in respect of the State 
on the New South Wales Legislature. The conferral of such power on the New South Wales 
Legislature can be traced back to s 1 of the Constitution Act 1855.3 2 0 The power conferred 
by s 1 was exercised, in conjunction with the authority conferred by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act 1865 (Imp),3 2 1  to enact the Constitution Act in 1902. 
 
  
31 6 Commonwealth v Grunseit (1943) 67  CLR 58 ('Grunseit'), 82 (Latham CJ); quoted in Plaintiff S157/2002 
(2003) 211  CLR 476, 513 [102] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and Hay ne JJ); Plaintiff M79/2012 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 336, 367  [88] (Hay ne J). 
31 7  Aroney  et al, above n 21, 383; see Grunseit (1943) 67  CLR 58 (1943) 67  CLR 58, 82; citing JW Hampton Jr 
and Company v United States 27 6 US 394 (1928), 407  (Williams J). 
31 8 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Proprietary Limited (1970) 123 CLR 361, 
374 (Kitto J). However, it does not extend to determining ‘what legal rights and interests should be created’; 
Precision Data Holdings Pty Limited v Willis (1991) 173 CLR 167, 189. 
31 9 See Aileen Kavanagh, 'The Constitutional Separation of Powers' in David Dy zenhaus and Malcolm 
Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law  (Oxford University Press, 2016) 221 . 
320 Though earlier Imperial statutes had conferred power on the unicameral Legislative Council of New South 
Wales; see Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation Press, 2004), 2-3. The New 
South Wales Constitution Act 1855  was enacted as a schedule to the New South Wales Constitution Statute 
1855  (Imp) 18 & 19 Vic, c 54. 
321  Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 382. 
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A   Section 5: The Power to Make Laws 
Section 5 of the Constitution Act confirms the power conferred on the New South Wales 
Legislature. Section 5 provides: 
 
The Legislature shall, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of 
New South Wales in all cases whatsoever: 
Provided that all bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue, or for imposing any 
new rate, tax or impost, shall originate in the Legislative Assembly. 
 
1   The Scope of Legislative Power 
Two elements of s 5 of the Constitution Act are significant to discerning the scope of the 
power it confers. The first is the reference to ‘peace, welfare, and good government’. This 
phrase will be shown, in section 2(a) below, to confer a plenary power rather than 
imposing a purposive limit. The second is the acknowledgement that the Legislature’s 
power is subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution. The constraints 
imposed by the Commonwealth Constitution will be considered in part IV of this chapter. 
Those imposed by the Constitution Act itself will be considered in section B below. 
 
2   Plenary Power 
Section 5 of the Constitution Act confers plenary power on the New South Wales 
Legislature. This power has been held to include the capacity to alter the Constitution Act 
itself3 2 2  (subject to any manner and form requirements). It has been held to include the 
capacity to enact laws that abrogate fundamental common law rights,3 2 3  subject to the 
rules of statutory construction. This follows from the supremacy of enacted statutes over 
the common law.3 2 4  The power has also been held to include: 
(i) the capacity to enact laws with retrospective operation325 where they displace 
the common law presumption;326 
322 Ibid 419 (Priestley  JA); citing Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR(NSW) 385 (Sugarman J); see also Attorney-
General v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 395 ('Trethowan (1931)'), 420 (Rich J); citing McCawley v The King 
[1920] 1  AC 691. 
323 R v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204 ('MSK'), 212-3 [37] (Mason P). 
324 Dicey , above n 45, 413-4; quoted in Jeffrey  Goldsworthy , 'Is Legislative Supremacy  Threatened?' (2016) 
60(11) Quadrant 56 , 56. 
325 Arena v Nader (1997) 42 NSWLR 427, 435 (Priestley , Handley, and Meagher JJA); see Twomey, above n 
320, 195. 
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(ii) the capacity to enact laws that compulsorily acquire property;327 and 
(iii) the capacity to alter laws at issue in pending proceedings.328 
 
(a)   Peace, Welfare and Good Government 
Section 5 confers ‘power to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government’ of New 
South Wales. A literal reading of this phrase suggests a purposive limit on the exercise of 
legislative power. That is, a law that was not discernibly for either the peace, the welfare, or 
the good governance of the State would be beyond the competence of the legislature. 
However, as Justices Crennan and Kiefel stated in Momcilovic, it does not enable judicial 
review of legislative action on the ‘ground that a law does not secure the welfare and the 
public interest’.3 2 9  The High Court concluded in Union Steamship Company that: 
 
within the limits of the grant, a power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of a territory is as ample and plenary as the power possessed by the Imperial 
Parliament itself.330 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the High Court endorsed a line of authority that emerged from 
Burah. 3 3 1  Lord Selborne (delivering the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (‘Privy Council’)) held that, subject to express statutory limits, the Legislative 
Council of India had ‘plenary powers of legislation as large, and of the same nature’ as the 
Imperial Parliament.3 3 2  According to Blackstone, the Westminster Parliament’s ‘power and 
jurisdiction’ was such ‘that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons, within any 
bounds’. 3 3 3  Blackstone observed that the Westminster Parliament had ‘sovereign and 
uncontrollable authority in the making, conferring, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, 
326 La Perouse Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act (2016) 220 
LGERA 1 , 36 [149] (Sheahan J); quoting Re Athlumney; Ex parte Wilson [1898] 2 QB 547, 551-2 (Wright J) 
(as quoted in Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 , 22 (Gibbs J)). 
327  Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 408 [7] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ) citing 
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 66 (Griffith CJ), 77  (Barton J), 98 (Isaacs J), 105 
(Gavan Duffy  J); P J Magennis Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382, 403, 405 (Latham CJ), 
416 (McTiernan), 419 (Williams J); Pye v Renshaw  (1951) 84 CLR 58, 7 8-80; Minister for Lands v Pye 
(1953) 87  CLR 469, 486; Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 ('Mabo (No 1)'), 202 (Wilson J); 
Commonwealth v WMC Resources Limited (1996) 194 CLR 1 , 58 [149] (McHugh J). 
328 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 375 (Street CJ). 
329 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 215-6 [562]. 
330 Union Steamship Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10. 
331  Ibid 9; citing R v Burah (1878) 3 App Cas 889 ('Burah'). 
332 Burah (187 8) 3 App Cas 889, 904. 
333 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (9th ed, 1783), 160; citing Edward Coke, 
Institutes of the Laws of England (1644), 36. 
53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
repealing, reviving, and expanding of laws’ on all possible matters.3 3 4  As Lord Bingham 
eloquently stated, the Westminster Parliament ‘could make or unmake any law it 
wished’.3 3 5  
 
The Privy Council adopted a similar view of s 92 of the British North America Act 1867 
(Imp). Sir Barnes Peacock reiterated that the Legislature of Ontario had, within express 
limits, legislative capacity ‘as plenary and ample … as the Imperial Parliament in the 
plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow’.3 3 6  The Privy Council emphasised that, 
within territorial and subject matter limits, a ‘local legislature is supreme, and has the 
same authority as the Imperial Parliament’.3 3 7  
 
The Privy Council subsequently held that the power granted to the New South Wales 
Legislature by s 1 of the Constitution Act 18553 3 8 was similarly plenary. Sir Robert Collier 
considered that Burah and Hodge dispelled the view that a colonial legislature exercised 
its powers as a ‘delegate of the Imperial Parliament’.3 3 9  The Privy Council confirmed that a 
colonial legislature was a ‘Legislature restricted in the area of its powers, but within that 
area unrestricted and not acting as an agent or a delegate’.3 4 0 
 
Returning to consideration of the phrase ‘for the peace, welfare, and good government’, the 
High Court concluded, in Union Steamship Company, that it does not contain ‘words of 
limitation’.3 4 1  The High Court agreed that the phrase connoted, ‘in British constitutional 
language, the widest law-making powers appropriate to a Sovereign’.3 4 2  The High Court 
explained that the phrase does not confer jurisdiction on a State court to ‘strike down 
334 Blackstone, above n 333; quoted in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337  ('Kartinyeri'), 355 
[12] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). 
335 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262 ('Jackson'), 274 [9]. 
336 Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117  ('Hodge '), 132. 
337  Ibid. 
338 Which was on substantially similar terms to s 5 of the Constitution Act. 
339 Powell v Apollo Candle Co Limited (1885) 10 App Cas 282, 290. 
340 Ibid. 
341  Union Steamship Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10. The High Court noted that the phrase was 
‘indistinguishable from the power to make laws “for the peace, order and good government” of a territory ’, 
such as the Commonwealth (see Commonwealth Constitution, s 51). Kirby  P stated that the phrase had 
‘hitherto been seen as an ample grant of power in all cases whatsoever’; Builders Labourers Federation 
(1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 406; see also Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 425 [55]. 
342 Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] 1  AC 900 ('Ibralebbe '), 923 (Viscount Radcliffe); cited in Union Steamship 
Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10. 
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legislation’ that does not ‘promote or secure’ peace, welfare, or good governance.3 4 3  This is 
because the task of determining the ‘wisdom and extent of legislative measures’, including 
those that modify or abrogate common law rights, is entrusted to the State legislature.3 4 4  
 
The High Court’s confirmation of the scope of the phrase rejected a persuasive 
construction preferred by Chief Justice Street. It was argued, in the Builders Labourers’ 
Federation case, that the Builders Labourers Federation (Special Provisions) Act 1986 
(NSW) was not a law for the peace, welfare, or good government of New South Wales.3 4 5  
Considering that argument, Street CJ rejected, as unsupported, the assumption that the 
phrase conferred unconstrained legislative power. 3 4 6  His Honour argued that the 
assumption rested on statements by the Privy Council (such as those summarised above) 
that were concerned with rejecting the proposition that colonial legislatures exercised 
legislative power as delegates of the Imperial Parliament.3 4 7  Judicial rejection of that 
proposition did not ‘necessarily import that the power is unlimited in scope’.3 4 8  His 
Honour further argued that the strongest statement of the proposition — in Ibralebbe — 
was unsupported obiter dicta. 3 4 9  Street CJ could find ‘no warrant’ for glossing the 
important phrase from s 5 of the Constitution Act by depriving its terms of their ordinary 
meaning and interpretation. 3 5 0  Street CJ preferred to follow Attorney-General for 
Saskatchewan v Canadian Pacific Railway Company, where the Privy Council stated that 
the ‘words “peace, order, and good government” are words of very wide import, and a 
legislature empowered to pass laws for such purposes has a very wide discretion’.3 5 1  Street 
CJ observed that by ‘acknowledging the “very wide” import and discretion, the Privy 
Council has … impliedly accepted that the import and discretion is not unlimited’.3 5 2  
Consistently with this view, his Honour considered that the phrase prescribed and 
confined the ‘scope of the legislative field open’ to the New South Wales Legislature.3 5 3  For 
a law enacted in exercise of the power granted by s 5 to be constitutionally valid, it must: 
343 Union Steamship Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10. 
344 MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204, 213 [37] (Mason P). 
345 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 382. 
346 Ibid 382-5. 
347  Ibid 383. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid 385. 
350 Ibid. 
351  Attorney-General for Saskatchewan v Canadian Pacific Railway Company [1953] 1  AC 594, 613-4 
(Viscount Simon). 
352 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 384. 
353 Ibid 382. 
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meet the test of being for “the peace, welfare, and good government” of that parliamentary 
democracy [New South Wales] as it is perceived at the time when the question arises. It 
rests with our courts to determine whether that test is met.354 
 
Chief Justice Street’s position found favour with Justice Priestley. His Honour considered 
it ‘at least arguable’ that the words of s 5 confined the exercise of legislative power.3 5 5  
However, Priestley JA cautioned that it would require a ‘very extraordinary’ act to induce a 
court to consider whether its provisions fulfilled the constitutional requirement.3 5 6  
President Kirby, in contrast, held that the phrase was not one of limitation.3 5 7  Kirby P 
accepted that the phrase indicated ‘an ample grant of power “in all cases whatsoever”’.3 5 8 
The President declined to consider whether s 5 reserved a power to the judiciary to ‘declare 
invalid a manifestly arbitrary and unjust law’.3 5 9  Kirby P, pragmatically, observed that a 
legislature that enacted such a law was unlikely to be restrained by the Constitution Act or 
the decision of a court.3 6 0 His Honour stressed that the protection against the enactment of 
such laws was ‘political and democratic’.3 6 1  Similarly, Justice Glass preferred to leave the 
question of whether the phrase constrained legislative power for future determination.3 6 2  
Justice Mahoney considered the phrase did not impose a limit on legislative power.3 6 3  
 
In addition to repudiating Chief Justice Street’s construction of s 5, the unanimous High 
Court’s judgment in Union Steamship Company, and its repeated endorsement, precludes 
the revival of such a construction in future. As Justice Kirby subsequently noted, the High 
Court ‘established conclusively that the words are words of grant’ not ‘words of 
limitation’.3 6 4  Thus, it is unlikely that a law that adversely affects the rule of law will be 
found to be beyond the scope of s 5 of the Constitution Act because it is not for the peace, 
welfare, or good government of New South Wales. 
 
354 Ibid. 
355  Ibid 421; quoting W L Morrison, The System of Law and Courts Governing New South Wales 
(Butterworths, Second ed, 1984), 83. 
356 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 421. 
357  Ibid 406. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361  Ibid. 
362 Ibid 407. 
363 Ibid 408. 
364 Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 425 [55]. 
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B   Limits on Legislative Capacity Imposed by the Constitution Act 
The Constitution Act entrenches several ‘manner and form’ constraints that limit how the 
New South Wales Legislature can enact certain classes of law.3 6 5  Such constraints were 
originally enacted pursuant to s 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and are currently 
validated by s 6 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) which, in light of Attorney-General (WA) v 
Marquet,3 6 6  is likely to be the only source of power to entrench a manner and form 
requirement. The two primary manner and form requirements are imposed by ss 7A and 
7B of the Constitution Act. Section 7A, for example, prohibits the abolition or dissolution 
of the Legislative Council, or the alteration of its powers, ‘except in the manner’ s 7A 
prescribes. The effectiveness of s 7A was confirmed by both the High Court3 6 7  and the Privy 
Council3 6 8 in Trethowan. A third significant manner and form requirement is found in the 
procedures imposed, by ss 5 and 5A, for money bills. Accepting that s 6 of the Australia 
Act 1986 (Cth) and the Australia Act 1986 (UK) may be the only source of power to 
entrench a manner and form requirement, the types of requirement that could be 
entrenched are limited. 
 
Two potential implications from the text and structure of the Constitution Act have 
received judicial consideration. The first — a separation of judicial power — was rejected. 
The Constitution Act lacks provisions comparable to ss 61 and 71 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. It, thus, does not contain a provision that expressly vests judicial, or 
executive, power in a distinct institution. President Kirby, in Builders Labourers’ 
Federation, provided three interrelated bases for rejecting an implied separation of judicial 
power. First, the power exercised by the New South Wales judiciary had not been 
entrenched; specifically, the ability of the New South Wales Legislature to make changes to 
courts or the judiciary was not subject to a manner and form requirement.3 6 9  Secondly, 
Kirby P considered that (in contrast with the Commonwealth Constitution3 7 0) the text and 
structure of the Constitution Act did not suggest the separation of judicial power.3 7 1   
Thirdly, such a separation was not suggested by the ‘history of judicial arrangements in 
365 Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 395, 413 (Gavan Duffy  CJ); see also Clayton v Heffron (1960) 105 CLR 214, 
250-1 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Tay lor, and Windey er JJ) 
366 (2003) 217  CLR 545. 
367  See Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 395. 
368 See Attorney-General v Trethowan [1932] 1  AC 526. 
369 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 400. Note that pt. 9 of the Constitution Act, which 
is concerned with the judiciary, was inserted by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1992 (NSW). 
37 0 See section B1  of part II of chapter 5 below. 
37 1  Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 400. 
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New South Wales’.3 7 2  In Kable, the High Court held that the purported entrenchment of 
judicial independence (by the insertion of part 9 into the Constitution Act) did not 
implement the separation of judicial power.3 7 3  
 
The other potential implied limitation is the freedom of political communication. Such a 
freedom has been derived from the Constitution Act 1889 (WA). 3 7 4  Whether the 
entrenched provisions of the New South Wales Constitution Act require representative 
government (in a manner comparable with that discerned in Stephens) has not been 
determined. Twomey has presented an argument that ss 7A and 7B, alongside other 
sections of the Constitution Act, might indirectly impose such a requirement.3 7 5  However, 
Twomey also identified significant obstacles to establishing that a provision that limits 
political communications contravenes such a requirement.3 7 6  It would only be in a case 
where the relevant law was found not to be inconsistent with the freedom implied from the 
Commonwealth Constitution (discussed in section B2 of part IV below) that a court would 
have occasion to consider whether it contravened a freedom derived from the Constitution 
Act. Ultimately, however, such an implication will be limited and will not extend to 
incorporate all the disparate elements of the rule of law. 
 
  
37 2 Ibid. 
37 3 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51  ('Kable (1996)'), 65 (Brennan CJ), 77-
80 (Dawson J), 93 (Toohey  J); see also Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 573 [69] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ). 
37 4 Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Limited (1994) 182 CLR 211  ('Stephens'), 232 (Mason CJ, 
Toohey, and Gaudron JJ), 236 (Brennan J), 259 (McHugh J). 
37 5 Twomey , above n 320, 205-6. 
37 6 Ibid 206-7 . 
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IV   LIMITS ON STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER IMPOSED BY THE 
COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION 
 
The New South Wales Legislature, as noted above, is expressly subordinate to the 
Commonwealth Constitution.3 7 7  This subordination is imposed by covering clause 5 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution Act and s 106 of the Commonwealth Constitution.3 7 8  
Section 106 provides for the continuation of the States’ constitutions ‘subject to this 
Constitution’. This provision diminishes the ‘content and strength’ of the legislative power 
conferred by s 5 of the Constitution Act.3 7 9  It does not, however, impose provisions of the 
Commonwealth Constitution that would not otherwise apply. 3 8 0  Section 107 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution complements s 106 by preserving ‘[e]very power of the 
Parliament of a Colony’ that becomes a State ‘unless it is by this Constitution exclusively 
vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the 
State’.3 8 1  
 
A   Express Limitations Imposed by the Commonwealth Constitution 
The Commonwealth Constitution imposes several express limitations on the legislative 
power of the States. Section 90, subject to s 91, reserves the power to ‘impose duties of 
customs and excise, and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods’  exclusively 
to the Commonwealth. Section 92 requires that ‘trade, commerce, and intercourse among 
the States’ be free. Section 114, inter alia, prohibits the States from raising or maintaining 
‘any naval or military force’ or imposing a tax on property owned by the Commonwealth 
(without its consent). Section 115 prohibits the States from coining money. 
 
 
  
37 7  Constitution Act, s 5; see New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118 ('Kable (2013)'), 127  [15] (French 
CJ, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ). 
37 8 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 ('McGinty'), 173 (Brennan CJ). 
37 9 Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 509, 530 (Dixon J). 
380 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 189 (Dawson J). 
381  See R v Phillips (1970) 125 CLR 93, 116-7  (Windey er J); Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 
CLR 37 3, 464 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh JJ). 
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1   The Commonwealth’s Legislative Power 
The Commonwealth’s legislative power constrains the States’ legislative power. Most of the 
heads of legislative power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament, including those 
conferred by s 51 of the Commonwealth Constitution, are concurrent. Their subject matter 
is not withdrawn from the reach of the State legislatures. Significantly, the conferral of 
non-exclusive legislative power on the Commonwealth Parliament does not include the 
conferral of power to prohibit the State legislatures from ‘enacting a law on a topic falling 
within a head of concurrent Commonwealth legislative power’.3 8 2  The most that the 
Commonwealth Parliament can achieve (by relying on s 109) is to render an inconsistent 
State law operatively ineffective to the extent of the inconsistency. However, this does not 
render the State law invalid in the sense of being beyond legislative power.3 8 3  
 
Section 52 of the Commonwealth Constitution, however, confers ‘exclusive power’ on the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to: 
 
(i) the seat of government of the Commonwealth, and all places acquired by the 
Commonwealth for public purposes; 
(ii) matters relating to any department of the public service the control of which is by 
this Constitution transferred to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth; 
(iii) other matters declared by this Constitution to be within the exclusive power of the 
Parliament. 
 
The conferral of exclusive power by s 52 effectively precludes the State legislatures from 
enacting laws in respect of the listed matters; although State laws may be adopted and 
applied as federal laws in Commonwealth places.3 8 4  
 
Two provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution effectively suppress the operation of 
some State laws: (i) s 109; and (ii) s 117. Section 109, as noted earlier, establishes the 
prevalence of Commonwealth laws over inconsistent state laws. It provides: 
 
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall 
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid. 
  
382 Mabo (No 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186, 197  (Mason CJ). 
383 See Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557  ('Carter (1942)'), 573 (Latham 
CJ); Western Australia (1995) 183 CLR 373, 465 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron, and 
McHugh JJ). 
384 Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970, s 4. 
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The High Court has construed ‘invalid’ to mean ‘inoperative’3 8 5  rather than being beyond 
the power of a State legislature. It has confirmed that the inconsistent law is only 
inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency,3 8 6  and inconsistent provisions resume full 
operation on the cessation of the inconsistency.3 8 7  
 
Section 117 provides that a ‘subject of the Queen’ (construed as an Australian citizen3 8 8) 
resident in any State shall not be: 
 
subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally 
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State. 
 
Section 117 does not render a discriminatory State law invalid.3 8 9  Instead, s 117 immunises 
subjects of the Queen from the application of the discriminatory law.3 9 0 
 
B   Limitations Impliedly Derived from the Commonwealth Constitution 
The text of the Commonwealth Constitution includes a number of references that could be 
cited as the basis for implying restrictions on the exercise of State legislative power. These 
include references to the State,3 9 1  to the State constitutions, 3 9 2  to State parliaments,3 9 3  and 
to State executives.3 9 4  The references to the State parliaments, consistently with the High 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding State Supreme Courts, 3 9 5  could constrain State 
legislatures from legislating themselves out of existence or from purportedly conferring 
their powers in a manner that would significantly impair their institutional integrity. 
However, an occasion for the High Court to consider this potential implication has not yet 
arisen.  
385 Carter (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573 (Latham CJ). 
386 Ibid. 
387  Butler v Attorney-General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268, 274 (Fullagar J), 278 (Kitto J), 283 (Taylor J), 286 
(Windey er J). 
388 Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28, 43 [30], [32] (Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ). 
389 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461  ('Street'), 486 (Mason CJ), 504 (Brennan J). 
390 Ibid 486 (Mason CJ), 502-3 (Brennan J). 
391  See Twomey , above n 320, 182. 
392 See Ibid; considering Commonwealth Constitution, ss 105A, 106. 
393 See Twomey , above n 320, 183-4; considering Commonwealth Constitution, ss 9, 15, 25, 29, 41 , 51, 107, 
108, 111, 123, 124. 
394 See Twomey , above n 320, 184-5; considering Commonwealth Constitution, ss 7 , 12, 15, 21, 84, 110. 
395 See section B3 of this chapter and part III of chapter 5. 
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1   The Cigamatic and Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal Limitation 
One implication arising from the Commonwealth Constitution, noted for completeness as 
it does not impose a constraint relevant to the issues under consideration in this thesis, is 
the implied limit on the ability of laws enacted by the State legislatures to apply to the 
Commonwealth. In Cigamatic, the High Court held that the States lacked capacity to enact 
laws controlling the rights and obligations between the Commonwealth and its 
residents. 3 9 6  Subsequently, the High Court concluded that a State law of general 
application could regulate how the Commonwealth executive undertakes commercial 
activities.3 9 7  
 
2   Implied Freedom of Political Communication 
The High Court has recognised the freedom of communication regarding political matters 
implied from the Commonwealth Constitution extends to constrain Commonwealth and 
State legislative power. The implied freedom was identified by the High Court in 
Nationwide News and Australian Capital Television, where it was derived from the 
sections of the Commonwealth Constitution, including ss 7, 24, and 128, that impose 
responsible and representative government on the Commonwealth. The implied freedom 
affects State legislative capacity because of the interaction of the States and the 
Commonwealth under the Commonwealth Constitution. The High Court has held that 
political communication cannot be compartmentalised by reference to whether it concerns 
Commonwealth or State matters. Chief Justice Mason noted that political debate occurs 
across the tiers of the Australian federation.3 9 8 This observation was confirmed when the 
High Court accepted that laws concerning the funding of State branches of political parties 
could still burden the discussion of Commonwealth issues that the implied freedom 
protects.3 9 9  It had previously held that a State law, such as a defamation law, could burden 
communication concerning Commonwealth matters. 4 00  Where a State law legally or 
practically burdens political communication, and is not proportionate,4 01  it will be invalid. 
 
396 See Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Limited (In Liquidation) (1962) 108 CLR 372, 377  (Dixon CJ, Kitto 
and Windey er JJ agreeing), 390 (Menzies J, Owen J agreeing). 
397  See Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte the Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 
410, 438-44 (Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ). 
398 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 142. 
399 Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 549-50 [20]-[25]. 
400 See Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly Times Limited (1994) 182 CLR 104 ('Theophanous'). 
401  McCloy (2015) 257  CLR 178, 212-3 [67]-[68] (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, and Keane JJ); as altered by 
Brown v Tasmania (2017) 91  ALJR 1089 ('Brown'). 
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Freedom of expression, as was noted in section C of part III of chapter 3, has been 
identified as a requirement necessary for the rule of law.4 02  However, the implication of a 
freedom of political communication from the Commonwealth Constitution suggests that it 
is unlikely that a court would consider it necessary to rely primarily on the relationship 
between freedom of expression and the rule of law to secure, or justify, the former. The 
implication of the freedom is sufficient to justify it. Further, the High Court’s articulation 
of the limited nature of the freedom means that it is unlikely to impose other aspects or 
requirements of the rule of law on State legislatures. It would be difficult, for example, for 
a court to use the implied freedom as the means of securing the judicial review of 
administrative action. Thus, to the extent that the implied freedom imposes a recognised 
element of the rule of law as a limit on the exercise of State legislative power, it does so in a 
particular way. 
 
3   Limitations Derived from Chapter III 
The High Court has derived limitations on State legislative power from chapter III of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. Chapter III, as will be discussed further in part II of 
chapter 5, is considered to entrench the separation of the Commonwealth’s judicial power 
from its executive and legislative powers. Chapter III is also the ultimate source of two 
interrelated constraints on the capacity of State legislatures. Justice McHugh noted that 
chapter III ‘invalidates State legislation that purports to invest jurisdiction and power in 
State courts in very limited circumstances’.4 03  The first circumstance was where State 
legislation attempts to alter or interfere with the federal judiciary.4 04  Justice Gummow 
suggested that a State law that burdened Commonwealth judicial power could be 
‘obnoxious’ to chapter III.4 05  Such a burden could emerge from a State law that prevented 
litigants from retaining effective legal representation and imposed unrepresented litigants 
on the federal courts located within that State. 
 
The second circumstance is where State legislation compromises the institutional integrity 
of State courts. The foundations of this limitation are references to State courts in the 
Commonwealth Constitution. Section 73 confers jurisdiction on the High Court ‘to hear 
402 See APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 443 [356]. 
403 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 57 5, 598 [37]. 
404 Ibid; citing Commonwealth v Queensland (1975) 134 CLR 298, 314-5 (Gibbs J, Barwick CJ, Stephen and 
Mason JJ agreeing). 
405 APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 412 [252] (Gummow J). 
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and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders and sentences’ from the 
‘Supreme Court of any State, or of any other court of any State from which at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council’. In Forge, 
Justices Gummow, Hayne and Crennan inferred from this that Chapter III of the 
Commonwealth Constitution required that there must ‘always be a court in each State 
which answers the constitutional description “the Supreme Court of [a] State”’.4 06  This 
would prevent a State legislature from abolishing its Supreme Court without depositing its 
jurisdiction in a comparable repository. The constitution and organisation of their State 
Supreme Courts, however, is a matter for State legislatures.4 07  
 
Two related principles have emerged from the High Court’s consideration of this 
constraint: one from Kable, the other from Kirk.4 08 These will be considered further, in 
part III of chapter 5, in the course of considering whether the entrenchment of the State 
Supreme Courts might secure the rule of law at the State level. 
 
V   COMMON LAW CONSTRAINTS 
 
The common law is an alternative source of potential constraints on the power conferred 
by s 5 of the Constitution Act. While it is accepted that State legislatures can enact laws 
that alter the common law, the question of whether ‘deep seated’ common law principles 
constrain legislative power is one that ‘must be visited and revisited’.4 09  There are two 
related lines of authority that suggest that a State legislature’s ability to affect some 
common law principles is limited. The first line can be traced to Chief Justice Coke’s 
speech determining Dr Bonham’s case,4 1 0 which will be considered below. The second 
emerges from a series of dicta offered by Justice Cooke of the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand. These dicta will be considered in part III of chapter 6.  
406 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 7 4 [57] (Gummow, Hay ne and Crennan JJ); citing Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51 . 
407  Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 7 5 [61]. 
408 Basten JA, extra-judicially, noted the tendency to run the reasoning underlying these principles together; 
see Basten, above n 310. 
409  Robert French, 'Common Law Constitutionalism' (2016) 14 New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law  153, 153. 
41 0 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 118a; 77 ER 638. 
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Returning to the first line of authorities, Chief Justice Coke asserted that common law 
courts had jurisdiction to judicially review legislative action. In the dictum from Dr 
Bonham’s case,4 1 1  Coke CJ asserted: 
 
it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul [sic] Acts of 
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it and adjudge such Act to be void.41 2 
 
Chief Justice Coke’s dictum was echoed by his successor, Chief Justice Hobart, in Day v 
Savadge.4 1 3  Concluding the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Hobart CJ stated: 
 
even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own 
case, is void in it-self, for jura naturæ sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum.41 4 
 
These dicta, alongside others, 4 1 5  have been understood as asserting that there were 
judicially enforceable limits on the United Kingdom Parliament’s legislative supremacy. 
 
However, in the Builders Labourers Federation case, President Kirby observed that ‘it was 
generally believed that the notion’ of limits on the validity of legislation derived from 
fundamental law ‘did not survive the fundamental constitutional and political changes 
which followed the Glorious Revolution’4 1 6  of 1688. In Durham Holdings, Justice Kirby 
relied on Goldsworthy’s conclusion that there was ‘no evidence’ that common lawyers 
before the Revolution considered that the judiciary ‘possessed ultimate authority to 
interpret and enforce’ a natural or fundamental constraint on the Westminster 
Parliament’s legislative capacity’4 1 7  to bolster his earlier view. His Honour noted that 
Durham Holdings Pty Limited had not identified any authority that supported its ‘attempt 
41 1  For a general discussion of Dr Bonham’s case, see Andrew Goddard and Marie-Thérèse Groarke, 
'Changing Perspectives on the Constitution and the Courts: Dr Bonham's Case' in Ian McDougall (ed), Cases 
that Changed Our Lives (LexisNexis UK, 2010) vol 1 , 3. 
41 2 Dr Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 118a, 118a. 
41 3 Day v Savadge (1614) Hob 85; 80 ER 235. 
41 4 Ibid 87 ; quoted in Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 403 (Kirby P). 
41 5 See Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 420 [44] (Kirby  J); citing Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co 
Rep 74, 77  ER 1352, 76 (Coke CJ); Rowles v Mason (1612) 2 Brownl Golds 192, 123 ER 892, 198 (Coke CJ); R 
v Inhabitants of the County of Cumberland (1795) 6 TR 194, 101  ER 507  (Kenyon LCJ); Heathfield v Chilton 
(1767) 4 Burr 2015, 98 ER 50, 2016 (Camden LCJ). 
41 6 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 403. 
41 7  Jeffrey  Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford University Press, 1999), 233; quoted in 
Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 420 [43]. 
65 
 
                                                 
to revive the question reserved’ by the High Court in Union Steamship Company.4 1 8  There 
the High Court declined to explore whether the exercise of the power conferred by s 5 of 
the Constitution Act ‘is subject to some restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in 
our democratic system of government and the common law’.4 1 9  While leaving that question 
unexplored, the plurality in Durham Holdings concluded that a requirement for just 
compensation fell ‘outside that field of discourse’.4 2 0 
 
VI   THE RULE OF LAW AS A LIMIT ON SECTION 5 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION ACT 
 
The survey of the constraints on the capacity of the New South Wales Legislature 
undertaken in this chapter demonstrates that the rule of law is not among the recognised 
limitations. The rule of law, as a coherent constraint, is not expressly imposed by either the 
Constitution Act or the Commonwealth Constitution. Nor is it currently recognised as a 
limit that can be implied from either of those constitutions although limited aspects of it 
might be given effect. It has also shown that the common law has not been held to limit 
State legislative power, although the question of deeply rooted common law principles 
remains unresolved. 
 
This is a sufficient answer to the Momcilovic question. 
 
However, it is not a satisfactory answer. It leaves unaddressed whether the rule of law 
might be implied from the Commonwealth Constitution and whether that, currently 
unrecognised, implication might limit State legislative capacity. This aspect of the question 
warrants consideration. Further, it leaves unaddressed whether the common law might 
offer some protection to the rule of law from adverse legislative action. It is toward these 
questions that this thesis turns. 
 
 
41 8 Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 423 [52]. 
41 9 Union Steamship Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10 
420 Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 410 [14]. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
CONSTITUTION 
 
 
In Momcilovic, Justices Crennan and Kiefel suggested that the question of whether the 
rule of law limits the grant of power to the State legislatures might require consideration of 
the Commonwealth Constitution.4 2 1  
 
This chapter confirms that it does. The focus of this chapter will be the large question of 
whether the Commonwealth Constitution could impose the rule of law as a constraint on 
the power of State legislatures. The foundation for an answer to that question was laid in 
part IV of chapter 4, where it was shown that the Commonwealth Constitution has not 
been held to impose the rule of law as a constraint on s 5 of the Constitution Act. To 
answer the larger question, the potential textual foundations offered by the 
Commonwealth Constitution will be examined. To effectively constrain a State legislature, 
the rule of law will need to be an ‘implication drawn from the language and structure’ of 
the Commonwealth Constitution4 2 2  (as chapter 4 showed that it is not incorporated in an 
express constraint on State legislative capacity). Accordingly, a constitutional convention 
requiring obedience to the rule of law,4 2 3  if there were such a convention, would not be 
sufficient to limit State legislative power.  
 
Whether the Commonwealth Constitution provides the foundation for such an implication 
will be considered in part II of this chapter. That part will focus on whether s 75(v) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution provides the requisite textual basis. It will also be argued 
that, if an implication can be derived from s 75(v), its content will be limited to the core 
421 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1  (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [563]. 
422 Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 418 [40] (Kirby J). 
423 See Goldsworthy, above n 311, 58. 
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requirements necessary to secure the legality of government action. In part III, academic 
suggestions that the Kable and Kirk principles, which rest on the references to State 
Supreme Courts contained in Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution, secure the 
rule of law at the State level will be examined. It will be argued that the Kable and Kirk 
principles could only extend to securing those elements of the rule of law that are 
associated with State Supreme Courts. 
 
The task to be undertaken in this chapter has been greatly reduced by Burton Crawford’s 
comprehensive examination of the place of the rule of law in the Australian constitution. 
Burton Crawford’s argument that the limitations imposed by the Commonwealth 
Constitution on government power ‘fall short of all that the rule of law might be said to 
require’4 2 4  is persuasive as is Burton Crawford’s analysis of the complexities that would 
attend a constitutional guarantee of the rule of law.4 2 5  However, as Burton Crawford is not 
seeking to answer the Momcilovic question, her analysis does not directly address the 
question of whether the Commonwealth Constitution imposes the rule of law as a 
constraint on the State legislatures. 
 
I   JUSTICE DIXON’S DICTUM: THE RULE OF LAW AS AN ASSUMED 
TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION 
 
Before considering whether there is a textual basis for implying a conception of the rule of 
law from the Commonwealth Constitution, it is necessary to consider Justice Dixon’s 
dictum from the Australian Communist Party case. This dictum, which was noted by 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel when they stated the Momcilovic question, will be shown (in 
this and the next part of this chapter) to provide the basis for how the High Court views the 
relationship between the Commonwealth Constitution and the rule of law. 
 
Justice Dixon, as was noted in chapter 1, recognised the rule of law as a traditional 
conception assumed by the Commonwealth Constitution. In the Australian Communist 
Party case, while discussing the ‘incidental power’ conferred by s 51(xxxix) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, Justice Dixon stated:  
424 Burton Crawford, above n 14, 199. 
425 Ibid 194-7 . 
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[t]he power [conferred by s 51(xxxix)] is ancillary or incidental to sustaining and carrying 
on government. Moreover, it is government under the Constitution and that is an 
instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it 
gives effect, as, for example, in separating judicial power from other functions of 
government, others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be 
said that the rule of law forms an assumption.426 
 
 
Justice Dixon proffered his dictum while dismissing a submission by the Commonwealth 
that the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) was a law on a subject ‘incidental to 
the execution and maintenance’ of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
 
Justice Dixon’s recognition of the rule of law has been widely endorsed.4 2 7  Justice Kirby, 
for example, relied on Justice Dixon’s dictum when he observed that the Commonwealth 
Constitution ‘establishes a polity adhering to the rule of law’.4 2 8 His Honour had, earlier, 
observed that Justice Dixon had ‘relied on a broad political and philosophical notion of the 
rule of law’.4 2 9  Whether that notion was broader than Dicey’s conception of the rule of law 
is open. But it can be set aside for a different occasion. 
 
426 Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193 (‘Justice Dixon’s dictum’). 
427  See, for example, Brown (2017) 91 ALJR 1089, 1192-3 [558] (Edelman J); Momcilovic  (2011) 245 CLR 1, 
216 fn 944 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 , 91  [232] (Hay ne J), 155-6 [423] (Crennan and 
Bell JJ); Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 ('Plaintiff M61 '), 346 [54] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hay ne, Hey don Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Futuris Corporation (2008) 237  CLR 146, 183 [124] 
(Kirby  J); Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232, 293 [182] (Kirby  J); Forsyth (2007) 231  CLR 531, 551  [53] (Kirby 
J); Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 118 [181], 123 [197] (Kirby J); Central Bayside (2006) 228 CLR 168, 196 [77] 
(Kirby  J); Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627 , 650 [67] (Kirby  J); Stevens v 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 224 CLR 193 ('Stevens'), 249 [198] (Kirby J); 
Combet (2005) 224 CLR 494, 619 [304] (Kirby J); APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 416 [270] (Kirby  J); Plaintiff 
S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [31] (Gleeson CJ); 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and 
Hay ne JJ); Abebe (1999) 197  CLR 510, 560 [137] (Gummow and Hay ne JJ); Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 
381  [89] (Gummow and Hay ne JJ); Australian Capital Television (1992) 177  CLR 106, 209 (Gaudron J); 
Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62, 72 [25] (Perram J); Haneef v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship (2007) 161  FCR 40, 46 [23] (Spender J); Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs (2006) 154 FCR 536, 544 [31] (Rares J); NAAV  (2002) 123 FCR 298, 415 [443] (French CJ); 
Mitchforce Pty Limited v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2003) 57  NSWLR 212 
('Mitchforce '), 237-8 [124] (Spigelman CJ); Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited [2017] NSWSC 987 
('Mao '), [109]. Mao  is interesting in so far as Ward CJ in Eq acknowledged the possibility  that the 
assumption may be salient to the resolution of a constitutional matter; however, the notice issued by  the 
plaintiff under s 7 8B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), did not disclose such a matter. 
428 Futuris Corporation (2008) 237  CLR 146, 171-2 [85]; quoting Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 
CLR 1 , 193. 
429 Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 37 ; quoted in Francis Jacobs, The Sovereignty 
of Law: The European Way (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 46. 
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More significant, for the purposes of answering the Momcilovic question, is how Justice 
Dixon may have understood the relationship between constitutional assumptions and the 
Commonwealth Constitution. The role of constitutional assumptions is central to 
answering the question of whether Justice Dixon’s dictum should be understood as 
suggesting that the rule of law constrains legislative power. Outlining Justice Dixon’s 
account of traditional conceptions assists to answer that question. 
 
A   Traditional Conceptions 
At the core of Justice Dixon’s dictum is an assertion that the Commonwealth Constitution 
was ‘framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions’. These ‘legal conceptions’ 
could be sourced from the general law.4 3 0 Beyond identifying the separation of powers and 
the rule of law as examples, Dixon J did not specify any other such conceptions. 
 
Justice Dixon’s ‘traditional conceptions’ seem consistent with the ‘fundamental concepts’ 
his Honour thought were embodied in common law legal systems.4 3 1  Dixon J described 
fundamental concepts as ‘abstract ideas usually arrived at by generalisation and developed 
by analogies’.4 3 2  His Honour asserted that regarding fundamental concepts ‘as no more 
than philosophic theories supplied ex post facto to explain a legal structure which has 
already been brought into existence by some other and more practical nature’ was a 
‘mistake’.4 3 3  Significantly, his Honour suggested that some fundamental conceptions were 
‘instinctive assumptions’ that could be seen to emerge as ‘definite principles contained 
within the ideas which provided the ground of action’.4 3 4  Justice Dixon observed that 
fundamental conceptions, once they emerged, ‘seldom’ disappeared.4 3 5  This provides a 
limited account of how certain concepts might emerge in a legal system. 
 
In the context of ‘British constitutional theory’, Justice Dixon identified three ‘rival 
conceptions’.4 3 6  These were the ‘supremacy of law’, the ‘supremacy of the Crown’, and the 
430 Owen Dixon, 'The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation' in Severin Woinarski (ed), 
Jesting Pilate (Law Book Company , 1965) 203, 205. 
431  Owen Dixon, 'The Law and the Constitution' in Severin Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate (Law Book 
Company , 1965) 38, 38. Dixon J used concepts and conceptions (see n 43 above) interchangeably. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. 
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‘supremacy of Parliament’.4 3 7  Central to the supremacy of law was the ability of the courts 
to ‘disregard as unauthorised and void the acts of any organ of government, whether 
legislative or administrative, which exceeded the limits of the power that organ derives 
from the law’.4 3 8 This conception implies the supremacy of the law over the Crown.4 3 9  His 
Honour’s analysis of the supremacy of law suggests a thin conception of the rule of law; 
one that emphasises legality. It can be tied — via the ideal of subjecting executive power to 
law — to the assumed conception identified in the Australian Communist Party case. 
Justice Heydon rested his interpretation of Justice Dixon’s dictum — that Justice Dixon 
sought to emphasise that the duty to obey the law imposed by the Commonwealth 
Constitution was paramount4 4 0 — on a similar analysis. 
 
Some further assistance in elucidating Justice Dixon’s ‘traditional concepts’ can be gained 
from comparison with Justice Isaacs’ account of ‘fundamental principles’.4 4 1  Justice Isaacs 
observed that certain fundamental principles ‘form the base of the social structure of every 
British community’4 4 2  including Australia. Isaacs J observed that such principles could not 
be ‘found in express terms in any written Constitution of Australia’.4 4 3  Rather, they formed 
the weft of the ‘fabric on which the written words of the [Commonwealth] Constitution are 
superimposed’.4 4 4  This fabric was woven of silently operating constitutional principles.4 4 5  
This description seems consistent with Justice Dixon’s exposition of fundamental 
concepts. One set of fundamental principles could, Justice Isaacs suggested, be derived 
from article 29 of the Magna Carta.4 4 6  These principles were, first, that every free citizen 
437  Ibid. The supremacy  of Parliament and the supremacy  of law are comparable with Dicey’s two 
constitutional principles. 
438 Jackson [2006] 1 AC 262, 304 [107] (Lord Hope); citing Dixon, above n 431, 43. Lord Hope noted the 
similarity between Justice Dixon’s and Dicey ’s conceptions of the supremacy of law. 
439 Dixon, above n 431, 37 . 
440 Hey don, above n 122, 24. 
441  The similarity  between Justice Dixon’s ‘traditional conceptions’ and Justice Isaacs’ ‘fundamental 
principles’ was noted by  Justice Crennan; see Susan Crennan, 'Magna Carta, Common Law Values and the 
Constitution' (2015) 39(1) Melbourne University Law Review 331, 341. 
442 Re Y ates; Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37  CLR 36 ('Ex parte Walsh'), 7 9. 
443 Ibid 7 9; quoted in Toohey, above n 27 , 161. 
444 Commonwealth v Kreglinger and Fernau Limited (1926) 37  CLR 393, 413; quoted in McCloy (2015) 257  
CLR 17 8, 224 [106] (Gageler J), 279 [301] (Gordon J). 
445  Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286, 293 (Lord Watson); see Herbert Vere Evatt, 'The Legal 
Foundations of New South Wales' (1938) 11 Australian Law Journal 409, 421-2. 
446  Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37  CLR 36, 79; compare Alfred Denning, 'Let Justice Be Done' (1975) 
2(September) Monash University Law Review  3, 5. Article 29 of the edition of the Magna Carta issued in 
1225 combines articles 39 and 40 of the charter agreed by  King John in 1215; David Carpenter, Magna Carta 
(Penguin Books Limited, 2015), 42. Article 29 (of the 1297  reissue, which is the ‘authoritative text’; see 
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has an ‘inherent individual right’ to their life, their liberty,4 4 7  and their property.4 4 8  
Second, a citizen’s rights ‘must always yield to the necessities of the general welfare’.4 4 9  
Isaacs J identified two corollaries to these fundamental principles. 4 5 0  The first was a 
presumption in favour of liberty.4 5 1  The second corollary of that presumption was that 
courts regulate the restraint of liberty.4 5 2  The emphasis these corollaries place on the role 
of law in securing individual liberty evokes the first of Dicey’s senses of the rule of law. 
While Justice Isaacs did not recognise the rule of law as a fundamental principle, Chief 
Justice Spigelman asserted that it was a thread of the underlying fabric.4 5 3  
 
B   Constitutional Assumptions 
More recently, Justice Crennan acknowledged that traditional conceptions inform the 
Commonwealth Constitution. Crennan J, extra-judicially, considered that Justice Dixon’s 
dictum recognised that: 
 
some features of government to which express effect is given under the [Commonwealth] 
Constitution — for example, the separation of powers (particularly judicial power) — 
operate alongside other unexpressed aspects of government.454 
 
Arguably, and consistently with Justice Dixon’s dictum, Justice Crennan’s ‘unexpressed 
aspects of government’ would include the rule of law. 
 
Justice Crennan’s observation emphasises the contrast between the traditional conceptions 
that are implemented by the Commonwealth Constitution and those that are merely 
assumed. Neither Justice Crennan, nor Justice Dixon before her, articulated the precise 
role that assumed conceptions play in the Commonwealth Constitution. However, Chief 
Justice Mason observed that assumed conceptions stand ‘outside’ the Commonwealth 
Irvine, above n 49, 227) remains in force in New South Wales; see Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 
(NSW), s 6. 
447  Except ‘so far as that is abridged by  a due administration of the law’: R v Macfarlane; Ex parte 
O'Flanagan (1923) 32 CLR 518 ('Ex parte O'Flanagan'), 541-2 (Isaacs J); quoted in Abebe (1999) 197  CLR 
510, 560 [137] (Gummow and Hay ne JJ). 
448 Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37  CLR 36, 7 9. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451  Ibid. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Mitchforce (2003) 57  NSWLR 212, 237  [124]. 
454 Crennan, above n 441. 
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Constitution. 4 5 5  In contrast, a constitutional implication is a ‘term or concept which 
inheres in the instrument and as such operates as part of the instrument’.4 5 6  
 
Justice Dixon asserted that the rule of law was assumed rather than implied. This status 
was stressed by his Honour’s juxtaposition of the rule of law against the separation of 
judicial power. Justice Dixon held the orthodox view that the text and structure of the 
Commonwealth Constitution gave effect to the separation of judicial power.4 5 7  It is 
buttressed by the absence of any suggestion by Dixon J of a textual foundation from which 
the rule of law could be implied. 
 
Authoritative rejection of underlying and overarching constitutional principles weighs 
against assumed concepts, such as the rule of law, serving as the basis of a substantive 
constraint imposed by the Commonwealth Constitution on legislative power. In McGinty, 
Justice McHugh forcefully rejected the contention that ‘[u]nderlying or overarching 
doctrines’ could be invoked as ‘independent sources of the powers, authorities, immunities 
and obligations’ during construction of the Commonwealth Constitution. 4 5 8  Justice 
McHugh’s rejection was directed to Justices Deane and Toohey’s conclusion that a 
‘constitutional implication can arise from a particular doctrine that “underlies the 
Constitution”’.4 5 9  Justice McHugh’s critique of underlying and overarching doctrines is 
consistent with Winterton’s reticence regarding the use of ‘extra-constitutional political 
notions’,4 6 0 such as the rule of law, to derive constraints on legislative capacity. Winterton 
argued that the use of extra-constitutional principles, and even constitutional implications, 
‘to contradict the effect of constitutional provisions’ was problematic.4 6 1  
 
Justice McHugh’s well founded rejection of underlying constitutional principles can be 
applied to Justice Dixon’s assumed conception of the rule of law. As an assumed 
conception, the rule of law is unlikely to be more than an underlying doctrine and cannot 
455 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177  CLR 106, 135; quoted in Carr (2007) 232 CLR 138, 145 [12] 
(Gleeson CJ). 
456 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135. 
457  Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193; see also, for example, R v Kirby; Ex parte 
Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Ex parte Boilermakers'), 269-70, 272. 
458 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 232. 
459 Ibid 231; quoting Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1 , 10. 
460 George Winterton, 'Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law' (1986) 16 Federal Law 
Review  223, 223. 
461  Ibid 226; compare Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 405 (Kirby P). 
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support a constraint on legislative capacity. This appears to be consistent with Chief 
Justice Dixon’s jurisprudence more generally, as his Honour did not invoke the rule of law 
as a constraint. 
 
C   The Rule of Law as an Aid to Constitutional Construction 
Justice Dixon’s assumed traditional conceptions, including the rule of law, may be valuably 
understood as aids to constitutional construction. This understanding is consistent with 
how Dixon J employed the rule of law, in the Australian Communist Party case, to justify 
a narrow construction of the Commonwealth Parliament’s incidental power.4 6 2  
 
Justice Dixon did not explicate the role that traditional conceptions could have in 
constitutional interpretation. Their use remains problematic,4 6 3  although Justice McHugh 
and Chief Justice French, while a member of the Federal Court of Australia, suggested how 
they may operate. Justice McHugh asserted, not necessarily inconsistently with the views 
that his Honour would later express in McGinty, that traditional conceptions should be 
considered when interpreting the Commonwealth Constitution. In Theophanous, McHugh 
J noted that the: 
 
true meaning of a legal text almost always depends on a background of concepts, principles, 
practices, facts, rights and duties which the authors of the text took for granted or 
understood, without conscious advertence, by reason of their common language or 
culture.464 
 
McHugh J identified the rule of law as one of those background principles, stating that in 
‘interpreting the Commonwealth Constitution, for example, the rule of law may 
legitimately be taken into account’.4 6 5  
 
Justice French expanded on Justice McHugh’s suggestion. In NAAV, Justice French 
endorsed Justice McHugh’s acknowledgement that the rule of law could be taken into 
account in the course of interpreting the Commonwealth Constitution. 4 6 6  Accepting 
Justice Dixon’s dictum, Justice French observed that the ‘concept of the rule of law plays a 
462 Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193; compare Winterton, above n 460, 228. 
463 See Gleeson, above n 106, 185. 
464 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 196. 
465 Ibid; citing Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193. 
466 NAAV  (2002) 123 FCR 298, 415 [443]. 
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normative role’ in the ‘constitutional and societal setting’ identified by Justice McHugh.4 6 7  
French J observed that the rule of law conveyed the: 
 
elements of representative democracy with legislative sovereignty vested in the Parliament 
subject to a constitution which limits its powers, an executive to carry out its laws and a 
judiciary to interpret them and determine their scope and limits.468 
 
Significantly, Justice French suggested that a constraint on executive action, equivalent to 
that imposed by the principle of legality on legislative action, followed from the rule of law.  
French J stated the: 
 
general proposition can be made, consistently with essential elements of the rule of law, 
that official power must be exercised as authorised by the Parliament and in accordance 
with the subject matter and conditions both substantive and procedural imposed by the 
Parliament.469 
 
His Honour argued that this general proposition required the narrow construction of 
privative clauses.4 7 0 
 
Extending this argument, constitutional assumptions may have a role when it is necessary 
to choose between conflicting interpretations of constitutional provisions. Where one of 
two conflicting interpretations of a constitutional provision would be inconsistent with the 
maintenance of a traditional conception, the other should be preferred. For example, if a 
reading of s 75(v) was proposed that might adversely affect the operation of the rule of law, 
reference to the traditional conception might support the adoption of an alternative 
construction. Such an approach is, at least superficially, consistent with how Justice Dixon 
appears to have utilised the rule of law in the course of characterising the scope of the 
incidental power. The role of constitutional assumptions appears limited, however, to 
circumstances where there is a legitimate choice between competing constructions of a 
constitutional provision. As a tool for constitutional interpretation, traditional 
conceptions, such as the rule of law, will not serve as limits on legislative capacity. To the 
extent that a law is inconsistent with a traditional conception assumed by the 
Commonwealth Constitution, that inconsistency is unlikely, on the current authorities, to 
render it beyond legislative power (or otherwise unconstitutional).  
467  Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid 415 [446]. 
47 0 Ibid. 
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II   IS THE RULE OF LAW A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATION? 
 
The rule of law, as noted earlier in this chapter, will only limit State legislative power if it is 
recognised as an implication from the Commonwealth Constitution that affects the State 
legislatures. An example of such an implication is the implied freedom of communication 
regarding political matters (which was discussed in section B2 of part IV of chapter 4 
above). 
 
A   Constitutional Implications 
Constitutional implications have an established role in the interpretation of the 
Commonwealth Constitution.4 7 1  Constitutional implications inhere in the Commonwealth 
Constitution. 4 7 2  They cannot be drawn from the Commonwealth Constitution if they are 
‘not based on the actual terms of the Constitution, or on its structure’.4 7 3  An implication 
from the structure of the Commonwealth Constitution ‘must be logically or practically 
necessary for the preservation of the integrity of that structure’.4 7 4  A relevant example of a 
structural implication is the separation of judicial power from the other governmental 
powers. In his Honour’s dictum, Justice Dixon observed that the Commonwealth 
Constitution implemented the separation of powers. 4 7 5  In light of the constraint on 
amendment imposed by s 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the textual, or 
structural, foundations from which constitutional implications are drawn are entrenched. 
This effectively entrenches the implications themselves and enables constitutional 
implications to constrain the Commonwealth Parliament and the State legislatures. 
 
  
47 1  Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 323, 401  (Windeyer J); quoted in Bennett v Commonwealth 
(2007) 231 CLR 91, 137  [136] (Kirby J). 
47 2 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135. 
47 3 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 168 (Brennan CJ); citing Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide 
Steamship Company Limited (1920) 28 CLR 129, 145, 155 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich, and Starke JJ); Melbourne 
Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 83 (Dixon J); Australian Capital Television (1992) 177  
CLR 106, 135 (Mason CJ), 209-10 (Gaudron J). 
47 4 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135 (Mason CJ). 
47 5 Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 199. 
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B   Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution and the Rule of Law 
There are High Court dicta suggesting that there may be a constitutional foundation from 
which the rule of law may be implied. Among these is Justice Kirby’s statement that: 
  
[t]he rule of law, which is an acknowledged implication of the Australian Constitution, 
imposes ultimate limits on the power of any legislature to render governmental action, 
federal, State or Territory, immune from conformity to the law and scrutiny by the courts 
against that basal standard.47 6 
 
 
The challenge for such dicta is identifying a sufficient foundation in either the text or 
structure of the Commonwealth Constitution. Kirby J did not undertake that task on that 
occasion. As will be shown in this part, Chapter III contains the strongest potential source 
of a textual foundation from which the rule of law could be implied. 
 
Before proceeding, the question of whether Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution 
gives effect to elements of the rule of law (which it arguably does) can be distinguished. 
The issue being considered in this section is the question of whether it provides a textual 
foundation for a constitutional implication that imposes the rule of law as a constraint, 
rather than merely entrenching limited elements of the rule of law as a consequence of the 
application of other implications. 
 
1   Chapter III 
Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution is concerned with federal judicial power. 
Section 71 vests federal judicial power in the High Court, ‘such other federal courts as the 
Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction’. Doing 
so, the Commonwealth Constitution implements a structural separation of powers;4 7 7  the 
ability to exercise judicial power is conferred on a constitutional institution — the High 
Court (and, if so legislated, other courts) — distinct from those entrusted to exercise 
executive and legislative power. Section 75, which will be discussed more extensively 
shortly,4 7 8 describes the High Court’s original jurisdiction. Section 76 grants the Federal 
Parliament power to confer original jurisdiction to resolve matters, involving certain types 
of issues, on the High Court.  
47 6 Fish (2006) 225 CLR 180, 224 [146]. 
47 7  See Ex parte Boilermakers' Society (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271-2 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, and Kitto 
JJ); see also Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 (Deane J). 
47 8 See section C of this part. 
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2   Chapter III as a Constraint on Legislative Capacity 
Members of the High Court have recognised that the separation of judicial power effected 
by Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution limits legislative capacity. In Plaintiff 
M68/2015, Justice Nettle concisely explained that the legislative powers granted by s 51, 
which are expressly ‘subject to’ the Commonwealth Constitution, ‘do not permit the 
conferral upon any organ of the Executive Government of any part of the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth’.4 7 9  An enactment purporting to confer such power would be beyond 
the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament.4 8 0 
 
3   Judicial dicta 
Keith Mason noted that members of the High Court ‘have seen the rule of law (in federal 
matters at least) as a more direct implication from Ch III’.4 8 1  Chief Justice French 
observed, extra-judicially, that judicial power is ‘essential to the rule of law’.4 8 2  Similarly, 
Justices Gummow and Crennan observed that it had ‘been well said that Ch III gives 
practical effect to the assumption of the rule of law upon which the [Commonwealth] 
Constitution depends for its efficacy’.4 8 3  Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Heydon agreed 
with Justice Dixon that the Commonwealth Constitution assumes the rule of law.4 8 4  Their 
Honours may have gone further than Dixon J intended when they observed that the 
Commonwealth Constitution depends on that assumption ‘for its efficacy’.4 8 5  Gleeson CJ 
and Heydon J went further still, arguing that the express terms of Chapter III, and the 
implications that could be drawn from them, gave ‘practical effect to that assumption’.4 8 6  
However, as far as their Honours were willing to carry the rule of law as a constitutional 
assumption, their Honours stopped short of authoritatively stating that the rule of law 
could be implied from Chapter III. Similarly, Justice Kirby stopped short of implying the 
rule of law from the terms of Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. His Honour 
observed that the rule of law was ‘inherent in the provisions and purposes of Ch III’.4 8 7  The 
47 9 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 257  CLR 42, 160 [378]; 
citing Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 
('Lim'), 26-7  (Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ); Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 606-7 (Deane J). 
480 Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Limited v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 355 (Griffith CJ). 
481  Mason, above n 163, 123; quoting McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Limited v Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633, 670 
(Murphy  J); Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1 , 27 -9 (Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ). 
482 Robert French, 'The Executive Power' (2010) 12(1) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 5, 9. 
483 Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 342 [61] (Gummow and Crennan JJ). 
484 APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 351  [30]. 
485 Ibid; Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307 , 342 [61] (Gummow and Crennan JJ). 
486 APLA  (2005) 224 CLR 322, 351  [30]. 
487  XY Z v Commonwealth (2006) 227  CLR 532, 578 [136]. 
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full implications of the ‘traditional conception of the rule of law’ for the constitutional 
writs, in his Honour’s opinion, had not been fully explored.4 8 8 
 
C   Section 75 of the Commonwealth Constitution and the Rule of Law 
Justice Kirby’s reference to the constitutional writs points to the potential of s 75 to 
provide a textual foundation for an implication of the rule of law. Section 75 is concerned 
with the original jurisdiction conferred on the High Court. It provides: 
 
In all matters: 
(i) arising under any treaty; 
(ii) affecting consuls or other representatives of other countries; 
(iii) in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of  
 the Commonwealth, is a party; 
(iv) between States, or between residents of different States, or between a State 
 and a resident of another State; 
(v) in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought  
 against an officer of the Commonwealth; 
the High Court shall have original jurisdiction. 
 
 
The strength of any argument for deriving the rule of law from s 75(v) depends on the 
purpose of that subsection itself in the broader context of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. Section 75(v) is considered to reinforce the obligation on the Commonwealth 
to comply with federal law. Dixon J observed that s 75(v) ‘constitutionally’ ensured that the 
High Court possessed jurisdiction to restrain ‘officers of the Commonwealth from 
exceeding Federal power’.4 8 9  Gleeson CJ similarly observed that the jurisdiction conferred 
by s 75(v) ‘to require officers of the Commonwealth to act within the law cannot be taken 
away by Parliament’.4 9 0 His Honour explained that the Federal Parliament could, subject 
to the Commonwealth Constitution, enact laws binding on the Commonwealth 
executive.4 9 1  Section 75 enabled those laws to be enforced by means of the ‘constitutional 
writs’.4 9 2  Gleeson CJ noted that the writ of mandamus could compel an officer to perform a 
488 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte S20/2002 (2003) 77  ALJR 1165, 1193 
[168]. 
489 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 , 363; quoted in Charles Noonan, 'Section 
75(v), No-Invalidity  Clauses and the Rule of Law' (2013) 36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
437 , 447. 
490 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 482 [5]. 
491  Ibid 482-3 [5]. 
492 Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, 665-6 [37]. The 
writs are ‘constitutional’ in the ‘sense of entrenched’: Gummow, above n 113. 
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duty imposed by law.4 9 3  Prohibition could issue to prevent an officer from exceeding their 
power or jurisdiction4 9 4  and an injunction could ‘issue to restrain unlawful behaviour’.4 9 5  
The effectiveness of the constitutional writs as a mechanism for ensuring the legality of 
executive action was demonstrated in Plaintiff S297/2013. 4 9 6  In response to the 
deficiencies in the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’s return of a writ of 
mandamus,4 9 7  the High Court issued a writ of pre-emptory mandamus.4 9 8 This latter writ 
required the Minister to grant the plaintiff a permanent protection visa. As s 75(v) 
entrenches the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue the constitutional writs, it limits the 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to immunise executive action from judicial 
review.4 9 9  This limit is significant. 
 
The jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution has been 
described, judicially, as being of ‘fundamental importance to the rule of law’.5 00 Members 
of the High Court have suggested that it serves the constitutional purpose of preventing the 
arbitrary exercise of executive power.5 01  Justice Heydon, after noting that he risked ‘over-
simplifying’ the ‘constitutional purpose’ of s 75(v), observed that the High Court: 
 
with its central place in the Australian judicial system, must be able to ensure the rule of 
law by granting relief against Commonwealth officers who act without, or in excess of 
power, or who refuse to perform a public duty.502 
 
The theme of this observation was confirmed in Plaintiff S157/2002, in which the High 
Court endorsed s 75(v) as a potential textual basis for constitutional recognition of the rule 
of law. The plurality linked s 75(v) with Justice Dixon’s dictum. Their Honours stated: 
  
493 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 476, 482-3 [5]; see also Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 
595, 603-4 (Brennan CJ). 
494 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 476, 483 [5]; see Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 93 [22] 
(Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
495 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 483 [5]. 
496 Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 231  ('Plaintiff 
S297/2013 (2015)'). 
497  Issued in accordance with Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 
255 CLR 179; see Plaintiff S297/2013 (2015) 255 CLR 231, 238 [1]. 
498 Plaintiff S297/2013 (2015) 255 CLR 231, 249-50 [46]-[48]. 
499 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 482 [5]. 
500 Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1729, [21]. 
501  Plaintiff M61 (2010) 243 CLR 319, 346 [54] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Hey don, Crennan, Kiefel, and 
Bell JJ). 
502 Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 37 2, 465-6 [263]. 
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[t]he provision of the constitutional writs and the conferral upon this Court of an 
irremovable jurisdiction to issue them to an officer of the Commonwealth constitutes a 
textual reinforcement for what Dixon J said about the significance of the rule of law in 
Australian Communist Party.503 
 
Their Honours observed that the constitutional writs served to assure ‘all people affected 
that officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor neglect any 
jurisdiction which the law confers on them’.5 04  Justice Gummow, who was a member of 
that plurality, recently observed that he expected that Justice Dixon would not have 
disagreed with the plurality on this point.5 05  
 
The plurality’s observation that the constitutional writs provide ‘textual reinforcement’ for 
Justice Dixon’s dictum is significant. It suggests, on a cursory glance, that s 75(v) could 
provide a textual basis from which to imply the rule of law. That reading, however, 
conflates a ‘textual reinforcement’ with the foundation necessary for an implication. Such a 
reinforcement could confirm that the rule of law is assumed by the Commonwealth 
Constitution without rendering it a necessary implication. This reading, however, returns 
to the question, posed in part I of this chapter, of what role that assumption serves in the 
Commonwealth Constitution. 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson argued that s 75(v) ‘secures a basic element of the rule of law’.5 06  His 
Honour, as noted above, 5 07  had discussed how the constitutional writs obliged the 
Commonwealth executive to comply with federal law. While reinforcing that account of the 
constitutional writs’ function, Chief Justice Gleeson endorsed Justice Dixon’s dictum as 
one of several ‘established principles’5 08 relevant to construing privative clauses enacted by 
the Commonwealth.5 09  Gleeson CJ stated that the rule of law was effected by means of 
judicial review. Chief Justice Gleeson adopted Justice Brennan’s statement that: 
 
503 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 47 6, 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and Hay ne JJ); 
citing Australian Communist Party (1951) 83 CLR 1 , 193. 
504 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 513-4 [104]. 
505 Gummow, above n 113. 
506 Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 476, 482 [5]; compare Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law and the 
Constitution (ABC Books, 2000), 67 . 
507  See p 7 9-80 above. 
508 The other principles included the principle of legality  (though his Honour, interestingly , did not refer to it 
by  that name), which will be discussed further in section B of part IV of chapter 6 below. Gleeson CJ 
suggested that the narrow construction of privative clauses was a ‘specific application’ of the principle of 
legality  and the rule of law; Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 492-3 [30]-[32]. 
509 Ibid 492 [31]. 
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Judicial review is neither more nor less than the enforcement of the rule of law over 
executive action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented from exceeding the 
powers and functions assigned to the executive by law and the interests of the individual are 
protected accordingly.51 0 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson outlined this position extra-judicially. Gleeson CJ argued that s 75(v) 
requires government officials to ‘exercise their powers according to law’. 5 1 1  Further, 
Gleeson CJ stressed that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court to compel obedience 
with the law was constitutionally entrenched in so far as it could only be modified or 
removed by constitutional amendment.5 1 2  As his Honour considered that the rule of law 
means that the ‘executive must obey the law’,5 1 3  s 75(v) could provide a textual foundation 
for implying the rule of law from the Commonwealth Constitution. However, like his 
colleagues in the plurality, Gleeson CJ stopped short of stating that the rule of law could be 
implied from the Commonwealth Constitution. 
 
Justice Kirby subsequently relied on Plaintiff S157/2002 as authority for the proposition 
that s 75(v) was a ‘vital means of upholding the rule of law’ under the Commonwealth 
Constitution.5 1 4  In Central Bayside General Practice Association, Kirby J asserted that the 
maintenance of the rule of law was a ‘fundamental assumption’ of the Commonwealth 
Constitution.5 1 5  Justice Kirby’s comments suggest that Plaintiff S157/2002 is consistent 
with the rule of law being an assumed traditional conception that aids constitutional 
construction. They do not suggest that Plaintiff S157/2002 should be read as suggesting 
the rule of law limits legislative capacity like the implied freedom of political 
communication. 
 
More recently, Justice Edelman questioned whether a broader limitation could be derived 
from the Plaintiff S157/2002 plurality’s dictum. Edelman J noted the suggestion that 
s 75(v) is: 
 
51 0 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 152 CLR 25, 70; quoted in Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 
47 6, 492 [31]. 
51 1  Gleeson, above n 506. 
51 2 Ibid 68. 
51 3 Ibid. 
51 4 British American Tobacco Australia Limited v Western Australia (2003) 217  CLR 300, 113; see also 
Stevens (2005) 224 CLR 193, 249 [198]; White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 231  CLR 570, 637  
[190]; Futuris Corporation (2008) 237  CLR 146, 172 [87], 183 [124]. 
51 5 Central Bayside (2006) 228 CLR 168, 196 [77]; quoted in Cornwell (2007) 231 CLR 260, 323 [181]. 
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concerned with the content of the power of judicial review, although indirectly as a “textual 
reinforcement” of a broader implication deriving from the “rule of law” and reflected in the 
“centrality, and protective purpose, of the jurisdiction of this Court”.51 6 
 
This ‘indirect implication’ would constrain legislative capacity to limit judicial review. 
Prompted by Burton Crawford,5 1 7  Edelman J asked: 
 
If the “rule of law” requires more than a guarantee of judicial review of executive action but 
instead restrains Parliament from “confining” the content of judicial review, then how great 
must that confinement be before the legislation will be invalid? Which of the different 
versions of the “contested concept”51 8 of the “rule of law”, whether thick or thin, is the basis 
for the implied constraint?51 9 
 
His Honour concluded that the difficulty of answering this, and related questions, was a 
reason for refraining from giving the values that underlie the rule of law ‘immediate 
normative operation’ in the application of the Commonwealth Constitution.5 2 0 
 
D   The Content of an Implied Conception of the Rule of Law 
In Plaintiff S157/2002, Chief Justice Gleeson and the plurality fixed on s 75(v) as a textual 
foundation for the rule of law. This foundation may only support a conception of the rule of 
law focused on securing the legality of the Commonwealth’s activities. As Chief Justice 
French observed, extra-judicially, the Commonwealth Constitution:  
 
entrenches the rule of law in the thin but vital sense that there is no Commonwealth power, 
legislative, executive or judicial that can be exercised other than with the authority of the 
Constitution or laws made under it.521 
 
 
This focus on legality is likely to define the scope of any conception of the rule of law 
derived from s 75(v) because the source of an implication provides its limits.5 2 2  This nexus 
is exemplified by the implied freedom of political communication. The content of the 
implied freedom is:  
51 6 Graham (2017) 91  ALJR 890, 915 [105]; quoting Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 476, 513-4 [103]-
[104]. 
51 7  Burton Crawford, above n 14, 110. 
51 8 Waldron, above n 30. 
51 9 Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 915 [106]. 
520 Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 , 23 [72] (McHugh and Gummow JJ); quoted in Graham (2017) 91  ALJR 
890, 915 [107]. 
521  Robert French, 'The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia - History, Principle and 
Interpretation' (Speech delivered to Australian National University, Canberra, 1 October 2015). 
522 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560. 
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defined by the need to preserve the integrity of both the system of representative and 
responsible government established by … the [Commonwealth] Constitution and the 
method of alteration prescribed by s 128.523 
 
Similarly, the content of a conception of the rule of law implied from the Commonwealth 
Constitution ‘is to be found by a consideration of the textual basis for the implication, its 
function, and its legal and contextual background and history’.5 2 4  If the textual basis is 
s 75(v), then the content will be limited by reference to securing the legality of 
Commonwealth government action. 
 
Any implication of the rule of law defined by the need to secure the legality of the 
Commonwealth’s activities will only incorporate a limited set of the elements that have 
been identified by the High Court. As was shown in section A of part II of chapter 3, the 
High Court has recognised several related requirements that can be associated with the 
judicial review of administrative action. These elements could be called on to provide the 
content for the implied conception of the rule of law that is derived from s 75(v). Though it 
is unlikely that the elements associated with the separation of governmental powers (which 
are gathered in section B of part II of chapter 3) would necessarily be included in an 
implication derived from s 75(v), because of its focus on the jurisdiction to issue the 
constitutional writs. Further, an implication derived from s 75(v) is even more unlikely to 
incorporate some of the other requirements — such as the principle of legality, the 
requirement of just compensation for governmental appropriation of property, or 
proportionality — that have been identified by members of the High Court. 
 
If, however, the textual foundation for the implication were found to extend beyond s 75(v) 
to Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution more generally, then some of the other 
elements might be incorporated. The elements associated with the separation of judicial 
power, and those that can be gathered around the theme of courts and the judiciary, could 
offer potential content for such an implication. Again, requirements such as the principle 
of legality, just compensation, and proportionality are unlikely to be incorporated in such 
an implication. 
 
523 McCloy (2015) 257  CLR 17 8, 229 [121] (Gageler J). 
524 Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 912 [94] (Edelman J). 
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The potential inclusion of the elements associated with the separation of powers should be 
treated cautiously. Their inclusion within an implication of the rule of law would, arguably, 
cloud the distinction between the rule of law and the structural separation of powers that 
the Commonwealth Constitution implements. This would provide an opportunity for 
competing justifications for some of the shared elements to emerge. Such an analytically 
compromised conception of the rule of law is not obviously advantageous. 
 
Ultimately, however, it is unclear how an implication of the rule of law would constrain 
legislative capacity. This lack of clarity follows from the uncertainty regarding what 
content — beyond the requirement of judicial review to the extent that it is already 
entrenched — would be incorporated. Without that content, it is not clear when the 
constraint would be enlivened. Given the abstract expression of the potential implication, 
it is less likely to be ‘one that has direct effect’.5 2 5  
 
III   THE STATE SUPREME COURTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
A conception of the rule of law derived from s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution is 
unlikely to extend to limit the legislative capacity of the State legislatures. This is because 
s 75(v) only entrenches the High Court’s jurisdiction with respect to writs sought against 
officers of the Commonwealth. As s 75(v) does not confer jurisdiction in respect of officers 
of the States, it does not provide a textual justification for extending an implication to the 
State level. 
 
However, there are academic suggestions that the Kable and Kirk principles may secure 
elements of the rule of law in respect of the States. This section will show that any 
conception of the rule of law secured by the Kable and Kirk principles will be limited, in a 
manner comparable to any implication resting on s 75(v), to a thin conception. However, 
this conception will focus on those elements of the rule of law associated with the 
characteristics of State Supreme Courts. This suggests that it would be a distinct 
implication.  
 
It is useful to start this consideration with a more detailed analysis of the Kable and Kirk 
principles.  
525  Graham (2017) 91  ALJR 890, 908 [75] (Edelman J). 
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A   Kable: The Institutional Integrity of Courts 
In Kable, a High Court majority determined that the State legislatures were prevented by 
the Commonwealth Constitution from infringing the integrity of the State Supreme 
Courts. The Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) purported to confer jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court to order the preventative detention of Gregory Wayne Kable.5 2 6  The 
High Court held that the conferral of this jurisdiction was ‘incompatible with the 
institutional integrity’ of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.5 2 7  The incompatibility 
arose from the ‘Supreme Court being required to act as a court in the performance of a 
function identified as not being a function for the judicial branch of government’.5 2 8 In 
Emmerson, the plurality stated that Kable stood for the principle that: 
 
State legislation which purports to confer upon a [State Supreme] court a power or function 
which substantially impairs the court’s constitutional integrity, and which is therefore 
incompatible with that court’s role as a repository of federal jurisdiction, is constitutionally 
invalid.529 
 
The limitation finds its source in the integrated court system established by Chapter III of 
the Commonwealth Constitution.5 3 0 
 
The Kable principle remains controversial. As Justice Heydon remarked in the Public 
Service Association case, it was coldly received by academic lawyers and has been much 
debated before the High Court.5 3 1  However, the High Court has continued to develop the 
constraint recognised in Kable. The plurality in Forge summarised the constraint: 
 
it is beyond the legislative power of a State so to alter the constitution or character of its 
Supreme Court that it ceases to meet the constitutional description of such courts.532 
 
An implication of their Honours’ analysis is that the State legislatures were constrained 
from distorting the ‘institutional integrity’ — understood as ‘those defining characteristics 
which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies’  — of State Supreme Courts 
526 Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW), ss 3, 5. 
527  Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 127  [15] (French CJ, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); citing Kable 
(1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 106-8 (Gaudron J), 122, 124 (McHugh J), 132-4 (Gummow J). 
528 Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 127  [16] (French CJ, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, and Keane JJ) (emphasis in 
original). 
529 Emmerson (2014) 253 CLR 393, 424 [40] (French CJ, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, and Keane JJ) 
(footnotes omitted). 
530 Ibid. 
531  Public Service Association (2012) 250 CLR 343, 467  [62]. 
532 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 7 6 [63] (Gummow, Hay ne, and Crennan JJ). 
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lest they cease being appropriate recipients of federal jurisdiction. 5 3 3  These defining 
characteristics include5 3 4  a requirement that judicial power be exercised consistently with 
the requirements of decisional independence and procedural fairness,5 3 5  adherence to the 
open court principle,5 3 6  and the obligation to give reasons for decision.5 3 7  
 
B   Kirk: The Entrenchment of Judicial Review 
The High Court has held that the State legislatures lack power to enact legislation that 
would deprive State Supreme Courts of their jurisdiction to grant relief for jurisdictional 
errors committed by inferior courts. In Kirk, the plurality recognised that it was necessary 
to take the constitutional requirement that each of the States have a State Supreme Court 
into consideration when construing ouster clauses enacted by the State legislatures.5 3 8 The 
High Court found that a colonial Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to grant the writ of 
certiorari for jurisdictional error could not be denied by an ouster clause.5 3 9  It considered 
that this jurisdiction was a defining characteristic of State Supreme Courts as they existed 
at Federation.5 4 0 Accordingly, legislation that would deprive a State Supreme Court of this 
jurisdiction was beyond the States’ legislative power. 5 4 1  However, the High Court 
acknowledged that legislation which ‘denies the availability of relief for non-jurisdictional 
error of law appearing on the face of the record is not beyond legislative power’.5 4 2  The 
High Court, subsequently, stated that its decision in Kirk ‘did not deny the competence of 
State legislatures to alter the substantive law to be applied’ in State courts.5 4 3  
 
533 Ibid. 
534 According to a list compiled by  French CJ: see Robert French, 'The Courts and the Parliament' (2013) 
87 (12) Australian Law Journal 820, 823. 
535 See, for example, International Finance Trust Company (2009) 240 CLR 319, 354 [54] (French CJ). 
536 See, for example, K-Generation Pty Limited (2009) 237  CLR 501, 520-1 [49] (French CJ). 
537  See, for example, Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 213-5 [54]-[59] (French CJ and Kiefel J). 
538 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580 [95] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); citing 
Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 [63] (Gummow, Hay ne, and Crennan JJ). This consideration was analogous to 
the ‘two fundamental constitutional considerations’ to be considered when construing ouster clauses in 
Commonwealth legislation that were identified in Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211  CLR 476, 512 [98] 
(Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby , and Hay ne JJ). 
539 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580 [97] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); citing 
Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan [1874] LR 5 PC 417 , 442 (Sir James Colv ille). 
540 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580-1  [98] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ). Extra-
judicially , French CJ described this characteristic as the ‘power to confine inferior courts and tribunals 
within the limits of their authority to decide’ by means of the prerogative writs; French, above n 534, 823. 
541  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 581 [100] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ). 
542 Ibid. 
543 Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption (2015) 256 CLR 83, 99 [29] (French CJ, Kiefel, 
Bell, and Keane JJ). 
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C   Kable and Kirk: the Imposition of the Rule of Law 
In Totani, Justice Hayne noted that the ‘implication which was drawn from Ch III in 
Kable, about the legislative power of the States, is also seen as giving practical effect’ to the 
assumption of the rule of law.5 4 4  
 
The Kable and Kirk principles have been the focus of academic consideration of how the 
Commonwealth Constitution could impose aspects of the rule of law as constraints on 
State legislative power. That Australian courts have not relied on either to take the step of 
reading down State legislative power to preserve some conception of the rule of law should 
be recalled throughout the following discussion. 
 
It is convenient to start with the Kable principle. Lindgren argued that Kable ‘entrenched 
within the State sphere an aspect of the rule of law, namely, a constraint on the exercise of 
political power’.5 4 5  Lindgren described Kable as the start of an ‘on-going development in 
Australian constitutional law’ with implications for the power of the ‘democratically 
elected legislatures and governments of the Australian states’. 5 4 6  This development 
recognised that the Commonwealth Constitution establishes an integrated system of 
courts, of which the State Supreme Courts are an ‘essential’ component.5 4 7  Chapter III, 
therefore, secures the institutional integrity of the State Supreme Courts from impairment 
by State legislation.5 4 8 
 
Allan relied heavily on Kable to support his argument that the Australian constitution 
incorporates the rule of law. According to Allan, the Community Protection Act 1994, as ad 
hominem legislation, fell ‘outside the concept of ‘law’ envisaged by, or implicit in, the ideal 
of the rule of law’.5 4 9  It did so by contravening the separation of judicial power. For Allan, 
that separation did not require formal entrenchment to limit legislative power. Rather, the 
judicial ‘obligation to affirm and preserve the rule of law’ provides a sufficient basis for a 
court determining that a law that detrimentally affects the separation of powers is 
544 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 , 91  [233]. 
545 Kevin Lindgren, 'Kable's Case and the Rule of Law' in Ian McDougall (ed), Cases that Changed Our Lives 
(LexisNexis UK, 2014) vol 2, 71, 80. 
546 Ibid 7 1. 
547  Ibid. 
548 Ibid. 
549 T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice - A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law  (Oxford University  Press, 2001), 
236. 
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unconstitutional. 5 5 0  Burton Crawford has persuasively argued that Allan’s idealised 
common law constitution departs ‘fundamentally’ from the Commonwealth 
Constitution. 5 5 1  Further, the High Court has found that effectively ad hominem legislation 
does not contravene the principle derived from Kable.5 5 2  
 
In Kirk, the High Court confirmed that the Commonwealth Constitution requires the 
continued existence of the State Supreme Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction with respect to 
jurisdictional error. Fearis argued that this confirmation provides a basis for securing the 
rule of law at the State level. Fearis’ argument rests on the recognition of the availability of 
judicial review as a requirement of the rule of law. For judicial review to be effective in 
enforcing the rule of law, the executive must not be able to ‘insulate its decisions from 
judicial supervision’.5 5 3  Accepting Dicey’s views concerning the significance of legality to 
the rule of law, Fearis argued that judicial supervision of the executive requires superior 
courts with jurisdiction to ensure that the officers of the executive do not step ultra 
vires.5 5 4  At the Commonwealth level, this jurisdiction is conferred by s 75(v) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. Comparable jurisdiction, Fearis observed, is conferred on 
the State Supreme Courts. 5 5 5  The State Supreme Courts have jurisdiction to award 
remedies in the nature of the constitutional writs.5 5 6  Further, as the ‘apex of the hierarchy 
of ‘ordinary courts’’ within each State, the State Supreme Courts are each required to have 
jurisdiction to supervise their inferior courts.5 5 7  Kirk confirms the entrenchment of this 
requirement by the Commonwealth Constitution.5 5 8 
 
Fearis’ argument implies that the rule of law constrains State legislative power. If the rule 
of law requires the State Supreme Courts to possess the supervisory jurisdiction necessary 
for judicial review with respect to jurisdictional error, then it must also prohibit the State 
legislatures from enacting laws that would diminish the potency of that jurisdiction. 
Without such a limit on legislative capacity, it would be open to the State legislatures to 
550 Ibid 238-9. 
551  Burton Crawford, above n 14, 200. 
552 See, for example, Knight v Victoria (2017) 91  ALJR 824. 
553 Edward Fearis, 'Kirk's New Mission: Upholding the Rule of Law at the State Level' (2012) 3 Western 
Australian Jurist 61 , 79. 
554 Ibid 80. 
555 Ibid. 
556 See, for example, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 66, 69. 
557  Fearis, above n 553, 80-1. 
558 Ibid 81; citing Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 581 [98]. 
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interfere with the jurisdiction of the State Supreme Courts and undermine the rule of law. 
The outcome of Kirk is consistent with such a limit on legislative capacity. However, the 
State legislatures retain the power to alter their courts’ jurisdiction to perform other forms 
of judicial review. In Kirk, the High Court emphasised protecting judicial review for 
jurisdictional error because of the need to preserve the potential of the State Supreme 
Courts to be receptacles for Commonwealth judicial power (as contemplated by s 71 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution). The High Court was not seeking to give effect to the rule of 
law more broadly. As in Kable, the High Court was only seeking to give effect to 
requirements imposed by Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
 
Informed by these broader interpretations of the Kable and Kirk principles, an argument 
could be advanced that the entrenchment of the State Supreme Courts’ supervisory 
jurisdiction entrenches the rule of law. However it is not obvious what the acceptance of 
such an argument would achieve. 
 
The problem for the argument arises from the overlap between those elements of the rule 
of law that it could protect and those that are already protected by the protection offered to 
the institutional integrity of State Supreme Courts. The argument posited earlier relies on 
an analogy between s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution and the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the State Supreme Courts. The jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs 
entrenched by s 75(v), according to the authorities considered in section C of part II of this 
chapter, can be understood as securing the availability of judicial review and thus the rule 
of law. However, s 75(v) arguably limits the scope of the elements of the rule of law that 
could be secured by an implication drawn from it. Following the logic of the analogy, a 
similar limit would apply to the scope of the elements of the rule of law secured by the 
entrenchment of the State Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. That focus on the 
State Supreme Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction might support an implication broad enough 
to encompass elements of the rule of law associated with the institutional integrity of 
superior courts, as such elements may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of 
that jurisdiction. On this basis it might protect some of the procedural requirements – 
such as the ability to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts – that have been recognised as 
elements of the rule of law. Though many of the other elements of the rule of law, such as 
the presumption against retrospectivity, would not be protected. To the extent that the 
argument does not appear to provide protection to a broader set of elements, it is not clear 
what it could be advanced to achieve.  
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Further, the elements that would be protected by the entrenchment of the rule of law, in 
accordance with this argument, are likely to overlap with those that are already protected 
by Kable and Kirk. In chapter 3, it was noted that the rule of law has been associated with 
the open courts principle and the right to a fair trial.5 5 9  Both of these are acknowledged to 
be defining characteristics of State Supreme Courts. Since they are defining characteristics 
of State Supreme Courts, they will be protected from legislative infringement by the Kable 
principle. It would be an indirect route to seek to protect the open courts principle by 
relying on its incorporation within the rule of law when its necessity to the State Supreme 
Courts’ integrity already protects it from legislative action. 
 
IV   CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RULE OF 
LAW 
 
The Commonwealth Constitution, via the Kable and Kirk principles, entrenches elements 
of the rule of law associated with courts and the judiciary. To the extent that it does so, 
those elements are protected from State legislative action. However, the Commonwealth 
Constitution does not contain a textual foundation for an implication capable of imposing 
all of the elements that would be incorporated in a thick conception of the rule of law. 
 
In neither Kable nor Kirk was the High Court expressly concerned with giving effect to a 
broader conception of the rule of law. To the extent that the Kable and Kirk principles 
secure elements of the rule of law that are also essential characteristics of State Supreme 
Courts, the question of whether there is any advantage to be gained by recognition of an 
implied conception of the rule of law remains open. This is a question that a court seeking 
to rely on the Kable or Kirk principles to recognise a further implied limit would need to 
resolve. 
 
 
559 See section D of part III of chapter 3 above. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE COMMON LAW 
 
Accepting that the rule of law has not been recognised as a constitutionally entrenched 
constraint on the capacity of a State legislature, the Momcilovic question prompts 
consideration of whether the common law protects it from legislative action. 
 
Central to this consideration is Chief Justice Gleeson’s description of the principle of 
legality as an aspect of the rule of law.5 6 0 Informed by that observation, it will be argued, 
from available authorities, that the protection from inadvertent legislative action offered 
by the principle of legality can extend to the rule of law. However, the principle of legality 
is better understood as protecting specific elements of the rule of law. The starting premise 
for this argument is recognition of the rule of law as a fundamental or skeletal principle of 
the common law. The common law of Australia will be introduced in part I. Some 
academic and judicial suggestions that the rule of law is a principle of the common law will 
be examined in part II. An argument that the rule of law could be a fundamental or skeletal 
principle of the Australian common law will be set out in part III. Ultimately, as will be 
argued in part V, any protection offered by the common law will be vulnerable to the 
clearly expressed intention of a State legislature. 
 
 
  
560 Electrolux Home Products (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21]. 
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I   THE COMMON LAW OF AUSTRALIA 
 
The common law, according to Chief Justice French, is a ‘body of principles or rules of law 
worked out on a case-by-case basis by courts in England’ and, since colonial settlement, in 
Australia.5 6 1  Consistently, Justice Basten explained that the common law is: 
 
normally understood to refer to principles or rules of substantive law which are, in some 
sense, derived from, or sourced in, judicial decisions. Some such principles have a long 
pedigree in case-law; others may derive from statute, in which event there could be an issue 
as to the relationship between the statute and the judicial exegesis. Underlying that 
question is the doctrine of precedent, which is best seen as a principle underpinning the 
methodology of decision-making in a “common-law” system.562 
 
The ‘judicially formulated principles’ of the common law are developed through a process 
of ‘identification and enunciation of principles that unify and explain earlier decisions’.5 6 3  
 
Justice Brennan, in Mabo (No 2), observed that the ‘law which governs Australia is 
Australian law’. 5 6 4  The historical and legal source of Australian common law is the 
common law of the United Kingdom. On settlement, the colonists imported as much of the 
common law as ‘was consistent with their then conditions’.5 6 5  However, as Brennan J 
noted, the Privy Council ‘held that the common law of this country might legitimately 
develop independently of English precedent’.5 6 6  His Honour argued that, due to the 
enactment of the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth), the Privy Council 
(Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth), and the Australia Act 1986 (Cth), the 
‘ultimate responsibility’ for declaring the common law of Australia had come to rest in the 
hands of the High Court.5 6 7  The High Court subsequently stressed that the Australian 
561  Robert French, 'The Common Law and the Protection of Human Rights' (Paper delivered to Anglo 
Australiasian Lawyers Society, Sydney, 4 September 2009) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj4sep09.pdf>. 
562 Bateman (2015) 90 NSWLR 7 9, 109 [137]; citing Mark Leeming, 'Theories and Principles Underly ing the 
Development of the Common Law - The Statutory Elephant in the Room' (2013) 36(3) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 1002 . 
563 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 339 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and 
McHugh JJ); see also Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 7 1, 115 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
564 Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1  ('Mabo (No 2)'), 29. 
565 Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1  Legge 312, 318. 
566 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 29; citing Australian Consolidated Press Limited v Uren (1967) 117  CLR 
221, 238, 241; compare Gleeson, above n 506, 80. 
567  Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 , 29. 
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common law ‘must conform with the [Commonwealth] Constitution’.5 6 8 This need for 
conformity will inform the on-going development of the Australian common law. It also 
reduces the weight to be afforded to statements by English courts that recognise the rule of 
law as a constitutional principle.5 6 9  
 
II   THE RULE OF LAW AS A COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE 
 
Whether the common law offers protection to the rule of law will depend on whether the 
latter is recognised by the former. Justice Dixon may have considered that the rule of law 
was an element of the common law foundation of the Commonwealth Constitution. This 
could illuminate his Honour’s assertion, considered in part I of chapter 5, that the rule of 
law is a traditional conception the Commonwealth Constitution assumes.5 7 0 If his Honour 
held such a view, it would imply that the rule of law is, somehow, incorporated in the 
common law. 
 
The assertion that the rule of law is incorporated in a common law constitution is central 
to Allan’s preferred method of constitutional interpretation. Allan argued that the ‘ideas 
and values of which the rule of law consists are reflected and embedded in the ordinary 
common law’.5 7 1  Allan asserted that these ideas and values, in Britain, also serve as a form 
of constitution. 5 7 2  Burton Crawford persuasively criticised the application of Allan’s 
account of common law constitutionalism to the Australian constitution.5 7 3  However, that 
critique does not comprehensively refute the possibility that the rule of law is incorporated 
in the common law. 
 
Goldsworthy, in the course of examining the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
suggested that the rule of law is understood in ‘[m]ost if not all common law jurisdictions’ 
as a common law principle.5 7 4  Goldsworthy asserted, without reference to authority, that 
the principle of the rule of law ‘unquestionably governs the decisions and actions of the 
executive and judicial branches of government’ as this principle was considered to 
568 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566. 
569 Such as Anufrijeva [2004] 1  AC 604, 621 [28] (Lord Steyn). 
57 0 See part I of chapter 5 above. 
57 1  Allan, above n 25, 4. 
57 2 Ibid. 
57 3 See, in summary , Burton Crawford, above n 14, 200. 
57 4 Goldsworthy, above n 311, 58. 
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constrain the legislative like the executive and the judicial branches. 5 7 5  Goldsworthy 
conceived the rule of law ‘first and foremost’ as a non-legal political principle (for the 
purposes of considering its compatibility with legislative sovereignty). 5 7 6  However, 
Goldsworthy accepted that ‘insofar as it is judicially enforcable’ it could also be a legal 
principle.5 7 7  
 
The lack of authority supporting Goldsworthy’s assertion is understandable. Remarkably, 
for all the judicial reference to the rule of law there has been minimal authoritative 
consideration of the status of the rule of law within the common law. A rare instance is 
NAAV, where Justice French observed that the ‘rule of law, so far as it is reflected in 
common law principle, came to Australia from England’.5 7 8 French J indicated that the 
rule of law could be seen in the common law’s assertion that the Crown ‘is subject to no 
man but to God and to the law’ (or, in the words of Bracton and Chief Justice Coke, ‘quod 
Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et lege’).5 7 9  His Honour considered that the 
rule of law could also be seen in the principle of legality.5 8 0 
 
A more substantive, though significantly less authoritative, judicial assertion that the rule 
of law forms part of the common law was advanced by Justice Blaxell in Thompson v 
McIntyre.5 8 1  Thompson sought a declaration that Stipendiary Magistrate McIntyre acted 
‘without jurisdiction and unlawfully’ when remanding him in custody. 5 8 2  Blaxell J 
considered that the circumstances invoked the rule of law, which his Honour described as 
‘one of the most fundamental principles of our system of justice’.5 8 3  Blaxell J argued that 
the rule of law formed part of the common law because it pre-dated parliaments and ‘was 
not to be found in any statute’.5 8 4  This observation echoed Justice Isaacs’ conception of 
fundamental principles. 5 8 5  Blaxell J drew two propositions from the rule of law. The first, 
57 5 Ibid. 
57 6 Ibid 58-9. 
57 7  Ibid 58. 
57 8 NAAV  (2002) 123 FCR 298, 416 [445]; compare Gleeson, above n 506, 6; quoting Dixon, above n 431, 42. 
57 9 NAAV  (2002) 123 FCR 298, 416 [444]; citing Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 64, 77  ER 1342; Case 
of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; W J V Windey er, Lectures on Legal History (Law Book Company, 2nd 
rev  ed, 1957)), 201-2. 
580 NAAV  (2002) 123 FCR 298, 416 [444]. 
581  [2006] WASC 218 (‘Thompson’). 
582 Thompson [2006] WASC 218, [4]. 
583 Ibid [18]; see Hart v Watt [2015] WASC 338, [37] (Pritchard J). 
584 Thompson [2006] WASC 218, [18]. 
585 Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37  CLR 36, 7 9. 
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echoing Dicey et al, was ‘equal standing before the law’.5 8 6  The second — that no-one, 
including a stipendiary magistrate, is above the law5 8 7  — is the converse of the first. Justice 
Blaxell explained that equality before the law incorporated every person in a polity sharing 
the ‘same basic rights and obligations as everyone else’.5 8 8 Principal among those was the 
right preserving an individual’s liberty and freedom from interference ‘except when 
permitted by law’.5 8 9  
 
However, the mere recognition of the rule of law as a common law principle does not 
render it a limit on legislative capacity. Initially, it is unclear what type of principle it might 
be. Further, if the rule of law is a common law principle, then that principle will be subject 
to the power, discussed in section A of part III of chapter 4, of the State legislatures to 
affect the common law (subject to the qualifications that will be considered in parts III and 
IV below). It is not inconceivable, in explanation, that a State legislature would seek to 
enact a provision to the effect that the elements of the rule of law do not apply to the 
procedures of a special tribunal. Such a provision would effectively displace the common 
law principle. To the extent that it is not immune from legislative action, the rule of law is 
incapable of constraining that action. 
 
III   COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The rule of law may have a more significant status than other common law principles. The 
available authorities suggest two related mechanisms that might secure the rule of law 
from legislative action. One is the controversial assertion that there are fundamental 
common law principles that control legislative action. The second is judicial deference to 
skeletal principles. 
 
Vital to both the potential mechanisms is recognition of the rule of law as a fundamental 
element of the common law. On the few available authorities, this point does not appear 
controversial. Extra-judicially, Sir Gerard Brennan asserted that the rule of law is the 
586 Thompson [2006] WASC 218, [18]; compare Green (2011) 244 CLR 462, 472-3 [28]. 
587  Thompson [2006] WASC 218, [20]. 
588 Ibid [21]. 
589 Ibid [19]; compare Ex parte O'Flanagan (1923) 32 CLR 518, 541-2. 
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‘axiomatic basis of the political/legal system’.5 9 0 It was ‘not to be found in a statutory 
text’.5 9 1  To the extent that it is not found in statute, or (as was shown in chapters 4 and 5) 
the Commonwealth Constitution, the only other legal source for the rule of law is the 
common law. 
 
A   The Ghost of Dr Bonham’s Case: Common Law Control of Legislation 
The first mechanism that could secure the rule of law is common law control of legislative 
activity. The purported ability of the common law to secure fundamental common law 
rights was noted by Justices Crennan and Kiefel in Momcilovic.5 9 2  This purported ability is 
commonly traced to Chief Justice Coke’s dictum in Dr Bonham’s case.5 9 3  Some criticisms 
of that dictum were outlined in part V of chapter 4. Those criticisms will not be repeated 
here. 
 
Lord Cooke formulated a distinct constraint. In Fraser v State Services Commission, 
Justice Cooke (then sitting in the New Zealand Court of Appeal) asserted that ‘some 
common law rights may go so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the courts 
to have destroyed them’.5 9 4  Adopting an example from Taylor v New Zealand Poultry 
Board, Cooke J doubted ‘that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be within 
the lawful powers of Parliament’.5 9 5  Cooke J also expressed a reservation: 
 
as to the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take away the rights 
of citizens to resort to the ordinary courts of law for the determination of their rights.596 
  
590 Gerard Brennan, 'Constitution, Good Government and Human Rights' (Paper delivered to the Human 
Rights Law Resource Centre, Melbourne, 12 March 2008) <http://hrlc.org.au/sir-gerard-brennan/>; 
compare Mitchforce (2003) 57  NSWLR 212, 237  [124] (Spigelman CJ). 
591  Brennan, above n 590; compare Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37  CLR 36, 79 (Isaacs J); Thompson [2006] WASC 
218, [18] (Blaxell J). 
592 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [562]. 
593 Dr Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 118a, 118a. 
594 Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1  NZLR 116, 121. 
595 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1  NZLR 394, 398. That suggestion is more problematic than 
it first appears. The United Kingdom Parliament cannot compel individuals by torture; see A v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221, 246 [11] (Lord Bingham). However, the rejection of 
torture took the form of an objection to the admissibility  of the fruits of torture into ev idence. It does not 
(even in the reports of the Proceedings against John Felton for the Murder of the Duke of Buckingham 
[1628] 3 St Tr 367) appear to have been a constraint on legislative capacity. 
596 New Zealand Road Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1  NZLR 374, 390. Cooke J, 
earlier, doubted whether it was ‘self-ev ident that Parliament could constitutionally’ confer the power to 
determine legal action on a body other than a court: L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519, 527. 
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Justice Toohey considered that Justice Cooke’s statements suggested a ‘revival of natural 
law jurisprudence’.5 9 7  This revival found few judicial sponsors in Australia. Acknowledging 
that Justice Cooke had presented the ‘clearest expression’ of the fundamental common law 
rights constraint, President Kirby rejected it.5 9 8 Justice Mahoney subsequently observed 
the suggestion had not been accepted by the High Court.5 9 9  In the Union Steamship case, 
the High Court noted Lord Reid’s rejection of the spectre of Dr Bonham’s case.6 00 That 
rejection preceded the stronger of Justice Cooke’s statements of the constraint. The High 
Court has, more recently, declined to explore whether the power conferred by s 5 of the 
Constitution Act was subject to the restraints contemplated by Justice Cooke.6 01  However, 
it is unlikely that an Australian court would solely rely on Justice Cooke’s dicta to find a 
statutory provision that purported to destroy a deeply rooted common law right beyond 
legislative power. Doing so would involve a significant alteration to the constitutional 
relationship between the courts and their respective legislatures. As will be argued in 
part IV, it is more likely that a court will rely on the principle of legality to protect a right 
from legislative action. 
 
B   Skeletal Principles 
Advancing a different proposition, Justice Brennan argued that some fundamental 
common law principles were sufficiently significant that they demanded judicial deference. 
His Honour’s argument was predicated on recognising that fundamental principles 
comprise the ‘skeleton’ of the common law. 6 02  The fundamental status of skeletal 
principles inspires judicial restraint,6 03  in so far as judges will be reluctant to dramatically 
alter them. In the context of Mabo (No 2), Justice Brennan stated that the rights and 
interests comprising native title should not be recognised by the common law if doing so 
would fracture a skeletal principle. 6 04  Brennan J observed that, when declaring the 
common law, the High Court was not at liberty to: 
 
597  Toohey , above n 27 , 167. 
598 Builders Labourers Federation (1986) 7  NSWLR 37 2, 404-5; citing British Railways Board v Pickin 
[1974] 1 AC 765, 782 (Lord Reid). 
599 Greiner v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1992) 28 NSWLR 125, 152; cited in Toohey, 
above n 27 , 168. 
600 Union Steamship Company (1988) 166 CLR 1 , 10. 
601 See Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 410 [14]. 
602 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 , 29-30; cited in Kirby , above n 429, 70. 
603 Kirby, above n 429, 70; citing Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 614-5 [70] 
(Kirby  J). 
604 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 , 43. 
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adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their 
adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape 
and internal consistency.605 
 
Accepting Justice Brennan’s characterisation of the rule of law as the axiomatic basis of 
Australian law, it, arguably, must qualify for recognition as a skeletal principle. It would 
attract the judicial deference that such principles are due in the development of the 
common law. In the unlikely circumstance that a court is confronted with a choice that 
could, for example, severely damage judicial immunity from civil suits (to the extent that 
the immunity is necessary to secure the finality of judicial determinations), then deference 
to the rule of law would be a reason weighing against that choice. That deference, however, 
is not a constraint on the exercise of legislative power by State legislatures. Where a 
legislature decides to fracture a skeletal principle, judicial deference will not heal it. 
 
IV   THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The interaction between the common law principle of legality and the rule of law is 
complicated. It involves an embrace between the recognition of the principle as an 
‘aspect’6 06  of the rule of law and the limited protection that the principle may afford the 
rule in a confrontation with a legislative action. The two parts of that embrace will be 
considered in this part. 
 
A   Legality as a Canon of Construction 
Chief Justice French, as noted earlier in this chapter,6 07  observed that the rule of law could 
be seen in the principle of legality. The principle of legality is a principle of statutory 
construction.6 08 The core of the principle of legality is a presumption that: 
 
  
605 Ibid 29. 
606 Electrolux Home Products (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21]; discussed further in section B below. 
607  See p 95 above. 
608 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196 ('Lee '), 307  [307] (Gageler and Keane JJ). 
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the Legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly 
declares either in express terms or by implication; or, in other words, beyond the 
immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters beyond, the law remains 
undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law without 
expressing its intention with irresistible clearness and to give such effect to general words, 
simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be 
to give them a meaning in which they were not really used.609 
 
The latter part of Maxwell’s canonical statement drew on Chief Justice Marshall’s 
statement that: 
 
[w]here rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the 
general system of laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with 
irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.61 0 
 
 
As a canon of construction, the principle is a factor a court can consider in the course of 
ascertaining legislative intention. 6 1 1  Accordingly, the principle sits alongside other 
canons — such as the ‘context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical 
construction’ and the ‘purpose of the statute’ being interpreted6 1 2 — that are considered 
when a court interprets legislation. 
 
While the core element of the principle of legality has long been accepted,6 1 3  its connection 
with the rule of law has only emerged during its recent development. That exposition is 
often traced to Bropho6 1 4  and Coco.6 1 5  In Bropho, a plurality of the High Court explained 
609 Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed, 1905), 122; quoted 
in Potter v Minahan (1908) 7  CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J) (footnotes omitted). The statement of this 
presumption in subsequent editions of On the Interpretation of Statutes should be treated cautiously : R v 
Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10 ('Janceski'), 24 [68] (Spigelman J); noted in James Spigelman, Statutory 
Interpretation and Human Rights (University of Queensland Press, 2008), 25. 
61 0 United States v Fisher 6 US (2 Cranch) 358 (1805), 390; cited in Maxwell, above n 609. 
61 1  Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] (McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby , and Hay ne JJ). 
61 2 Ibid.  
61 3 Justice O’Connor’s adoption of the ‘irresistible clearness’ principle was endorsed by  Chief Justice Griffiths 
in R v Snow  (1915) 20 CLR 315, 322. Variations of this element of principle have been stated on various 
occasions: see the examples collected by  Spigelman CJ in Durham Holdings Pty Limited v New South Wales 
(1999) 47  NSWLR 340, 353-4 [44] (cited in James Spigelman, 'Principle of Legality  and the Clear Statement 
Principle' (2005) 79(12) Australian Law Journal 769, 779). Lim has cautioned against relying on those roots 
to assert that the principle enjoys a ‘continuous historical pedigree’: Brendan Lim, 'The Normativ ity  of the 
Principle of Legality' (2013) 37  Melbourne University Law Review 372 , 373. 
61 4 Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1  (‘Bropho ’). 
61 5 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427  (‘Coco’). 
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that the rationale for the clear statement element of the principle — like the equivalent 
element of principles of construction such as the presumption against retrospective 
effect 6 1 6 — is ‘an assumption that the legislature would, if it intended to achieve the 
particular effect, have made its intention in that regard unambiguously clear’.6 1 7  The Court 
noted that if ‘such an assumption be shown to be or to have become ill-founded, the 
foundation upon which the particular presumption rests will necessarily be weakened or 
removed’.6 1 8 
 
In Coco, a plurality of the High Court restated the principle of legality. The plurality 
endorsed Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement that the ‘presence of general words in a 
statute is insufficient to authorise interference with the basic immunities which are the 
foundation of our freedom’ as consistent with previous statements by the High Court.6 1 9  
Authoritatively6 2 0 stating the principle, the plurality explained that the requirement that 
abrogation of a fundamental right must be expressly authorised: 
 
must be understood as a requirement for some manifestation or indication that the 
legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or 
curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms or immunities but has also determined upon 
abrogation or curtailment of them.621 
 
Their Honours continued: 
 
[t]he Courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental 
rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous 
language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically 
deal with the question because, in the context in which they appear, they will often be 
ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights.622 
 
This requirement was understood to enhance the ‘parliamentary process by securing a 
greater measure of attention to the impact of legislative proposals on fundamental 
61 6 See n 326 above. 
61 7  Bropho  (1990) 171 CLR 1 , 17-8 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh JJ). 
61 8 Ibid 18. 
61 9 Coco  (1994) 179 CLR 427, 436; citing Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] 1  AC 1054, 1065; Marcel v 
Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225, 234; Lord Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, 'The Infiltration of a Bill of 
Rights' (1992) Public Law  397, 404-8. 
620 Spigelman, above n 609. 
621  Coco  (1994) 179 CLR 427 , 437. 
622 Ibid; citing Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1 , 12 (Mason CJ). 
101  
 
                                                 
rights’.6 2 3  This understanding is a prelude to the bestowal of a constitutional guise on the 
principle. That guise will be further considered in the next section. 
 
The exposition of the principle in Coco foreshadowed its English restatement in Ex parte 
Pierson and Ex parte Simms. In Ex parte Pierson, Lord Steyn named the interpretive 
presumption the ‘principle of legality’.6 2 4  Lord Steyn suggested that the principle ‘served to 
protect procedural safeguards provided by the common law’ and applied with ‘equal force 
to protect substantive, basic or fundamental rights’.6 2 5  Lord Browne-Wilkinson similarly 
observed that a legislature should be ‘presumed not to have intended to change the 
common law unless it has clearly indicated such intention either expressly or by necessary 
implication’.6 2 6  
 
In Ex parte Simms, Lord Steyn applied the principle of legality to provisions of a standing 
order made under the Prisons Act 1952 (UK). Lord Steyn considered that the relevant 
paragraphs jeopardised a ‘fundamental or basic right’, specifically the right of an inmate to 
gain access to justice.6 2 7  Applying the principle of legality, his Lordship read down the 
standing order to leave this fundamental right ‘untouched’.6 2 8 Lord Hoffmann (who agreed 
with Lord Steyn) stressed the constitutional context of the principle. His Lordship 
conceded that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty meant that the legislative acts of 
the Westminster Parliament could affect human rights. 6 2 9  That power, however, was 
subject to political constraint. Lord Hoffmann explained that the principle gives effect to 
that constraint by requiring the Westminster Parliament to ‘squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost’.6 3 0 His Lordship explained the principle operates to 
protect fundamental rights: 
 
623 Coco  (1994) 179 CLR 427 , 437-8. 
624  Ex parte Pierson [1998] 1  AC 539, 587. Lord Stey n adopted the term ‘principle of legality’ from 
Butterworths, Halsbury's Laws of England, vol 8(2) (4th ed reissue, 1996) Constitutional Law and Human 
Rights, 13 [3], where the learned authors stated that the ‘legal basis of government gives rise to the principle 
of legality, sometimes referred to as the rule of law’; see R v JS (2007) 230 FLR 276, 288 [35] (Spigelman 
CJ). This connection between the principle of legality  and the rule of law informs Chief Justice Gleeson’s 
assertion that the former is an aspect of the latter in Electrolux Home Products; see section B of this part. 
625 Ex parte Pierson [1998] 1  AC 539, 589. 
626 Ibid 573. 
627  Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 130. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid 131. 
630 Ibid. 
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Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because 
there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have 
passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or 
necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most 
general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.631 
 
 
The High Court’s recent application of the principle of legality has focused on legislation 
that purports to affect human rights. However, the protection the principle offers extends 
to ‘fundamental principles’ and ‘the general system of laws’.6 3 2  This aspect of the principle 
was emphasised in X7. Justices Hayne and Bell, in the course of considering the powers 
conferred on the Australian Crime Commission, relied on the protection that the principle 
of legality affords to the ‘general system of law’. Their Honours considered that holding: 
 
that the general words of the relevant provisions of the [Australian Crime Commission] Act 
[2002 (Cth)] authorise compulsory examination of a person charged with an indictable 
Commonwealth offence about the subject matter of the offence charged would thus depart 
in a marked degree from the “general system of law”.633 
 
Hayne and Bell JJ considered that the Commission’s preferred construction of its enabling 
legislation would have negatively affected the accusatorial nature of the criminal justice 
system.6 3 4  Applying the principle of legality, their Honours considered that a fundamental 
alteration to that system ‘could only be made by a statute if made clearly by express words 
or by necessary intendment’.6 3 5  Meagher observed that their Honours’ statement that the 
operation of the principle was ‘not confined to legislation which may affect rights’6 3 6  
revived an element of the principle that had withered.6 3 7  Meagher suggested that this 
revival was significant because it could ‘provide robust protection to those “defining 
characteristics” of Australia’s common law system of justice that our courts identify and 
recognise’.6 3 8 Justices Gageler and Keane subsequently endorsed the revived operation of 
this aspect of the principle in Lee. Their Honours observed:  
631 Ibid. 
632 Maxwell, above n 609. 
633 X7  (2013) 248 CLR 92, 132 [87]. 
634 Ibid. 
635 A v Maughan (2016) 50 WAR 263, 272 [32] (Martin CJ; McLure P and Corboy  J agreeing); citing X7 
(2013) 248 CLR 92, 142-3 [124]. 
636 X7  (2013) 248 CLR 92, 132 [87]. 
637  Dan Meagher, 'The Common Law Principle of Legality ' (2013) 38(4) Alternative Law Journal 209, 212; 
citing Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10, 23 [62] (Spigelman CJ); Malika Holdings Pty Limited v Stretton 
(2001) 204 CLR 290 ('Malika Holdings'), 298 [28] (McHugh J). 
638 Meagher, above n 637, 213. 
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[a]pplication of the principle of construction is not confined to the protection of rights, 
freedoms or immunities that are hard-edged, of long standing or recognised and 
enforceable or otherwise protected at common law. The principle extends to the protection 
of fundamental principles and systemic values.639 
 
The principle of legality’s ability to secure fundamental principles and systemic values 
arguably encompasses the rule of law. In AXA General Insurance, Lord Reed stated that 
the principle stops the Westminster Parliament from overriding ‘fundamental rights or the 
rule of law by general or ambiguous words’.6 4 0 The available authorities suggest that the 
rule of law would attract comparable protection in Australia. Judicial statements — such as 
Sir Gerard Brennan’s statement quoted in part III of this chapter6 4 1  — indicate a basis for 
recognising the rule of law as either a ‘fundamental principle’ or ‘characteristic’6 4 2  of the 
‘general system’ of the Australian law. However, such protection is limited. The nature of 
the principle means that a legislature, such as the New South Wales Legislature, retains the 
power to override the rule of law by unambiguous words. 
 
B   The Quasi-Constitutional Status of the Principle of Legality 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to address the not uncontroversial6 4 3  description of the 
principle of legality as a ‘quasi-constitutional ‘manner and form’’ requirement. 6 4 4  
Goldsworthy argued that statements such as Lord Hoffmann’s statements in Ex parte 
Simms, suggested that use of the principle of legality amounted to the judiciary imposing 
requirements intended to enhance the accountability of legislatures to their electorates.6 4 5   
 
In contrast, Chief Justice Spigelman considered that the various common law principles 
that were subsumed into the principle of legality 6 4 6  were ‘accurately characterised as quasi-
639 Lee (2013) 251  CLR 196, 310 [313]. Gageler J subsequently  cautioned that the principle prov ides ‘little 
assistance’ where the ‘statutory  language’ squarely  addresses the relevant right (Northern Australian 
Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569 ('Northern Australian 
Aboriginal Justice Agency'), 605-6 [81]) and against its ‘[u]nfocused invocation’ (Independent Commission 
Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1  ('Cunneen'), 35 [88]). 
640 AXA General Insurance v HM Advocate [2012] 1  AC 868 ('AXA General Insurance '), 946 [152]; citing Ex 
parte Pierson [1998] 1  AC 539, 575 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
641  Brennan, above n 590; see p 96-7  above. 
642 Meagher noted that the task of identify ing the defining characteristics of the general sy stem of law 
remains with the courts; Meagher, above n 637, 213. 
643 See Goldsworthy, above n 324; Burton Crawford, above n 14, 152. 
644 Goldsworthy, above n 311, 309. 
645 Ibid 306, 308-9. 
646 See Spigelman, above n 609, 27-9. 
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constitutional’. 6 4 7  Accepting that those principles were rebuttable presumptions 
concerning legislative intention, Spigelman CJ considered that they reflected ‘fundamental 
assumptions about the relationship between citizen and state’.6 4 8 His Honour suggested 
that the fundamental nature of such principles justified treating them ‘as part of 
constitutional law’. 6 4 9  Justice Basten observed that the ‘High Court has somewhat 
enigmatically recognised the constitutional significance of the rules of statutory 
interpretation’.6 5 0  Chief Justice French suggested that the principle of legality can be 
‘regarded as ‘constitutional’ in character’.6 5 1  
 
Chief Justice Gleeson emphasised the constitutional aspect of the principle of legality in 
Electrolux Home Products. Acknowledging Justice McHugh’s earlier protest that ‘modern 
legislatures regularly enact laws that take away or modify common law rights’,6 5 2  Gleeson 
CJ endorsed the Coco plurality’s statement of the principle.6 5 3  Echoing Lord Hoffmann’s 
statements in Ex parte Simms, Chief Justice Gleeson stressed that the principle: 
 
is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to 
have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to 
Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. The 
hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.654  
647  Ibid 56. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid 55. 
650 John Basten, 'The Principle of Legality  - An Unhelpful Label?' in Dan Meagher and Matthew Groves (eds), 
The Principle of Legality in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2017) 74, 75-6; citing Zheng v 
Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455-6 [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); and quoting Lacey 
v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 591-2 [43] (French CJ, Gummow, Hay ne, Crennan, Kiefel, 
and Bell JJ). 
651  Robert French, 'Human Rights Protection in Australia and the United Kingdom: Contrasts and 
Comparisons' (Paper delivered to Anglo-Australian Lawy ers Society  and Constitutional and Administrative 
Law Bar Association, London, 5 July  2012) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov .au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj05july12.pdf>; 
quoted in Dan Meagher, 'The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems' 
(2014) 36 Sydney Law Review  413, 419; see also French, above n 534, 827 ; Robert French, 'Foreword' in 
Dan Meagher and Matthew Groves (eds), The Principle of Legality in Australia and New Zealand 
(Federation Press, 2017) v , vii. 
652 Electrolux Home Products (2004) 221  CLR 309, 328 [19]; citing Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty 
Limited (2003) 214 CLR 269, 284 [36] (McHugh J). 
653 Electrolux Home Products (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [20]. 
654 Ibid 329 [21]. This dictum, while strictly  obiter, has been cited with approval on numerous occasions; see, 
for example, Australian Education Union v General Manager, Fair Work Australia (2012) 246 CLR 117 , 
134-5 [30]; Lee (2013) 251 CLR 196, 309 [312]; Northern Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (2015) 256 
CLR 569, 581-2 [11]. The suggestion that statutory construction is an aspect of the rule of law can be traced to 
Lord Bridge’s observation that the rule of law under the English constitution ‘rests upon twin foundations: 
the sovereignty  of the Queen in Parliament in making the law and the sovereignty  of the Queen’s courts in 
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Chief Justice Gleeson’s dictum in Electrolux Home Products built on his analysis in Al-
Kateb.6 5 5  There his Honour asserted that the principle was ‘an expression of legal value’ 
rather than a ‘factual prediction’.6 5 6  Two aspects of the Electrolux Home Products dictum 
are significant. The first is the relationship between the principle of legality and the rule of 
law. The second is the description of the principle as a hypothesis known by both the 
legislature and the judiciary. 
 
Recognition of the principle of legality as a hypothesis known to the legislature and the 
judiciary explains its description as a quasi-constitutional principle. Meagher suggested, 
based on a line of authority, that the principle has been transformed from an ‘interpretive 
fiction’ 6 5 7  to a statement from the judiciary that it will guard certain common law rights 
and freedoms from legislative encroachment.6 5 8 To the extent that the principle, like some 
other principles of statutory interpretation, is a declaration by the judiciary of how it will 
approach the task of interpreting a legislature’s actions, it clearly emerges from the 
relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. That relationship is constitutional. 
This may confer ‘constitutional significance’ on the relationship. However that significance 
does not extend to rendering those principles judicially enforceable constraints on the 
scope of legislative power. For a principle of statutory interpretation to have that effect, it 
would have to be implied from an entrenched constitutional text (such as the entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution Act or the Commonwealth Constitution) rather than merely 
emerging from the constitutional relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. To 
the extent that the description of such principles as ‘constitutional’ or ‘quasi-constitutional’ 
suggests more than judicial acknowledgement that constitutional arrangements are their 
source, it is apt to mislead. 
 
Returning to Chief Justice Gleeson’s description of the relationship between the principle 
of legality and the rule of law, it is unclear why the former needs to be incorporated as an 
aspect of the latter. The core element of the principle of legality, as was shown earlier in 
this chapter, is a long accepted principle of statutory construction. That core does not 
appear to require additional justification, or to obtain significant validation, from 
interpreting and applying the law’; X Limited v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Limited [1991] 1  AC 1, 48; 
quoted in French, above n 534, 822. 
655 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 ('Al-Kateb'). 
656 Ibid 577 [20]. 
657  Malika Holdings (2001) 204 CLR 290, 299 [29] (McHugh J); quoted in Meagher, above n 651, 420. 
658 Meagher, above n 651, 420. 
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association with the rule of law. This suggests that Chief Justice Gleeson’s dictum should 
be treated cautiously. 
 
C   Protection of the Elements of the Rule of Law 
A fundamental problem for the argument that the principle of legality could protect the 
rule of law is why the principle should protect the rule of law as a comprehensive concept 
rather than protecting each of its composite elements. A central proposition of that 
argument must be that the rule of law is a ‘systemic value’ or a significant element of the 
general system of laws. This may follow from acceptance of the proposition — advanced in 
chapters 2 and 3 — that the rule of law is a shorthand phrase that encompasses a range of 
elements. However, several of these elements are independently protected by the principle. 
Spigelman CJ, for example, noted that access to the courts,6 5 9  freedom of speech,6 6 0 and 
legal professional privilege6 6 1  had been protected.6 6 2  It is arguable that other elements of 
the rule of law would independently attract the protection conferred by the principle. As 
the principle requires a statutory provision that inadvertently affects a fundamental right 
or systemic value to be read down, its application will require a right or value to be 
identified.6 6 3  The process of identifying the affected right or value is likely to focus on an 
element of the rule of law — such as freedom of association — rather than the rule of law as 
a systemic value. In explanation, the principle may be called upon to inform the 
construction of a provision intended to prohibit members of a proscribed organisation 
from meeting at proscribed locations. A poorly drafted provision could, inadvertently, 
restrict other residents of the polity from gathering at the proscribed locations. The 
application of the principle to the provision should focus on the freedom of association as a 
fundamental right rather than as a requirement imposed by the rule of law. In such a case, 
the rule of law could bolster the importance of its component element. However, 
depending on the pedigree of the element, that support may be unnecessary.  
659 See Magrath v Goldsbrough Mort and Company Limited (1932) 47  CLR 121, 134 (Dixon J); Plaintiff 
S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 47 6, 492-3 [30]-[32] (Gleeson CJ). 
660 See Nationwide News (1992) 177  CLR 1 , 31  (Mason CJ); Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 125-7 , 130 
(Lord Stey n). 
661  See Y uill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 322 (Brennan J), 338 (Gaudron J); Daniels Corporation (2002) 213 CLR 
543, 553 [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, and Hay ne JJ); R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Limited) v Special 
Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1  AC 563, 606-7 [7]-[8] (Lord Hoffmann). 
662 Spigelman, above n 609, 27-8. 
663 See Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1 , 35 [86] (Gageler J). 
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V   CONCLUSION: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
This chapter has shown that it is arguable that the common law could protect the elements 
of the rule of law. In particular, it has shown that the principle of legality may secure 
elements of the rule of law from inadvertent legislative action. 
 
However, the common law’s ability to protect the rule of law, or its elements, from 
deliberate action by a State legislature is constrained. Returning to a proposition discussed 
in part III of chapter 4, the power conferred by s 5 of the Constitution Act includes the 
capacity to enact laws that abrogate fundamental rights. The principle of legality is 
impotent in the face of a clearly expressed legislative intention. This leaves the rule of law, 
and its elements, vulnerable. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE RULE OF LAW AND EXTREME LAWS 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to answer the Momcilovic question. That question, as stated in 
chapter 1, asked whether the rule of law imposes a limit on the power of the State 
legislatures to enact laws. 
 
I   POTENTIAL ANSWERS 
 
If this thesis has not conclusively answered the Momcilovic question, the preceding 
chapters have, at least, confirmed Justices Crennan and Kiefel’s observation that it is a 
large question that involves consideration of the Commonwealth Constitution.6 6 4  
 
The preceding chapters have also shown that there are several potential answers to the 
Momcilovic question. These answers have accepted that the rule of law should be 
understood as a shorthand phrase that encapsulates a range of elements. This approach 
was posited, in part IV of chapter 2, as a convenient means of accommodating the various, 
potentially conflicting, elements attributed to the rule of law. The diversity of the elements 
that have been recognised by senior Australian jurists was shown in chapter 3. That survey 
also illustrated the consistency between judicial and academic conceptions of the rule of 
law. 
 
One potential answer to the Momcilovic question — the possibility that the rule of law is a 
political ideal — was set aside. While, in part I of chapter 2, it was shown that the rule of 
law is commonly understood as a political ideal, it was further shown, in part I of 
664 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1 , 216 [563]. 
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chapter 4, that such an ideal would not be judicially enforceable. Lacking judicial 
enforcement, the rule of law cannot effectively constrain legislative action. 
 
A significant answer — that the rule of law has not been recognised as a judicially 
enforceable constraint on the capacity of the New South Wales Legislature — was 
confirmed in chapter 4. It was shown that the Constitution Act does not expressly impose 
the rule of law as a constraint on the legislative power conferred by s 5. It was also shown 
that the Commonwealth Constitution does not expressly impose such a constraint on the 
State legislatures. It was further shown that the rule of law has not been recognised as a 
constraint implied from the text or structure of the Commonwealth Constitution that 
limits the power of the State legislatures even though other constitutional implications 
may, effectively, secure some of the recognised elements of the rule of law, such as 
requirements concerning judicial review, against legislative abrogation. 
 
In light of the answer reached in chapter 4, it was appropriate to consider whether the rule 
of law could be recognised as a constraint on the New South Wales Legislature by a court 
confronted with a statute that purports to abrogate its elements. Two aspects to that 
question were addressed concurrently in the course of chapters 5 and 6. The first was the 
legal question: whether there was a legal, in that it was capable of being given effect 
judicially, basis for recognition of the constraint? The second was practical: what would 
recognition of the rule of law as a constraint achieve? This latter question will be further 
considered in part II of this chapter. 
 
Picking up Justices Crennan and Kiefel’s suggestion that an answer to the Momcilovic 
question might require consideration of the Commonwealth Constitution, chapter 5 
identified two potential textual foundations in the Commonwealth Constitution that could 
support an implication of the rule of law. The first is Chapter III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution generally and s 75(v) more specifically. Members of the High Court — 
including the plurality in Plaintiff S157/2002 — have suggested that s 75(v) is a textual 
anchor for the rule of law. However, that anchor, if it were recognised to provide the 
foundation for a constitutional implication, would not secure more than a thin conception 
of the rule of law, a conception focused on securing the legality of governmental action. 
Further, it was argued, in part II, that an implication derived from s 75(v) would not 
necessarily limit the capacity of a State legislature. An alternative potential foundation 
might be provided by the references to State Supreme Courts, in Chapter III of the 
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Commonwealth Constitution, that underpin the Kable and Kirk principles. Via those 
principles, the entrenched concept of a State Supreme Court could serve as the foundation 
of an implication that constrains the State legislatures. It was argued in part III that those 
references could secure those elements of the rule of law that are associated with the 
essential characteristics of State Supreme Courts, such as the open courts principle and 
judicial impartiality. This would be a thin set of elements, but a set that could include some 
of the more significant elements of the rule of law. As was shown in chapter 5, many of 
these elements are defining characteristics of State Supreme Courts and already attract the 
protection offered by the Kable and Kirk principles. This conclusion raises the 
fundamental problem of what further assistance could be provided by an implied 
conception of the rule of law. This problem was left unresolved. 
 
Justice Dixon’s recognition, in the Australian Communist Party case, of the rule of law as 
a traditional conception assumed by the Commonwealth Constitution was also considered 
in chapter 5. Justice Dixon’s dictum has informed judicial consideration of the relationship 
between the Commonwealth Constitution and the rule of law. Accepting that an assumed 
conception lacks the ability of an entrenched constitutional implication to limit the 
exercise of Federal, or State, legislative power, and following suggestions offered by 
Justices McHugh and French, it was argued that constitutional assumptions — such as the 
rule of law — could assist to resolve conflicts over the construction of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. It is in this role that the rule of law may ultimately prove most useful. 
 
Finally, the potential for the common law to protect the rule of law was examined in 
chapter 6. There, it was argued that the judicial recognition of the significance of the rule 
of law suggests that the common law could protect it. Part II of chapter 6 showed that the 
rule of law could be recognised as a fundamental common law principle. Two related 
mechanisms — common law protection of fundamental principles and judicial deference to 
skeletal principles — were shown, in part III, to offer it limited protection. That protection 
is limited because both means, since they emerge from the common law, are vulnerable to 
express legislative action. Thus, the New South Wales Legislature could (in theory, even if 
the precise means might require creative drafting) legislate to abrogate or abolish the 
protection that they offer. A similar weakness was shown, in part IV, to limit the ability of 
the principle of legality (despite its quasi-constitutional status) to protect the rule of law 
from legislative abrogation. 
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II   CIRCUMSTANCES FOR RECOGNITION OF THE RULE OF LAW AS A 
LIMIT 
 
The earlier chapters of this thesis avoided a threshold issue related to the Momcilovic 
question: in what circumstances would a court recognise the rule of law as a constraint on 
the capacity of a State legislature? In this part it will be suggested that this itself is a large 
question. A question that properly warrants a thesis of its own or, should the circumstance 
arise, extensive judicial consideration. However, the groundwork for an answer further 
illuminates the Momcilovic question. 
 
Lord Craig, of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, suggested an answer to the 
related question. In AXA General Insurance, Lord Craig said that the rule of law, as a 
constitutional principle, requires that superior courts retain the power to insist that 
extreme laws — such as legislation abolishing their judicial review jurisdiction or 
diminishing their ability to protect individuals — are not laws that courts will recognise.6 6 5  
His Lordship’s observation was prompted by a concern that it was ‘not entirely 
unthinkable that a government’ with the necessary legislative ‘power may seek to use it to 
abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts’.6 6 6  Lord Craig’s dictum 
suggests two factors salient to judicial recognition of the rule of law as a constraint on 
legislative capacity. First, the challenged law would need to be sufficiently extreme. 
Secondly, it would need to affect legality and the exercise of judicial power. Each of these 
factors will be outlined in turn. 
 
 
  
665 AXA General Insurance [2012] 1  AC 868, 913 [51]. 
666 Ibid; citing R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262, 293 [71] (Lord Steyn). 
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A   Extreme laws 
In AXA General Insurance, the insurers alleged that the Damages (Asbestos-Related 
Conditions) Act 2009 (Scotland) was outside the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament. Lord Craig set aside the question of whether the rule of law was among the 
limits on that competence6 6 7  (similarly to Justices Crennan and Kiefel in Momcilovic). As 
observed above, however, his Lordship considered that the rule of law required courts to 
be capable of refusing to recognise extreme laws. This observation echoes those dicta 
(noted in part V of chapter 4 and discussed in section A of part III of chapter 6) that ripple 
from Dr Bonham’s Case, though it purports to give effect to the constitutional principle 
rather than to the common law. 
 
In Australia, judicial power itself could provide a bulwark against most extreme laws. 
Justice Kirby argued, in Durham Holdings, that Chapter III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution could provide the foundation for the judicial response to an extreme law. 
Kirby J pointed to Kable as an ‘illustration’ of how the Commonwealth Constitution ‘can 
sometimes afford protections’ from extreme State legislation.6 6 8 Kirby J suggested that an: 
 
attempt to impose on State courts functions incompatible with the exercise of judicial 
power and due process of law might, in a given case, contravene the presuppositions of 
Ch III of the [Commonwealth] Constitution. If this is so, an extreme case may well be 
constrained by other implications derived from the Constitution, which limit and control 
the lawmaking of other branches of the government of a State, including a Parliament of a 
State.669 
 
Justice Kirby’s comments reiterate the significance of Chapter III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, a chapter shown to be salient to consideration of the rule of law. However, 
they also suggest that it is unlikely that a court will recognise the rule of law as a limit on 
State legislative power in response to an extreme law. This is because an Australian court, 
confronted with a law that is an affront to the values attributed to the rule of law, is more 
likely to resort to the acknowledged limits imposed on legislative power by Chapter III (as 
it did in Kable and Kirk) than take the radical step of implying the rule of law from the 
terms or structure of the Commonwealth Constitution. While possible foundations for 
such an implication were identified in chapter 5, a court will appreciate that striking down 
a law that it deems inconsistent with the rule of law (in any of the guises identified in this 
667  AXA General Insurance [2012] 1  AC 868, 913 [51]. 
668 Durham Holdings (2001) 205 CLR 399, 430-1 [73]. 
669 Ibid 431  [73] (citations omitted). 
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thesis) risks provoking a conflict with the legislature.6 7 0 The potential consequences of this 
risk are likely to dissuade a court from taking the radical step of striking an extreme law 
down for inconsistency with a requirement of the rule of law. It remains open to a court 
confronted with an extreme law, and seeking to avoid confronting its legislature, to 
criticise it for failing to meet the requirements imposed by the rule of law. This approach 
would be consistent with recognition of the rule of law as a political, or even constitutional, 
ideal. 
 
Further, the requirement of extremity reduces the number of laws that could prompt 
recognition of the rule of law as a constraint. Threats to the rule of law, as Chief Justice 
Gleeson observed, originate from small encroachments.6 7 1  However, small encroachments, 
such as enacting laws with retrospective effect or shielding mundane executive decisions 
behind privative clauses, are unlikely to be sufficiently extreme to prompt a court to 
consider whether they contravene the implications of Chapter III, let alone warrant 
recognition of the rule of law as a constraint on legislative capacity. This suggests that a 
situation drastic enough to require recognition of the rule of law as a constraint on State 
legislative power is unlikely to arise. 
 
 
  
67 0 Compare Basten, above n 34, 50. 
67 1  Gleeson, above n 506, 5. 
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B   Affecting Legality 
If inconsistency with Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution provides the primary 
method for invalidating extreme laws, it is unclear why it would be necessary to invoke the 
rule of law. Lord Craig, as noted earlier in this part, suggested that English legislation 
abolishing judicial review might be precluded by the rule of law. The rule of law, if it is 
recognised as a principle derived from the Commonwealth Constitution, might offer 
similar protection. In chapter 5, it was argued that if the rule of law was derived from 
s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution, then the content of that implication would 
focus on those elements associated with securing legality (which were identified in 
chapter 3). This could result in a position equivalent to Lord Craig’s view of the United 
Kingdom constitution. However, at the State level, the Kable and Kirk principles support 
Justice Basten’s suggestion that ‘any hypothetical attempt to remove the supervisory 
jurisdiction of a State Supreme Court might be found to be inconsistent with Chapter III’ 
of the Commonwealth Constitution. 6 7 2  Accordingly, it would be necessary for the 
challenged State law to affect an element of the rule of law that is not also a defining 
characteristic of a State Supreme Court. A number of such elements — the presumption 
against regularity and the entitlement to just compensation for governmental 
appropriation of property, for example — were identified in chapter 3. However, many of 
these were shown to be within the scope of State legislative power. This seems to further 
reduce the potential circumstances in which a court would take the drastic step of 
recognising the rule of law as a constraint on State legislative capacity. 
 
 
  
67 2 Basten, above n 34, 51. 
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III   CONCLUSION 
 
To provisionally answer the Momcilovic question, this thesis has shown that the rule of 
law, understood as a shorthand phrase encompassing a range of elements, has not been 
recognised as a constraint on the capacity of the New South Wales Legislature. It has 
shown that some of the elements that may be incorporated within that concept have, 
independently, been recognised as such constraints. It has further shown that there may be 
foundations for recognising the rule of law as such a constraint. However, it has also 
suggested that a court is only likely to take that drastic step when confronted with a 
sufficiently extreme law that threatens its jurisdiction to enforce the legality of the actions 
of the other branches of government. This conclusion, to provide a fuller answer to the 
Momcilovic question, suggests that the rule of law is unlikely to be recognised as a 
constraint on the capacity of the New South Wales Legislature. 
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